Ingram v. Greyhound Corp., 37165

• Decision Date: 23 June 1958
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 37165,37165,1
• Citation: 104 S.E.2d 658,97 Ga.App. 892
• Parties: A. M. INGRAM v. GREYHOUND CORPORATION et al
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 658

104 S.E.2d 658

97 Ga.App. 892

A. M. INGRAM v. GREYHOUND CORPORATION et al.

No. 37165.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

June 23, 1958.

Rehearing Denied July 14, 1958.

Syllabus by the Court

The plaintiff's petition failed to set forth a cause of action against The Greyhound Corporation and the trial court did nor err in sustaining its general demurrer and in dismissing the action as to it.

A. M. Ingram sued The Greyhound Corporation doing business as Southeastern Greyhound Corporation, and Telesphon J. Beaudet for injuries and damages sustained in a double collision involving the motor vehicles of all of the parties. It was alleged that the plaintiff's automobile, which he was driving, was first struck by Beaudet's vehicle and then by a bus being operated in the course of the corporate defendant's business by its bus operator. The corporate defendant filed general and special demurrers to the plaintiff's petition; after amendments to the petition and renewal of demurrers, the corporate defendant's general demurrers were sustained, and it is to this judgment that the plaintiff excepts. No question as to the liability of the defendant Beaudet is presented in this appeal.

Northcutt, Edwards & Johnston, W. S. Northcutt, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Gambrell, Harlan, Russell, Moye & Richardson, S. Smythe Gambrell, James C. Hill, Edward W. Killorin, Hurt, Gaines, Baird, Peek & Peabody, W. Neal Baird, Atlanta, for defendant in error.

NICHOLS, Judge.

The allegations of the plaintiff's petition, succinctly stated, alleged that the collisions occurred on Northside Drive in the City of Atlanta, that such street is approximately 39 feet wide and divided into four marked lanes, that the defendant Beaudet was traveling south in the outer lane for southbound traffic, that the plaintiff was traveling north in the single northbound lane nearest the center of the roadway, that all three vehicles were observing the speed laws, that the corporate defendant's bus, like the plaintiff, was traveling north on such street, that the corporate defendant's bus was not as far north as the plaintiff's vehicle, that such bus was approximately 10 feet behind the plaintiff's vehicle and had been for some time, that the vehicle being driven by the defendant Beaudet turned left and crossed over the intervening traffic lane between it and the lane in which the plaintiff was traveling and drove into and against the left side of the plaintiff's vehicle, that the impact of the collision pushed the plaintiff's vehicle to the plaintiff's right to a point about midway of the outer northbound traffic lane where, not more than one second later, the plaintiff's vehicle was struck by the corporate defendant's bus, and that such collisions caused the injuries and damages sued for. As concerned the alleged negligence of the defendants, certain ordinances of the City of Atlanta were pleaded. The one ordinance which dealt with the alleged negligence of the corporate defendant was as follows: 'The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and condition of the street, so that he will have the vehicle he is operating under control and be able to stop same in safety in an emergency.' The negligence charged to the corporate defendant charged that it failed to use ordinary care to avoid injuring the plaintiff, that it failed to lengthen the distance between its bus and the plaintiff's vehicle when it saw that the vehicle of the defendant Beaudet was approaching from the opposite direction, that it was following the vehicle of the plaintiff more closely than was reasonable and prudent having due regard for the traffic...