Ingram v. Rankin

• Decision Date: 14 October 1879
• Citation: 2 N.W. 755,47 Wis. 406
• Parties: INGRAM v. RANKIN and others
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

2 N.W. 755

47 Wis. 406

INGRAM v. RANKIN and others

Supreme Court of Wisconsin

October 14, 1879

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Jefferson County.

Action to recover the value of a quantity of hay, wheat and oats which the plaintiff claims to own, and which, he alleges, was wrongfully taken from his possession by the defendants and converted to their use. Defendants took the hay and grain by virtue of an execution upon a judgment in their favor against one Hammond, the owner in fee of the land upon which the same was raised and found. Plaintiff had a lease of the land from Hammond for six months from its date, March 6, 1875; and the chattels were seized during that term.

Defendants appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The errors which they alleged in the instructions, are stated in the opinion.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded for new trial.

For the appellants, there was a brief by Coleman & Spence, their attorneys, and C. A. Eldredge, of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. Spence.

Edward S. Bragg, for the respondent.

OPINION

DAVID TAYLOR, J.

The appellants assign as errors, that the circuit judge erroneously instructed the jury as to the measure of damages the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and erred in instructing the jury, in substance, that the written lease under which the plaintiff asserted his right to the possession of the land upon which the grain and hay in controversy were raised, was valid and not impeachable for fraud.

It is insisted by the learned counsel for the respondent, that the leasing of real estate by a judgment debtor could not be in fraud of his creditor, as it in no way interferes with the judgment creditor's right to seize and sell such real estate upon his judgment; and especially in this case it could not be in fraud of any such creditor, because the lease did not continue but for one year, as it would have been impossible for the creditor to have obtained any right of possession to the real estate, by virtue of his judgment, within the year. We are inclined to hold that the circuit judge was right in his view of this question, as explained by him to the jury, and that the instruction which was given to the jury upon that question was sufficiently favorable to the defendants. The instruction was as follows: "But, if the possession of the plaintiff was in reality the possession of Hammond--i. e., if there was an arrangement or understanding between them that the plaintiff should occupy for the benefit of Hammond, that the crop should be raised on the land for his use and benefit, or that whatever the plaintiff might do on the land should be for the advantage and benefit and in the interest of Hammond,--then the crop raised was the individual property of Hammond, and was subject to execution against him, and your verdict must be for the defendant."

It is apparent, from this instruction, that the court fairly submitted to the jury the question whether the lease was merely colorable, and intended as a mere cover, to be used for the purpose of securing to the lessor, the judgment debtor, the benefit of the crops raised on the leased premises, in fraud of his creditors; and this, certainly, was the only question in issue between the parties, which could be litigated in the action. If there was no understanding either expressed or implied, between the lessor and the lessee, that the crops raised on the leased premises should enure to the benefit and advantage of the lessor, there could be no question of fraud in the case; and it was true, in the sense in which the learned circuit judge understood the case, that the lease itself could not be impeached for fraud.

Upon the question of damages, the court instructed the jury as follows: "Testimony has been given in respect to the value of this property; not the value of the property at the time it was taken, but the highest value of this property at any time since the property was taken, to the present time. If the plaintiff be entitled to recover, he is entitled to recover the highest value of the property within that period of time, from the time it was taken to the present time." To this instruction the defendants duly excepted.

After a careful consideration of the decisions of this court upon the question as to the rule of damages in actions of this kind, and an examination of a large number of cases decided by the courts of other states in this country, and by the courts of England, we are satisfied that the rule as laid down by the learned circuit judge is not sustained by the weight of authority, and that it ought not to be adopted by this court upon principle. We think the rule adopted by the circuit court would in many cases work great injustice, and violate the rule that compensation for the plaintiff's loss is the true rule of damages in all cases in which he is not entitled to exemplary damages.

As it is urged by the learned counsel for the respondent that the circuit judge was constrained to give this instruction as to the measure of damages, upon the authority of the decisions of this court, it is but just that a full examination of the cases in this court should be had. As this court is now constituted, we would hesitate to set aside a rule of law which can fairly be said to have received the deliberate sanction of the court, in a case or series of cases calling for the settlement of such rule of law.

The first rule laid down by this court as to the measure of damages, and which is sustained by a large number of cases, is that the damages for which the plaintiff may recover must be the legal, natural and proximate consequences of the act complained of; and this rule is equally applied to actions for the breach of contract and for torts. Vedder v. Hildreth, 2 Wis. 427; Brayton v. Chase, 3 Wis. 456; Bradley v. Denton, 3 Wis. 557; Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355; Oleson v. Brown, 41 Wis. 413; Stewart v. City of Ripon, 38 Wis. 584. This rule is so well settled, both in this and all other courts, that it is unnecessary to cite other cases to sustain the same. This rule is only qualified, in this court, where the act complained of is of such a nature as to entitle the plaintiff to recover exemplary or punitory damages, in addition to compensatory damages.

It is unnecessary to cite cases either in this or other courts to sustain the universal rule of law, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover only compensatory damages, except in the cases above stated, when, under the decisions of this and some other very respectable courts, the plaintiff may recover exemplary or punitory damages.

The great controversy in the decisions and in the courts is as to what are and what are not compensatory damages, all the courts holding to the rule that compensation is the true measure of the damages to be recovered, except where exemplary damages are allowed; and, although there may have been some slight deviation and some dicta suggesting a different rule, the uniform current of opinion in this court has been, that in actions for the tortious conversion of chattels, or for a breach of contract by the nondelivery thereof, in the absence of any proof of circumstances showing that the plaintiff has suffered other specific and particular damages which were the natural and proximate result of the tort or breach of contract, the measure of damages is the value of the property at the time of the conversion, or at the time when the same was to be delivered, with interest thereon from such date to the day of trial. In this court, the rule above stated has been approved in the following cases:

Ainsworth v. Bowen, 9 Wis. 348, was an action for the conversion of a school land certificate, and the court say, Justice COLE delivering the opinion: "The measure of damages would be the value of the certificate at the time of such conversion." Nudd v. Wells, 11 Wis. 407, was an action against a carrier for the nondelivery of goods according to his contract. Justice PAINE, delivering the opinion of the court, says: "The general rule as to damages for nondelivery of goods by a common carrier is the value of the goods, with interest from the day when they should have been delivered;" citing Sedgwick on Damages as his authority for the rule. Meshke v. Van Doren, 16 Wis. 319. In this action an attachment had been issued by the plaintiff, and a quantity of wheat belonging to the defendant had been seized thereon. The attachment had been dissolved upon a trial upon the traverse of the affidavit; and the question was, what damages the defendant should recover against the plaintiff for the taking and detention of the wheat upon the attachment. Justice COLE, delivering the opinion, says:

"The testimony showed that wheat bore about the same market value when seized upon the attachment as when redelivered to the defendant. In the intermediate period it appears that there was a considerable rise in the price for a day or so. The defendant claimed that he should have the benefit of this rise in the value, although he did not show that he could or would have sold at that price. He was, of course, entitled to recover damages for any loss which he had sustained in consequence of being deprived of the use and control of his property during the pendency of the attachment, or for any injury thereto or loss thereof. . . . These damages the jury were directed to allow him under the rule laid down by the court; but to have permitted him to recover the difference between the highest market value of the wheat at any time during the pendency of the attachment, and the value when redelivered to him, without giving any testimony that he could or would have availed himself of that opportunity to sell, it seems to us would have been erroneous. Such a...