Ingram v. Sterling

• Decision Date: 29 March 2016
• Docket Number: Case No.: 3:14-cv-02691-GPC-DHB
• Parties: CURTIS CLIFFORD INGRAM, Plaintiff, v. K. STERLING et. al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

CURTIS CLIFFORD INGRAM, Plaintiff, v. K. STERLING et. al., Defendants.

Case No.: 3:14-cv-02691-GPC-DHB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

March 29, 2016

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT & RECOMMENDATION AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

[ECF Nos. 10, 16]

Introduction

Plaintiff Curtis Clifford Ingram ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., ECF No. 1.)¹ Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") on December 31, 2014, in which he asserts a variety of claims against Defendants K. Sterling, K. Balakian, K.A.Seibel, and Warden Paramo (collectively "Defendants").² Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's FAC. (Def. Mot., ECF No. 10.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 6336(b)(1)(A), United States Magistrate Judge Bartick submitted a Report and Recommendation ("Report") to this Court recommending the Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. (Report, ECF No. 16.) Judge Bartick required the parties to file objections by January 15, 2016. The parties did not file any objections. Having considered the parties submissions and the applicable law, the Court ADOPTS the Honorable Judge Bartick's Report and Recommendation and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' motion to dismiss.

Background

Plaintiff commenced this action on November 12, 2014, by filing a Complaint and Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On December 31, 2014, Plaintiff filed the FAC. (Compl., ECF No. 3.) On February 9, 2015, this Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and, following an initial screening of the FAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), directed U.S. Marshal service of the FAC on Plaintiff's behalf. (Order, ECF No. 4.)

Plaintiff alleges that on April 2, 2014, Defendant Sterling, a library technical assistant, denied his request for Priority Legal User ("PLU") status even though he had a court order from the Central District of California demonstrating extraordinary circumstances warranting such status.³ Defendant Sterling allegedly told Plaintiff, "PLUstatus is basically for lockdowns and modified program," which, Plaintiff alleges is contrary to California Code of Regulations §§ 3122(b)(1) and 3122(b)(6).⁴

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sterling manufactured incident narratives and issued Rule Violation Reports ("RVRs") against him that were false. On three separate occasions Defendant attended administrative hearings regarding Defendant Sterling's allegations, and the administrative panel found him not guilty of any rules violations. Plaintiff also asserts that prior to these events he generated a CDCR Form 22 Request for Interview, Item, or Service Form directed at Defendant Sterling, but Defendant Sterling refused to receive it. Plaintiff then forwarded the request to Defendant Balakian, after which Defendant Sterling responded to the request only by stating that Plaintiff hadviolated California Code of Regulations § 3086 because he delivered the request to inmate clerks.⁵ Plaintiff then generated a second Form 22 Request through Sergeant Kang, who signed off on and delivered the request. Defendant Sterling never responded to this request.

Aside from generating these allegedly false reports, Defendant Sterling also allegedly obstructed Plaintiff from using the library and defending his case. On one occasion, Plaintiff attempted to make copies of an RVR so he could attach them to a CDCR 602 Appeal/Grievance Form, and according to the Plaintiff, Defendant Sterling exceeded the permissible scope of her duties by making additional copies of the documents for herself. On another occasion, Defendant Sterling had Plaintiff escorted from the library claiming that he caused a disturbance, which he denies. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Sterling manufactured these reports to cause him to lose his job assignment and cause him to be placed on C-Status—which limits law library access and would force him to send his entertainment appliances home. Furthermore, Plaintiff claims that the remaining defendants were aware of Defendant Sterling's pattern of behavior but were indifferent to it.

Plaintiff filed three separate claims against Defendants, but the claims are factually related and assert many of the same causes of action:

1. Denial of the right to access to the courts, retaliation, supervisor liability, deliberate indifference, acquiescence of actions, denial of due process, and cruel and unusual punishment;

2. Denial of the right to access to the courts, retaliation, supervisor liability, and deliberate indifference, acquiescence of actions; and3. Denial of the right to access to the courts, retaliation, supervisor liability, and deliberate indifference.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's causes of action are summarized as: (1) denial of access to the courts; (2) retaliation; (3) supervisor liability, acquiescence of actions, and deliberate indifference; (4) denial of due process; and (5) cruel and unusual punishment.

On May 4, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 10.) Defendants contend the FAC should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiff fails to state a claim in any of his three counts; and (2) the face of the FAC demonstrates that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to Count 3. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff filed an Opposition on June 5, 2015. (Pl.'s Opp'n, ECF No. 13.) Defendants filed a reply on June 9, 2015. (Def.'s Reply, ECF No. 14.)

Discussion

A. Legal Standards

1. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on the "sufficiency" of a claim rather than the claim's substantive merits, "a court may [ordinarily] look only at the face of the complaint to decide a motion to dismiss." Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). However, courts may consider exhibits that are attached to the complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c) ("A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes."); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Amfac Mortg. Corp. v. Ariz. Mall of Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may be considered" in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.) However, exhibits that contradict the allegations of a complaint may fatally undermine the complaint's allegations. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors,266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (a plaintiff can "plead himself out of a claim by including . . . details contrary to his claims." (citing Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[W]e are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint."))).

A motion to dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff fails to proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' [Citation omitted.] A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570).

"All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Court need not, however, "accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 (citing Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on motion to dismiss, court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation."). "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Thus, "[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether theyplausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.''" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (when plaintiffs have not "nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.")).

"In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory 'factual content,' and reasonable inferences [drawn] from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. United States Secret...