Ingram v. Lumpkin

• Decision Date: 19 April 2021
• Docket Number: Civil No. SA-20-CA-01148-XR
• Parties: JAMES INGRAM, JR., TDCJ No. 02153629, Petitioner, v. BOBBY LUMPKIN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

JAMES INGRAM, JR., TDCJ No. 02153629, Petitioner, v. BOBBY LUMPKIN, Director,Texas Department of Criminal Justice,Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.

Civil No. SA-20-CA-01148-XR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

April 19, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are pro se Petitioner James Ingram, Jr.'s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1), Petitioner's Memorandum in Support (ECF No. 2), and Respondent Bobby Lumpkin's Answer thereto (ECF No. 11). Having reviewed the record and pleadings submitted by both parties, the Court concludes Petitioner is not entitled to relief under the standards prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner is also denied a certificate of appealability.

I. Background

In August 2017, a Gonzales County jury found Petitioner guilty of assault on a public servant. Following a separate punishment proceeding, the trial court found that the two enhancement paragraphs included in the indictment to be true and sentenced Petitioner to twenty-five years of imprisonment. State v. Ingram, Jr., No. 210-16-B (25th Dist. Ct., Gonzales Cnty., Tex. Aug. 22, 2017) (ECF No. 12-2 at 65-66).

The Texas Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction in an unpublished opinion on direct appeal. Ingram, Jr. v. State, No. 13-17-00490-CR (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg, Dec. 6, 2018, pet. ref'd); (ECF No. 12-16). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) then refused his petition for discretionary review (PDR). Ingram, Jr. v. State, No. 1367-18 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 10, 2019).¹ On August 15, 2019, Petitioner filed a state habeas corpus application challenging the constitutionality of his state court conviction, but the TCCA eventually denied the application without written order on March 11, 2020, based on the findings of the trial court and on the court's own independent review of the record. Ex parte Ingram, Jr., No. 89,506-02 (Tex. Crim. App.); (ECF Nos. 13-12, 13-19 at 21).

Petitioner initiated the instant proceedings on September 25, 2020, by filing a petition for federal habeas relief and supplemental memorandum in support. (ECF Nos. 1, 2). In the petition and supplemental memorandum, Petitioner raises two grounds for relief: (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction for assault on a public servant, and (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the use of an Oklahoma conviction for enhancement purposes. Respondent, relying exclusively on the state court's adjudication of these claims during Petitioner's direct appeal and state habeas proceedings, argues federal habeas relief is precluded under the AEDPA's deferential standard. (ECF No. 11).

II. Standard of Review

Petitioner's federal habeas petition is governed by the heightened standard of review provided by the AEDPA. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254. Under § 2254(d), a petitioner may not obtain federal habeas corpus relief on any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of that claim either: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the statecourt proceeding. Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). This intentionally difficult standard stops just short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996)).

A federal habeas court's inquiry into unreasonableness should always be objective rather than subjective, with a focus on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable" and not whether it was incorrect or erroneous. McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120 (2010); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003). Even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable, regardless of whether the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion itself. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Instead, a petitioner must show that the decision was objectively unreasonable, which is a "substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). So long as "fairminded jurists could disagree" on the correctness of the state court's decision, a state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). In other words, to obtain federal habeas relief on a claim previously adjudicated on the merits in state court, Petitioner must show that the state court's ruling "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 103; see also Bobby v. Dixon, 565 U.S. 23, 24 (2011).

III. Merits Analysis

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence (Claim 1).

Petitioner first contends the State failed to present legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction for assault on a public servant. Specifically, Petitioner contends the evidence was insufficient to establish that the victim actually suffered bodily injury or that Petitioner recklessly caused this injury. Petitioner's allegation was rejected by the state appellate court on direct appeal and again by the TCCA when it refused Petitioner's PDR. As discussed below, Petitioner fails to show that either court's determination was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, federal law, or that it was an unreasonable determination of the facts based on the evidence in the record.

1. Relevant Facts

On direct appeal, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals accurately summarized the evidence presented at Petitioner's trial:

The State first called Officer Daniel Torres of the Luling Police Department. At the time of [Petitioner]'s offense, Torres was employed with the Nixon Police Department. Torres initiated a traffic stop of [Petitioner]'s vehicle after he observed [Petitioner] driving. Torres was aware that [Petitioner]'s license was suspended, and he confirmed that fact over the computer prior to the traffic stop. According to Torres, [Petitioner] ignored the flashing police lights and continued to drive a short distance until he parked at his residence. Once there, [Petitioner] exited his vehicle, and Torres informed [Petitioner] he was being placed under arrest for driving without a license. Torres repeatedly instructed [Petitioner] to place his hands behind his back, but [Petitioner] refused to comply. [Petitioner]'s girlfriend and wife were also present at the scene.

After [Petitioner] failed to comply with Torres's commands, Torres attempted to grab [Petitioner]'s arm to place him under arrest. According to Torres, when he grabbed [Petitioner]'s arm, [Petitioner] "pushed with both hands and punched" in one simultaneous motion, striking Torres in the chest and in the face. The strike knocked Torres into the lawn tractor beside him, but he regained his balance and successfully placed [Petitioner] under arrest. Torres explained the strike caused his face to sting, caused it to be sore that night, and caused it to be swollen the next day.

Torres radioed for back up, and Deputy Jared Brumme of the Gonzales County Sheriff's Office responded to the call. Brumme testified that when he arrived he noticed Torres was a bit shaken from the struggle with [Petitioner] and that Torres had a small amount of redness on his cheek area.

As his witnesses, [Petitioner] called his girlfriend, Darcy Clifton, and his wife, Carolyn Thomas. Clifton testified that Torres pushed [Petitioner] as he attempted to put handcuffs on him and that [Petitioner] then pushed Torres back, causing him to trip over the lawnmower. Clifton denied seeing [Petitioner] punch Torres. Thomas testified that [Petitioner] and Torres "started tussling" as Torres attempted to handcuff [Petitioner]. As they struggled, according to Thomas, both Torres and [Petitioner] fell. Thomas testified she never saw [Petitioner] strike Torres.

Ingram, Jr. v. State, No. 13-17-00490-CR (ECF No. 12-16 at 2-3).

2. Reviewing Sufficiency Claims Under AEDPA

In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), the Supreme Court enunciated the standard of review when a state prisoner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. The Court stated the issue to be "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. In applying this standard, the Court went on to say that "[t]his familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Id. Thus, all credibility choices and conflicts in inferences are to be resolved in favor of the verdict. United States v. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d 907, 911 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Nguyen, 28 F.3d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1994).

In addition, AEDPA imposes a "twice-deferential standard" when a federal court reviews a state prisoner's claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 43 (2012). As the Supreme Court has explained:

The opinion of the Court in Jackson v. Virginia . . . makes clear that it is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set

...