Ingram v. State
| Decision Date | 18 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 48A04-0105-CR-192.,48A04-0105-CR-192. |
| Citation | 761 N.E.2d 883 |
| Parties | Charles Willis INGRAM, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Angela Warner Sims, Hulse, Lacey, Hardacre, Austin & Shine, P.C., Anderson, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
Charles W. Ingram pled guilty to numerous crimes and received a total of seventy-eight years executed. He appeals, arguing that the trial court erroneously enhanced his sentence without providing an adequate sentencing statement. The trial court's sentencing statement was adequate. However, we reverse and remand because the trial court erroneously ordered Ingram's two habitual offender counts to be served consecutively.
Ingram pled guilty to Count I, escape, a Class C felony; Count II, battery, a Class C felony; Count III, pointing a firearm, a Class D felony; Count IV, battery, a Class C felony; Count V, attempted battery, a Class C felony; and Count VI, possession of a handgun without a license, a Class C felony. He also admitted to being an habitual offender. In a different cause, he pled guilty to being a prisoner possessing a dangerous device or material, a Class B felony. He also admitted, in that cause, to being an habitual offender.
The trial court found Ingram's criminal history to be an aggravating circumstance and his plea of guilty to be a mitigating circumstance. Finding the aggravating circumstance greatly outweighed the mitigating circumstance, the trial court sentenced Ingram to eight years on Counts I, II, IV, V and VI. Count III was dismissed. Ingram was sentenced to twenty years on Count VII, the habitual offender count. The trial court then ordered Counts I and VII to run consecutively and all the other counts to run concurrently, for a total of twenty-eight years executed.
Under the other cause number, the trial court sentenced Ingram to twenty years for being a prisoner possessing a dangerous device or material, and enhanced that by thirty years for being an habitual offender, for a total of fifty years executed. The trial court then ordered the sentences in each case to be served consecutively, for a total executed incarceration of seventy-eight years.
Sentencing lies within the discretion of the trial court. Thacker v. State, 709 N.E.2d 3, 9 (Ind.1999). If a trial court uses aggravating or mitigating circumstances to enhance the presumptive sentence, it must (1) identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances; (2) state the specific reason why each circumstance is determined to be mitigating or aggravating; and (3) articulate the court's evaluation and balancing of the circumstances. Id. The trial court is not required to find the presence of mitigating circumstances. Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind.1993). When a defendant offers evidence of mitigators, the trial court has the discretion to determine whether the factors are mitigating, and it is not required to explain why it does not find the proffered factors to be mitigating. Taylor v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1105, 1112 (Ind.1997). The trial court's assessment of the proper weight of mitigating and aggravating circumstances and the appropriateness of the sentence as a whole are entitled to great deference and will be set aside only upon a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion. Thacker, 709 N.E.2d at 10.
Ingram is correct in that the trial court's sentencing order does not set forth the details of Ingram's criminal history. In that regard, the sentencing order could have been much clearer. However, a presentence report referencing Ingram's criminal past was apparently available to the trial court,1 and counsel's argument to the court indicated that Ingram had admitted at least seventeen armed robberies in Anderson. Because a pre-sentence report indicating Ingram's criminal history was available to the court, the court's sentencing statement, although cursory, is sufficient. Lemos v. State, 746 N.E.2d 972, 975 (Ind.2001)
However, the trial court improperly ordered the sentences for the two habitual offender counts to run consecutively. In Starks v. State, 523 N.E.2d 735 (Ind.1988), our supreme court addressed whether consecutive habitual offender sentences are proper. Initially, the court noted that Ind.Code § 35-50-2-8, the habitual offender statute, provides that a person may be sentenced as an habitual offender for "any" felony. The court also noted that Subsection (e) of that section does not explicitly exclude the possibility of multiple applications of the habitual offender section. Still, it found the imposition of consecutive habitual offender sentences...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Aslinger v. State
...imposed during the same sentencing proceeding, even if not from a single trial—as is the case with Aslinger. See Ingram v. State, 761 N.E.2d 883, 885–86 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). However, the State argues that Aslinger's consecutive sentence enhancements should be distinguished because we are deal......
-
Crider v. State
...even where the enhancements arose from separate and unrelated trial or sentencing hearings. Id. at 1024;see also Ingram v. State, 761 N.E.2d 883, 885–86 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (declaring trial court exceeded its legislative authorization in imposing consecutive habitual offender sentences even t......
-
Springer v. State
...it was handed down in 2009, but that he "did read through the cases and [he became] aware the [sic] Sarks case, the Smith case and the Ingham case. Each of which was decided before Mr. Springer's case and each of which decided on separate grounds that habitual offender enhancements could no......
-
Springer v. State
...handed down in 2009, but that he “did read through the cases and [he became] aware the [sic] Sarks [ Starks ] case, the Smith case and the Ingham [ Ingram ] case. Each of which was decided before Mr. Springer's case and each of which decided on separate grounds that habitual offender enhanc......