Ingram v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.

Decision Date30 September 2020
Docket NumberCASE NO. 8:16-cv-2406-T-23AAS
PartiesWALTER INGRAM, Applicant, v. SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
ORDER

Ingram applies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) and challenges his conviction for first-degree premeditated murder, for which Ingram is imprisoned for life. Numerous exhibits ("Respondent's Exhibit ___") support the response. (Doc. 9) The respondent both admits the application's timeliness (Doc. 9 at 14-15) and argues that some grounds are not fully exhausted and, as a consequence, are procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 9 at 15-20)

I. BACKGROUND1

Ingram lived with Hope Frazier whom he considered his "god-sister." Frazier was dating a neighbor named Glenn Dilworth. The couple argued often and Ingram tried to mediate. On October 1, 2009, Ingram saw Frazier and Dilworth arguing and tried to separate them. Dilworth left but later returned and asked Ingram to comeoutside to talk. When Ingram went outside, Dilworth pointed a gun at him and, using a racial epithet, called to him. Ingram — upset — went back inside and told others what happened. Ingram said that he was tired of Dilworth and intended to kill him, but no one took Ingram seriously.

Dilworth again called to Ingram to come outside. Ingram tried to ignore Dilworth, but eventually Ingram went outside with a knife and the cardboard tube from an empty roll of paper towels. Ingram first hit Dilworth with the cardboard tube. When Ingram thought Dilworth grabbed for his gun, Ingram stabbed him with the knife, which killed him. Ingram retreated to his home and left.

Ingram was arrested and charged with first-degree murder. At his trial Ingram testified that he stabbed Dilworth in self-defense. The jury found Ingram guilty as charged, and the judge sentenced Ingram to the mandatory term of life imprisonment.

II. COGNIZABILITY, EXHAUSTION, AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

The respondent argues that Ground One, Ground Two in part2, and Ground Six are procedurally barred from federal review because either Ingram failed to fully exhaust his available state court remedies or the state court dismissed the federal claims as facially insufficient. An applicant must present each claim to a state court before raising the claim in federal court. "[E]xhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners 'fairly presen[t]' federal claims to the state courts in order to give theState the 'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). Accord Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-19 (1982) ("A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error."). "To provide the State with the necessary 'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present' his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (citing Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66).

Ground One:

Ingram asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor's violation of a pretrial order. (Doc. 1 at 4) Ingram presented this claim on direct appeal as an abuse of discretion under state law and not as the violation of a federally protected right. (Respondent's Exhibit D at 642-45) The failure to alert the state appellate court that the trial court allegedly violated a federally protected right fails to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. As Reese explains, 541 U.S. at 32, an applicant must alert the state court that he raises a federal law claim and not just a state law claim:

A litigant wishing to raise a federal issue can easily indicate the federal law basis for his claim in a state-court petition or brief, for example, by citing in conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim "federal."

As a consequence, "[i]t is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts, or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made." Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). Kelley v. Sec'y, Dep't Corrs., 377 F.3d 1317, 1345 (11th Cir. 2004) ("The exhaustion doctrine requires a habeas applicant to do more than scatter some makeshift needles in the haystack of the state court record.") (citations omitted); Upshaw v. Singletary, 70 F.3d 576, 578 (11th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he applicant must have fairly apprised the highest court of his state with the appropriate jurisdiction of the federal rights which allegedly were violated."). An applicant must present to the state court the same claim presented to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. at 275 ("[W]e have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal courts."). "Mere similarity of claims is insufficient to exhaust." Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366.

Moreover, even if he had "fairly presented" his claim to the state courts, the claim fails to assert the violation of a federally protected right. Ingram asserts that the trial court erred by denying the mistrial motion and does not contend that the ruling violated due process or any other federal law. (Doc. 1 at 4) The ruling on the mistrial motion was based on Florida's mistrial standard and a federal habeas court does not review a state law ruling by a state court. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) ("[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions."); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984) ("Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a writ of habeas corpus disturbing a state-courtjudgment may issue only if it is found that a prisoner is in custody 'in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'"). See also Dessaure v. State, 891 So. 2d 455, 464-65 (Fla. 2004) ("An order granting mistrial is required only when the error upon which it rests is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial, making a mistrial necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial."). The state courts rejected the state law claim, and the rejection receives deference in a federal court. (Respondent's Exhibit B at 197-200, Exhibit C at 259-60, 436, and Exhibit D at 670). Agan v. Vaughn, 119 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[S]tate courts are the final arbiters of state law, and federal habeas courts should not second-guess them on such matters.").

Ground Two in Part and Ground Six:

The respondent argues that Ground Two in part and Ground Six are procedurally defaulted because the state court dismissed the claims as facially insufficient. (Doc. 9 at 18) A state court's dismissal of a claim for facial insufficiency is an adjudication on the merits owed deference under Section 2254(d) and not, as the respondent contends, a dismissal on state procedural grounds. Boyd v. Comm., Ala. Dep't Corrs., 697 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir. 2012); Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 812-15 (11th Cir. 2011).

* * * *

The failure to properly exhaust each available state court remedy causes a procedural default of the unexhausted claim. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 847 (1999) ("Boerckel's failure to present three of his federal habeas claims to the IllinoisSupreme Court in a timely fashion has resulted in a procedural default of those claims."); Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 736 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[W]hen it is obvious that the unexhausted claims would be procedurally barred in state court due to a state-law procedural default, we can forego the needless 'judicial ping-pong' and just treat those claims now barred by state law as no basis for federal habeas relief.").

As determined above, Ingram procedurally defaulted Ground One by not "federalizing" the ground in state court; as a consequence, the ground is barred from federal review absent a showing of "actual cause and prejudice" or "manifest injustice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). The basis for "cause" must ordinarily reside in something external to the defense. Marek v. Singletary, 62 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 1995). To show "prejudice," the applicant must show "not merely that the errors at his trial created the possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1480 (11th Cir. 1991) (italics original) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)).

To meet the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, Ingram must show constitutional error coupled with "new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). This exception is not available unless "petitioner shows, as a factual matter, that he didnot commit the crime of conviction." Ward v. Cain, 53 F.3d 106, 108 (5th Cir. 1995) (denying a certificate of probable cause).

Ingram establishes neither "cause and prejudice" nor a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." Therefore, Ground One is procedurally barred from federal review and not entitled to a determination on the merits. Grounds Two and Six are entitled to a review on the merits.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Section 2254(d), which creates a highly deferential standard for...

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