Ingram v. State

• Decision Date: 02 May 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2895, September Term, 2006.,2895, September Term, 2006.
• Citation: 947 A.2d 74,179 Md. App. 485
• Parties: Anton Sherrod INGRAM v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

947 A.2d 74

179 Md. App. 485

Anton Sherrod INGRAM v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 2895, September Term, 2006.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

May 2, 2008.

Anton Ingram, Pro se.

Carrie J. Williams (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. General on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellee.

Panel: SALMON, DEBORAH S. EYLER, MEREDITH, JJ.

MEREDITH, Judge.

Anton Sherrod Ingram appeals from the denial of a motion he filed pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345(a), which is the rule that provides: "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time." Ingram asserted in his motion that his sentence is illegal because he had previously been tried and convicted of a lesser included offense arising out of the same course of conduct which gave rise to his current sentence. As a consequence of the prior prosecution, Ingram contends that the sentence he is currently serving is based upon a conviction that should have been barred by the legal protections against double jeopardy.

Based upon the limited record before us, it appears that Ingram's contention that his second trial may have been barred by the law's constitutional and common law protection against double jeopardy is supported by the decision of the Court of Appeals in Anderson v. State, 385 Md. 123, 867 A.2d 1040 (2005). Notwithstanding this conclusion, we will affirm the denial of his motion to correct his sentence. We hold that an argument that challenges the merits of a conviction is not properly raised by way of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. We leave open the possibility that Ingram may have a right to challenge the merits of his conviction pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, codified in Maryland Code (2001), Criminal Procedure Article ("Crim.Pro."), Title 7.

Our conclusion that a motion to correct an illegal sentence is not the proper vehicle for raising an argument attacking the underlying conviction is supported by recent cases in which the Court of Appeals has emphasized that Rule 4-345(a) is not a substitute for an appeal. Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 466-67, 918 A.2d 506 (2007); Pollard v. State, 394 Md. 40, 47, 904 A.2d 500 (2006); State v. Wilkins, 393 Md. 269, 273, 900 A.2d 765 (2006). In Pollard, supra, 394 Md. at 47, 904 A.2d 500, Judge Clayton Greene wrote: "A motion to correct an illegal sentence ... may not be used as an alternative method of obtaining belated appellate review of the proceedings that led to the imposition of judgment and sentence in a criminal case." Accord Wilkins, supra, 393 Md. at 273, 900 A.2d 765. Because the claim Ingram makes arises out of his prosecution, rather than the sentence itself, the issue is not properly raised by way of a motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Background

Ingram was prosecuted twice in Baltimore County for charges arising out of his conduct on June 11, 2003. On January 14, 2004, Ingram was found guilty and sentenced for having possessed cocaine on June 11, 2003. Then, on June 1, 2004, Ingram was found guilty of having distributed cocaine on June 11, 2003. It is the sentence he received for this second conviction that Ingram claims is illegal. Ingram has not provided us with any transcripts of proceedings, but we glean the following facts from documents in the record.¹

In a memorandum filed in support of his motion to correct, Ingram summarizes the facts that led to his prosecutions as follows:

In the instant case, Petitioner [i.e., Ingram] sold an undercover detective one baggie of cocaine from a "stash" in his boxer shorts. As in Anderson, the part of the [police officers'] plan for identification of Petitioner went awry when, before he could be approached and questioned, he got into a vehicle belonging to a relative to leave the area. However, a prior check of the MVA records on the vehicle, while waiting to move in to identify Petitioner, revealed a legitimate ground for a stop, to wit: suspended registration. Officer Sean Salisbury[,] the "identifier" for the undercover team, stopped and ultimately arrested Petitioner for falsely identifying himself and driving on a suspended license and registration. During a search, while being processed, the remainder of Petitioner's package of cocaine was discovered [concealed in the hem of his boxer shorts].... Petitioner was charged with possession with intent to distribute, as well as possession. Thus, the case became a Circuit Court matter, calling for the State's Attorney's attention....

In the circuit court's memorandum opinion denying Ingram's motion to correct the allegedly illegal sentence, the court summarized its analysis of the pertinent facts as follows:

The Petitioner[, Ingram,] argues that he was subjected to double-jeopardy, in violation of his Constitutional rights, by having been convicted of and sentenced for the crimes of Possession of Cocaine, and Distribution of Cocaine. He argues further that if he was subjected to double-jeopardy, then any sentence given for such a conviction would be an illegal sentence.

Having reviewed the case file and the petition, this Court is not satisfied that the Petitioner was ever subjected to double-jeopardy and was, therefore, never given an illegal sentence. The crimes of Possession of Cocaine and Distribution of Cocaine are separate and distinct. While it is true that the two charges for which the Petitioner was convicted ... stem from the same evening, the incidents are different. The Petitioner concedes that he sold an undercover police officer a bag of cocaine that he had on his person. This is certainly the distribution of cocaine. But before the Petitioner was identified at the scene and arrested, he got into his car [and] left. He was pulled over and arrested on the unrelated offense of driving on a suspended license. Only then was cocaine discovered in the Petitioner's car, thus satisfying the elements of possession [of] cocaine. While all occurring in the same evening, these charges stem from two separate incidents. It is true that in order to distribute cocaine, one must, at some point, possess cocaine, making possession of cocaine a lesser-included offense of distribution of cocaine. The distinction here is that the possession of cocaine the Petitioner was tried and convicted of was in the cocaine found in his car subsequent to the traffic stop, not the possession for cocaine as it was being handed to the undercover officer in the distribution charge. Thus, the Petitioner was convicted of two separate crime[s] and received appropriate sentences for each.

We are unable to ascertain the basis for the motion court's statements that a separate quantity of cocaine was "discovered in the Petitioner's car," and that the initial conviction was for "the cocaine found in [Ingram's] car subsequent to the traffic stop." The statement of probable cause prepared by the arresting officer makes no reference to any cocaine being found in Ingram's vehicle. To the contrary, the statement of probable cause corroborates Ingram's contention that his only stash on June 11, 2003, was concealed in the hem of his boxer shorts.

As the Court of Appeals explained in Anderson, 385 Md. at 140-41, 867 A.2d 1040, the question of whether offenses are separate for double jeopardy purposes is generally determined by reviewing the charging documents rather than the actual trial evidence. The Court there explained, id.:

One may never know, unless a transcript is prepared, what evidence was presented, and one could never be certain in any event what evidence a trier of fact (or the court on motion) credited in reaching its verdict. The Supreme Court, for Constitutional purposes, and we, as a matter of common law, have rejected an "actual evidence" test to determine sameness in law, and we see no profit, absent special circumstances not present here, in adopting that test to determine sameness in fact. In most cases, the only sensible and workable criterion for determining the nature and scope of the prior offense is the effective charging document. That states the offense for which the defendant was tried.

Following Ingram's arrest on June 11, 2003, he was initially charged, by way of a District Court Statement of Charges, with driving a vehicle with suspended registration, as well as possession of cocaine, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. On July 7, 2003, Ingram was indicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Indictment No. 03CR2487 charged Ingram with the following five counts based upon conduct on June 11, 2003:

COUNT ONE

The Jurors of the State of Maryland, for the body of Baltimore County, do on their oath present that ANTON S. INGRAM late of Baltimore County aforesaid, on the 11th day of JUNE, in the year of our Lord Two Thousand Three at Baltimore County aforesaid, unlawfully did possess a controlled dangerous substance of Schedule II of the Criminal Law Article Sec. 5-602 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, which is a narcotic drug, in sufficient quantity reasonably to indicate under all circumstances an intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, to wit: COCAINE; contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly in such case made and provided, and against the peace, government and dignity of the State.

(CDS POSS W/INT TO DIST-CR 5-602)

COUNT TWO

The Jurors of the State of Maryland, for the body of Baltimore County, do on their oath present that ANTON S. INGRAM late of Baltimore County aforesaid, on the 11th day of JUNE, in the year of our Lord Two Thousand Three at Baltimore County aforesaid, unlawfully did possess a controlled dangerous substance of Schedule II, to wit: COCAINE; contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly in such case made and provided, and against the peace, government and dignity of the State.

(POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED DANGEROUS SUBSTANCE-CR 5-601)

COUNT THREE

The Jurors of the State of Maryland, for the body of Baltimore County, do on their oath present that ANTON S. INGRAM late of Baltimore County aforesaid, on the 11th...