Ingram v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis Pension Plan for Nonschedule Emps.
Decision Date | 23 October 2014 |
Docket Number | Case No. 4:11CV1327 HEA |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Parties | THEODORE F. INGRAM, Plaintiff, v. TERMINAL RAILROAD ASSOCIATION OF ST. LOUIS PENSION PLAN FOR NONSCHEDULE EMPLOYEES, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Supplemented Administrative Record, [Doc. No. 47] and Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Supplemental Administrative Record, [Doc. No. 51]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is granted and Plaintiff's Motion is denied.
Plaintiff brings this cause of action pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq., alleging that Defendant, sponsor of the pension plan to which Plaintiff was a participant, failed to properly calculate his pension benefits, and improperly calculated the offset to his retirement benefits because of benefits he received from another employer, UnionPacific. Plaintiff seeks recovery of the retirement benefits based on his calculations, prejudgment interest and attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).
Plaintiff and Defendant both filed motions for summary judgment, in which they argued that there were no genuine disputes of material fact and that they were each entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court denied the motions and allowed the parties time within which to supplement the record.
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Supplemented Administrative Record, [Doc. No. 51] and Defendant's Motion for Summary judgment on the Supplemented Administrative Record, [Doc. No. 47]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is granted and Plaintiff's Motion is denied.
Prezioso v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 748 F.3d 797, 802-803 (8th Cir. 2014).
The relevant provisions of the Plan at issue provide:
The Plan language clearly gives the administrator discretion, thus, the standard of review ordinarily would be under an arbitrary and capricious analysis. Plaintiff, however, argues procedural irregularities render the de novo standard inappropriate. Plaintiff claims that there was no effective delegation of discretionary authority to the plan administrator because there was no publication of Kerry Paubel as the plan administrator, despite the fact that Paubel was designated as the administrator by resolution of the Board of Directors of Terminal Railroad Association dated February 20, 2002. In support of his position, Plaintiffrelies on Jobe v. Medical Life Ins. Co., 598 F. 3d 478, 479 (8th Cir. 2010). In Jobe, Plaintiff successfully argued that the de novo standard should be applied because the Plan itself did not afford the administrator discretion, rather, the delegation of discretionary authority was only conferred in the Plan Summary Description. As such, the Court found that the administrator was not properly given discretion to interpret the plan. This ruling does not run contrary to the current matter. The plan herein specifically details the administrator's discretionary authority. Jobe is therefore inapposite. \
The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how the failure to disclose the administrator would render the customary standard of review inapplicable. Plaintiff does not establish any prejudice by reason of the failure to publish the administrator, nor does Plaintiff identify how this technical failure negates the Administrator's delegated discretion which is fully articulated in the Plan.
Plaintiff also claims Paubel engaged in a material procedural irregularity.
Minor procedural defects in the review process do not carry significant weight in [the court's] review of a plan administrator's decision to deny benefits. See Trs. of Electricians' Salary Deferral Plan v. Wright, 688 F.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir.2012). To alter the standard of review or affect [the court's] review under the abuse-of-discretion standard, a procedural irregularity must rise to the level of a " 'serious breach of the plan trustee's fiduciary duty to the plan beneficiary.' " Menz v. Procter & Gamble Health Care Plan,520 F.3d 865, 869 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting Buttram v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 76 F.3d 896, 900 (8th Cir. 1996)). The procedural error must leave "the court with serious doubts as to whether the result reached was the product of an arbitrary decision or the plan administrator's whim." Buttram, 76 F.3d at 900; see also Wright, 688 F.3d at 927.
Waldoch v. Medtronic, Inc. 757 F.3d 822, 830-831 (8th Cir 2014)(footnote omitted).
Plaintiff claims that Paubel acted with a material conflict of interest as the Chief Financial Officer of the Railroad. Hampton v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 4977397 (8th Cir. 2014).
Id. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Paubel's employment with the Railroad caused a conflict of interest with...
To continue reading
Request your trial