Ingris v. Borough of Caldwell

• Decision Date: 09 June 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 14-855 (ES)
• Parties: PETER INGRIS, Pro Se, Plaintiff, v. BOROUGH OF CALDWELL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

PETER INGRIS, Pro Se, Plaintiff, v. BOROUGH OF CALDWELL, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 14-855 (ES)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

June 9, 2015

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Plaintiff pro se Peter Ingris ("Plaintiff") seeking leave to file an Amended Complaint [D.E. 46]. Also before the Court are Plaintiff's applications to disqualify defense counsel and change venue to the Trenton vicinage [D.E. 70]. The Court has considered the papers submitted in support of, and in opposition to, Plaintiff's motions. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78, the Court decided this motion without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motions are denied.

II. BACKGROUND

On February 6, 2014, Plaintiff filed the Complaint, asserting multiple claims against fifteen defendants in connection with his interactions with the Pio Costa Foundation, Inc., the landlord of the commercial property Plaintiff leased, as well as the Borough of Caldwell, and certain of its officials. See generally Compl., Feb. 6, 2014, D.E. 1. Thereafter, multiple Defendants filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See D.E. 4, 8, 9, 13.

With those motions pending, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on July 29, 2014, see D.E. 36, in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. By Letter Order, dated September 12, 2014, the Honorable Esther Salas, United States District Judge, struck Plaintiff's Amended Complaint because he neither sought the Court's leave to amend nor obtained his adversaries' consent. See Letter Order, dated Sept. 12, 2014, D.E. 45. The District Court, however, granted Plaintiff an opportunity to file a motion to amend by September 26, 2014. See id.

On September 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for leave to amend. See Pl.'s Mot. to Amend, Sept. 22, 2014, D.E. 46. In his proposed First Amended Complaint ("PFAC"), Plaintiff seeks to add claims against twenty-one new defendants.¹ See generally PFAC, Sept. 22, 2014, D.E. 46-1. Specifically, although he re-states his previous claims against his commercial landlord, and the Borough of Caldwell, Plaintiff now seeks to add claims against, among others, multiple attorneys and judges involved in other cases in which Plaintiff was a party. See id.; see also Pl.'s Reply, Oct. 6, 2015, D.E. 51. Plaintiff also seeks to add Iliyana Schaaf ("Ms. Schaaf"), whom Plaintiff describes as his former professional dance partner and former fiancé, as a Plaintiff. See PFAC, at 3 and ¶ 2, Sept. 22, 2014, D.E. 46-1.

Ms. Schaaf, as well as proposed Defendants Adam Kenny, Esq. and Weiner Lesniak LLP (collectively, the "WL Defendants"), oppose Plaintiff's motion. See WL Defs.' Opp'n Br., Oct.2, 2014, D.E. 48; see also Mot. to Dismiss Involuntary Pl. Iliyana Schaaf, Oct. 17, 2014, D.E. 52. No other party, or proposed party, has opposed Plaintiff's motion.²

III. DISCUSSION

"The threshold issue in resolving a motion to amend is the determination of whether the motion is governed by Rule 15 or Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, No. 10-1283 (NBF), 2011 WL 5170445, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2011). Rule 15 provides, in pertinent part, "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave whenjustice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also Wright & Miller § 1484, at 676 ("Subdivision (a)(2) encourages the court to look favorably on requests to amend."). On the other hand, "Rule 16 . . . requires a party to demonstrate 'good cause' prior to the Court amending its scheduling order." Karlo, 2011 WL 5170445, at *2 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4)). While there sometimes might be "tension" between the standards of the two Rules, id. at *2 n.3, Third Circuit courts "have consistently reached the same conclusion: a party seeking to amend the pleadings after the deadline set by the Court must satisfy the requirements of Rule 16(b)(4)—i.e., that party must show 'good cause.'" Id. at *2; see also Dimensional Commc'n, Inc. v. OZ Optics, Ltd., 148 F. App'x 82, 85 (3d Cir. 2005) (instructing that the Third Circuit has adopted a good cause standard when determining the propriety of a motion to amend after the deadline has elapsed).

Here, Rule 15 governs Plaintiff's motion. The Letter Order, dated September 12, 2014, set September 26, 2014 as the deadline to file any motions for leave to amend the pleadings. See Letter Order, dated Sept. 12, 2014, D.E. 45. Plaintiff timely filed this motion on September 22, 2014. See Pl.'s Mot. to Amend, D.E. 46. Thus, Rule 15, which contains a "more lenient standard than good cause," Charles A. Wright et al., 6A Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1522.2 (3d ed. 2010), applies here. This lenient standard ensures that "a particular claim will be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities." Dole v. Arco Chem. Co., 921 F.2d 484, 487 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted); see also Sabatino v. Union Township, No. 11-1656 (JLL), 2013 WL 1622306, at *6 (D.N.J. April 15, 2013) (internal citations omitted) (discussing that "if the underlying facts relied upon by a party might be a proper subject of relief, that party should have the opportunity to test its claims on the merits.").

The decision to grant or deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a) is "committed to the sound discretion of the district court." Arab African Int'l Bank v. Epstein, 10 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). While courts have broad discretion to decide motions to amend, they must "heed Rule 15(a)'s mandate that amendments are to be granted freely in the interests of justice." Voilas v. General Motors Corp., 173 F.R.D. 389, 396 (D.N.J. 1997) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In the absence of unfair prejudice, futility of amendment, undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive, the court must grant a request for leave to amend. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that generally, leave to amend should be granted "unless equitable considerations render it otherwise unjust.").

Here, the WL Defendants challenge certain of Plaintiff's proposed amendments on "futility" grounds. See WL Defs.' Opp'n Br., Oct. 2, 2014, D.E. 48. To determine whether an amendment would be "properly dismissed," the Court employs the standard applied to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). Under this standard, the question before the Court is not whether the movant will ultimately prevail, but whether the complaint sets forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Harrison Beverage, 133 F.R.D. at 468 ("'Futility' of amendment is shown when the claim or defense is not accompanied by a showing of plausibility sufficient to present a triable issue."). A two-part analysis determines whether this standard is met. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 629 (2009)).

First, a court separates the factual and legal elements of a claim. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. All well-pleaded facts set forth in the pleading and the contents of the documents incorporatedtherein must be accepted as true, but the Court may disregard legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11; West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 97 n.6 (3rd Cir. 2010); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that a complaint is insufficient if it offers "labels and conclusions," a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "naked assertions" devoid of "further factual enhancement") (alterations omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).

Second, as stated above, a court determines whether a plaintiff's facts are sufficient "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; accord Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 556 U.S. at 678. The plausibility standard is not a "probability requirement," but the well-pleaded facts must do more than demonstrate that the conduct is "merely consistent" with liability so as to "permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. at 678-79 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This "context-specific task . . . requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.

A court conducting a futility analysis based only upon the sufficiency of the pleading must consider a limited record. Specifically, a court may consider only the proposed pleading, exhibits attached to that pleading, matters of public record, and undisputedly authentic documents provided the claims are based on those documents. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993); accord West Penn, 627 F.3d at 97 n.6 (reiterating the rule and its limited exception for documents that are "integral or explicitly relied upon in the complaint").

Further, the defendants bear the burden of establishing that the plaintiff's proposed amendments are futile, which is a "heavy" burden, "given the liberal standard applied to the amendment of pleadings." Pharm. Sales & Consulting Corp. v. J.W.S. Delavau Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 761, 764 (D.N.J. 2000); accord Marjam Supply Co. v. Firestone Bldg. Prods. Co., LLC, No. 11-7119 (WJM), 2012 WL 6005709, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2012). Thus, "[i]f a proposed amendment is not clearly futile, then...