Ingram v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 13 March 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 5:15-HC-2279-FL,5:15-HC-2279-FL
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: WINSOR DEVONE INGRAM, Petitioner, v. DENNIS DANIELS, Respondent.

WINSOR DEVONE INGRAM, Petitioner, v. DENNIS DANIELS, Respondent.

NO. 5:15-HC-2279-FL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA WESTERN DIVISION

March 13, 2017

ORDER

The matter comes before the court on respondent's motion for summary judgment (DE 7) and motion to dismiss (DE 11). The issues raised have been fully briefed and are ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, the court grants respondent's motions.

STATEMENT OF CASE

On November 18, 2011, petitioner was convicted, following a jury trial¹ in Wayne County Superior Court, of first degree murder. See State v. Ingram, 227 N.C. App. 383, 741 S.E.2d 906, (2013). Petitioner was tried non-capitally, and the jury was not given the option of imposing a death sentence. The superior court sentenced petitioner to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id. Petitioner appealed, and, on July 15, 2014, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found no error in petitioner's conviction or sentence. Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court denied petitioner's counseled petition for discretionary review ("PDR") on September 3, 2013. (Resp't Ex.3 (DE 9-3). Petitioner was represented at trial by Mr. Charles R. Gurley and on appeal by Mr. M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr.

On October 16, 2014, petitioner filed a pro se motion for appropriate relief ("MAR") in Wayne County Superior Court. (Resp't Ex. 10 (DE 9-10)). The superior court denied petitioner's MAR on May 6, 2015. (Resp't Ex. 11 (DE 9-11)). On August 5, 2015, petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of certiorari in the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which was denied on August 21, 2015. (Resp't Ex. 14 (DE 9-14)). On August 31, 2015, petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of certiorari in the North Carolina Supreme Court, which was denied on November 5, 2015. (Resp't. Ex. 17 (DE 9-17)).

On November 19, 2015,² petitioner filed the instant pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 asserting the following grounds for relief: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss; (2) the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder; (3) prosecutorial misconduct; (4) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (5) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

On June 29, 2016, respondent filed both a motion for summary judgment, arguing that petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits of his claims and a motion to dismiss on the grounds that petitioner's habeas petition was filed outside of the statute of limitations, and therefore is time-barred. The motions were fully briefed. On June 30, 2016, the clerk of court issued a Rule 56 letter in compliance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975). Petitioner respondedto the motions. As part of his response, petitioner filed an appendix consisting of the following exhibits: (1) citations to the trial transcript and other excerpts from the trial record; (2) his MAR; (3) a letter of investigation for North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services ("NCPLS"); and (4) his own affidavit, which was prepared for him by a NCPLS attorney prior to completing her investigation.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts as summarized by the North Carolina Court of Appeals are as follows:

On the afternoon of 10 September 2007, T.K., then ten years old, returned home from school. She observed her cousin, Tamorris Raynor (Raynor), emerging from the home. A man in a white t-shirt, whom T.K. had seen before, exited a gray automobile and spoke with Raynor. The man and Raynor went behind the house. After the man met with Raynor, he departed in his vehicle, parked it around the corner by a funeral home, and returned to the property via a concealed, wooded path.

When T.K. returned, she heard gunfire and saw Raynor come around the house. The other man came around the house and shot Raynor. T.K. gave a statement to the police. She identified the photograph of Windsor Ingram (defendant) from a photographic lineup as the man who shot Raynor.

Ernest Raynor (Ernest), Raynor's uncle, ran outside after hearing shots and found Raynor on the ground. He saw a man flee down a path and get into a gray Lincoln LS automobile. Ernest described the man as being 5'8" or 5'9", wearing a white t-shirt, white cap, and jeans.

Telephone records revealed that Raynor had used Ernest's telephone to call two different phone numbers that day, one of which was that of defendant's cellphone.

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation. His first trial ended in a mistrial when the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. The case was tried a second time before a jury at the 14 November 2011 Criminal Session of the Superior Court for Wayne County. The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

State v. Ingram, 227 N.C. App. 383, 384, 741 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2013).

DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss

1. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of initially coming forward and demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party then must affirmatively demonstrate that there exists a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint but "does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). A complaint states a claim if it contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Asking for plausible grounds . . . does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal [the] evidence" required to prove the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Furthermore, the complaint need not set forth "detailed factual allegations," but instead must simply "plead sufficient facts to allow a court, drawing on 'judicial experience and common sense,' to infer 'more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'" Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). In evaluating the complaint, "[the] court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff," but does not consider "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, . . . bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[,] . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Id. at 255 (citations omitted).

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must keep in mind the principle that "a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, Erickson does not undermine the requirement that a pleading contain "more than labels and conclusions." Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Furthermore, while a pro se complaint must be construed liberally, it is not the court's obligation "to discern the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff." Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n. 3 (4th Cir. 2006).

2. Analysis

a. Statute of Limitations

The court first addresses whether petitioner's § 2254 action is time-barred. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a writ of habeas corpus by aperson in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court must be filed within one year. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The period begins to run from the latest of several dates:

A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application . . . is removed . . .; C) the date on which the constitutional right was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Id.

The running of the "period of limitation" under § 2244(d)(1) is tolled during the time "a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557, 561 (4th Cir. 1999). An application for post-conviction or other collateral review is pending from initial filing until final disposition by the state court. See Taylor, 186 F.3d at 561.

The statutory period began to run in this case on the date petitioner's judgment became final. Petitioner's conviction became final on December 2, 2013, 90 days after the North Carolina Supreme Court denied his PDR. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 (providing 90 days in...