Ingram v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 07 December 1972
• Docket Number: No. 72-1353.,72-1353.
• Citation: 471 F.2d 1268
• Parties: Ulys INGRAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Elliot L. RICHARDSON, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

471 F.2d 1268 (1972)

Ulys INGRAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Elliot L. RICHARDSON, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 72-1353.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

December 7, 1972.

William A. Watson, Middlesboro, Ky., Watson & Watson, Middlesboro, Ky., on brief, for plaintiff-appellant.

Robert M. Murphy, Asst. U. S. Atty., Lexington, Ky., for defendant-appellee; Eugene E. Siler, Jr., U. S. Atty., Lexington, Ky., on brief.

Before WEICK, PECK and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

WEICK, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from the District Court's order which denied appellant's objections to the Report and Recommended Decision of the United States Magistrate, adopted the Magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant in a proceeding brought to review the Secretary's denial of Social Security disability insurance benefits to the plaintiff-appellant, Ulys Ingram.

Ingram has not worked since May, 1964, and had been receiving public assistance benefits until he applied for Social Security benefits; he receives food stamps.

On December 9, 1964, Ingram filed his application with the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, to establish a period of disability, which application was denied. He was then given a hearing before a Hearing Examiner who denied his claim on June 30, 1965, and the Appeals Council declined to review the Examiner on September 29, 1966.

Ingram filed his complaint in the District Court to review the decision of the Secretary, on November 28, 1966. There the case remained until January 7, 1969, when the District Court, upon motion of Ingram, remanded it to the Secretary for further administrative action. That action was taken by the Appeals Council, and the Council made its report on June 10, 1969, which report was sent to the District Court.

On December 23, 1971, the Magistrate's Report and Recommended Decision was filed. A copy of the report, received by Ingram, was his only notice of the reference to the Magistrate, according to Ingram's counsel.¹ Appellee's counsel advised us that all Social Security disability cases are now referred to the Magistrate, and we are informed that there are many of them.

Ingram filed objections to the report, which were denied by the Court on January 7, 1972.

Appellant has raised no question in this Court as to the propriety of the reference to the Magistrate, but we conceive it to be our duty to notice and pass upon obvious irregularities appearing on the face of the record.

28 U.S.C. § 636, which provides for jurisdiction and powers of Magistrates, expressly authorizes:

"(1) service as a special master in an appropriate civil action, pursuant to the applicable provisions of this title and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States district courts; . . ."

Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

"(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and of difficult computation of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it."

The leading case on the subject of reference to a Master under Rules 53(b), is LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 77 S.Ct. 309, 1 L.Ed.2d 290 (1957), which involved two large and complex antitrust lawsuits under the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman Act. Eighty-seven retailers sued six manufacturers and distributors of shoe repair supplies. The case had taken a long time to prepare for trial, and the trial was expected to last at least six weeks. District Judge LaBuy, on his own motion, referred the case to a Master. One of the reasons given by Judge LaBuy for the reference was his congested court calendar. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued writs of mandamus compelling Judge LaBuy to vacate his orders of reference, and held that no exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Rule 53(b) permitting a reference, were present. The Supreme Court upheld the Seventh Circuit.

The Supreme Court held that the antitrust cases before Judge LaBuy should not have been referred to a Master. The Court specifically addressed itself to the question of congestion as a reason for reference of a case to a Master. "Congestion in itself is not such an exceptional circumstance as to warrant a reference to a master." 352 U.S. 249, 259, 77 S.Ct. 309, 315 (1957). Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Clark stated that if congestion were a basis for reference to a Master, then "present congestion would make reference the rule rather than the exception." 352 U. S. at 259, 77 S.Ct. at 315. The Court further rejected the view that complexity of the antitrust suit which Judge LaBuy referred to a Master was an appropriate basis for reference. However, no one here contends that the appellant's case was complex. The only apparent basis for the reference to a Magistrate appears to be congestion of the docket.

The Supreme Court found in LaBuy that the orders of reference "amounted to little less than an abdication of the judicial function depriving the parties of a trial before the court on the basic issues involved in the litigation." 352 U.S. at 256, 77 S.Ct. at 313. Similarly, here, it would appear that there has been a delegation of the judicial function to a Magistrate, which was not authorized by statute.

The Supreme Court quoted the following language from Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 1942):

"Litigants are entitled to a trial by the court, in every suit, save where exceptional circumstances are shown."²

In 9 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, 789-790, it is stated that beyond matters of account, damages, and supervision of discovery, "it is difficult to conceive of a reference of a nonjury case that will meet the rigid standard of the LaBuy decision."

Crowded court calendars may be a problem in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Reference of cases to Magistrates, however, is not the proper solution of the problem. The proper solution of a crowded docket rests with the Congress. District Courts, of course, can do much and, as pointed out in LaBuy, have done much, to relieve crowded dockets by sound judicial administration and enlightened procedural techniques (352 U.S. at 259, 77 S.Ct. 309); but the problem of a crowded docket must not be allowed to close the door to a litigant who has a statutory right of review by a court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Nor should Social Security disability insurance cases be singled out and referred to a Magistrate for disposition, while other civil actions are not so referred.

42 U.S.C. § 405(h) provides:

"No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided."

It is the Secretary, and not a Magistrate or a District Court, who adopts findings of fact. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides:

"The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . ."

Thus the function of the District Court is only to determine whether the findings and decision of the Secretary are supported by substantial evidence. O'Brien v. Finch, 415 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1969).

It would place a greater burden upon the appellant here if he is required to overturn not only findings of fact of the Secretary, but also findings of the Magistrate which have been adopted by the District Court.

It is not our understanding that all civil cases in the Eastern District of Kentucky are as old as the present case before they are reached for trial. Since the function of the District Court is only to determine whether the decision of the Secretary is supported by substantial evidence, these cases could be briefed, argued and decided long before other civil cases are at issue particularly where discovery or other protracted proceedings are conducted. Social Security disability cases usually involve poor persons who are receiving public assistance, and there is no good reason why their cases should be shunted in favor of other civil actions. It was error for the District Court to refer the case to the magistrate.

IS THE DECISION OF THE SECRETARY SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE?

Claimant was a male, 53 years old, who lived with his wife and five of his children (under 18 years of age) in a small four-room house that had no bath; the house was located on Route 2, Middlesboro, Kentucky. He was 5 feet 11 inches tall and weighed about 140 pounds. He had a sixth grade education and was able to read and write. After leaving school claimant worked as a laborer in construction, mining, and carpentry. His earnings requirement under Social Security Act was met prior to his claimed disability on May 23, 1964, and extended through September 30, 1964. It was therefore necessary for him to prove that he was under disability as defined by the Act prior to October 1, 1964.

Claimant's physician, Dr. J. C. Ausmus, Jr., who attended him regularly twice a month, reported in writing on September 3, 1964, that Ingram became disabled on March 7, 1964. Dr. Ausmus' diagnosis was:

"1 Diaphramatic pleuritis on the right side.

2 Chronic bronchitis severe.

3 Peptic ulcer.

4 Degenerative arthritis hands, ankles, knees.

5 Psychoneurosis."

He had "severe constant chest pain in right lower lobe aggravated by motion and activity." In his report Dr. Ausmus further stated:

"Mr. Ingram at this time is suffering from a temporary total disability. Whether he can be returned to work depends upon his response to therapy which will require approximately another 6 months."

The period of temporary total disability, according to Dr. Ausmus, was at least one year, but subsequent...