Ingram v. Interstate Motor Freight Systems
| Decision Date | 21 July 1982 |
| Docket Number | Docket Nos. 51796,53263 |
| Parties | Arthur W. INGRAM and Louise Ingram, Plaintiffs, v. INTERSTATE MOTOR FREIGHT SYSTEMS, a Michigan corporation, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AJAX ROLLED RING COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant. Arthur W. INGRAM and Louise Ingram, Plaintiffs, v. INTERSTATE MOTOR FREIGHT SYSTEMS, a Michigan corporation, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AJAX ROLLED RING COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee. 115 Mich.App. 559, 321 N.W.2d 731 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[115 MICHAPP 560] Davidson, Gotshall, Kohl, Secrest, Wardle, Lynch & Clark by Roger F. Wardle and Cynthia Cooper Adkison, Farmington Hills, for Interstate Motor Freight Systems.
Conklin, Loesch & Caravas, Southfield, and Plunkett, Cooney, Rutt, Watters, Stanczyk & Pedersen by John P. Jacobs and Raymond W. Morganti, Detroit, of counsel, for Ajax Rolled Ring Co.
[115 MICHAPP 561] Before GILLIS, P. J., and BEASLEY and DEEGAN, * JJ.
On October 13, 1975, a tractor and trailer owned by Interstate Motor Freight Systems (Interstate) and driven by its employee, Ernest Cesarone, was backed up to the freight dock of Ajax Rolled Ring Company (Ajax) to be loaded with a shipment of Ajax's steel rings. A metal dock plate was used to facilitate the loading from the freight dock to the bed of the trailer. Plaintiff, an employee of Ajax, lifted several rings of steel with a hi-lo and began to load the rings onto the trailer by driving the hi-lo across the dock plate to the bed of the trailer. While the hi-lo was on the dock plate, the truck began to pull away from the dock. Plaintiff and the hi-lo landed in the loading well, causing injury to plaintiff.
Interstate's driver, Cesarone, testified by deposition that when he backed the trailer to the dock plate the trailer was not flush with the dock plate; that the dock plate was 2 to 4 inches above the lip of the trailer; and that when he stepped on the dock plate it did not go down with his weight. Cesarone testified that he told William Peet, another Ajax employee who assisted plaintiff in loading, that the trailer was not flush with the dock and that he was going to straighten it out. According to Cesarone, Peet nodded his head. Cesarone testified that, after the accident, he approached Peet and asked him why plaintiff had been allowed to load the steel when Peet knew that Cesarone was going to straighten the trailer. According to Cesarone, Peet stated that he had been wearing ear plugs and had not heard Cesarone, even though he had nodded. Peet testified that [115 MICHAPP 562] Cesarone did not tell him he was going to move the trailer before the accident and did not recall telling anyone that he had been wearing ear plugs. Cesarone, plaintiff and Peet all testified that there were no specific safety procedures in effect at Ajax at the time of the accident nor were any special safety devices required to be used.
Plaintiff brought suit against Interstate, alleging that his injury occurred as a result of the negligence of Interstate's employee.
Interstate filed a third-party complaint against Ajax alleging a contract between Ajax and Interstate pursuant to which Interstate agreed to pick up Ajax's products on Ajax's premises. The third-party complaint further alleged that, pursuant to the contract, Ajax either expressly or impliedly agreed to: (a) provide a safe place for the loading and unloading of Interstate's vehicles; (b) provide proper and necessary safety equipment for the loading and unloading of Interstate's vehicles; (c) provide properly trained personnel who were cognizant of the hazards attendant to the loading and unloading of Interstate's vehicles; (d) provide for utilization of reasonably safe procedures by its employees during the loading and unloading of Interstate's vehicles. The third-party complaint alleged that Ajax breached that contract by failing to provide proper safety measures and that, as a consequence of that breach, plaintiff suffered personal injuries for which he sought redress against Interstate. The third-party complaint sought to recover from Ajax, for their breach of contract, any sums paid by Interstate to plaintiff pursuant to the principal action. An amendment to the third-party complaint added an allegation that when Ajax contracted with Interstate, as described above, it impliedly agreed to indemnify Interstate if it breached any of the duties outlined above.
[115 MICHAPP 563] Ajax filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that Interstate had failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted and that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding Ajax's liability. The motion was denied. Ajax appeals that decision in Docket No. 51796.
Interstate was then permitted to file a second amended third-party complaint requesting common-law indemnity from Ajax in an amount equal to the percentage of damages allocable to Ajax's breach of the duties owed to Interstate, i.e., comparative indemnity.
Ajax moved for summary judgment based on failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This motion was granted by the trial judge. Interstate appeals that decision in Docket No. 53263.
Before proceeding, we note here that neither of the claims alleged are barred by provisions of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, M.C.L. Sec. 418.101 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(101) et seq. Although the act would preclude an action for contribution from Ajax, indemnity, either contractual or common-law, is permissible. McLouth Steel Corp. v. A. E. Anderson Construction Corp., 48 Mich.App. 424, 210 N.W.2d 448 (1973).
We initially address Ajax's appeal in Docket No. 51796. Ajax presents a number of arguments, only one of which need be addressed: whether or not Interstate has alleged a colorable claim for breach of an implied warranty of workmanlike service.
The groundwork for this theory of liability was laid in Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133 (1956). In Ryan, a stevedoring company contracted to perform all the stevedoring operations required of a certain shipowner. In performance[115 MICHAPP 564] of this contract the stevedores loaded the ship in South Carolina with mixed cargo but did not properly secure a portion of the cargo. A few days later at a pier in Brooklyn a stevedore was injured while unloading the cargo.
The stevedore company's insurance carrier paid compensation under the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act. As permitted by the act the injured employee sued the shipowner on theories of unseaworthiness and negligence. The shipowner filed a third-party complaint against the stevedore company for indemnity, which complaint was dismissed by the trial judge. The appeal from this dismissal reached the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that the stevedore company had breached its warranty of workmanlike service. The Court explained that the stevedore company's agreement to perform all of the shipowner's stevedoring operations necessarily included an obligation to perform the work properly and safely. The Court compared the warranty of workmanlike service to a manufacturer's warranty:
350 U.S. at 133-134, 76 S.Ct. at 237. (Emphasis supplied.)
In an earlier part of the opinion the Court noted that indemnity for improper performance is part of the quid pro quo of the agreement.
"In the instant case, the stevedoring contractor, however, has received a contractual quid pro quo from the shipowner for assuming responsibility for the proper performance of all of the latter's stevedoring requirements, including the discharge of foreseeable damages resulting to the shipowner from the contractor's improper performance of those requirements." 350 U.S. at 129, fn. 3, 76 S.Ct. at 235, fn. 3. (Emphasis in original.)
Maritime cases subsequent to Ryan further developed and applied this theory of breach of warranty of workmanlike service. See Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 78 S.Ct. 438, 2 L.Ed.2d 491 (1958); Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421, 81 S.Ct. 200, 5 L.Ed.2d 169 (1960); Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423, 79 S.Ct. 445, 3 L.Ed.2d 413 (1959); Italia Societa per Azioni di Navagazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., Inc., 376 U.S. 315, 84 S.Ct. 748, 11 L.Ed.2d 732 (1964).
Once firmly established, it was not long before this theory of indemnity was being applied in other areas of the law. In Diamond State Telephone Co. v. The University of Delaware, 269 A.2d 52 (Del.1970), the University of Delaware hired Diamond State Telephone to run a cable into one of the university buildings. While...
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