Inhabitants of Town of Frankfort v. Waldo Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 08 March 1929
• Citation: Inhabitants of Town of Frankfort v. Waldo Lumber Co., 128 Me. 1, 145 A. 241 (Me. 1929)
• Parties: INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF FRANKFORT v. WALDO LUMBER CO.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

145 A. 241

INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF FRANKFORT

v. WALDO LUMBER CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 8, 1929.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Penobscot County, at Law.

Action of debt for taxes by the Inhabitants of the Town of Frankfort against the Waldo Lumber Company.Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings exceptions.Exceptions overruled.

Argued before WILSON, C. J., STURGIS, BARNES, and BASSETT, JJ., and PHILBROOK, A. R. J.

Mayo & Snare, of Bangor, for plaintiff.

Gillin & Gillin, of Bangor, for defendant.

BARNES, J. Action of debt for taxes.

This case was submitted to the court below upon the writ, pleadings, and an agreed statement of fact; each party reserving the right to be heard on exceptions to determination of questions of law.

The suit was brought for balances of taxes lawfully assessed against the defendant in the years 1923 and 1924, still due, unless plaintiffs are barred by action of attorneys to whom such taxes were properly committed for collection.

These attorneys brought suit for a portion of the taxes here declared upon, entered the writ in court, and later accepted of one I. G. Stetson his promissory note on one year for the amount they assumed to be due from defendant, gave a receipt for the face of the note, in the name of plaintiffs, as being "in full payment for all outstanding balance on taxes assessed by the town of Frankfort on the real and personal property of said (defendant) company for the years 1923-1924," and agreed that the suit already brought should be finally terminated, with the entry, "Neither party; no further action for same cause," which entry was made at the April term of court, 1925.

In the fall of the year 1927 the municipal officers of plaintiff, in writing, duly authorized an action for the collection of the same taxes, and the writ in the present case was sued out December 1 of that year.

Before bringing the suit here considered, the municipal officers of the plaintiff sued the Stetson note and recovered default for face, interests, and costs, by agreement; and, although execution issued, no part of such judgment has been paid, and no payment has been made on the taxes sued for in the present action.

On April 28, 1928, the court below rendered judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $982.33, and defendant filed exceptions.

By its exceptions it presents as error in law the finding that the action was maintainable against, and that any sum was recoverable from, the defendant.

More fully stated, defendant argues that the demands sued on were aforetime fully settled by plaintiff's attorneys, who, accepting for the town, their employer, a valuable consideration, to wit, a promissory note, gave, for said town and as its agents, a receipt for all taxes then due, the taxes here sued for being included, and that plaintiff is barred from recovery here because the former suit was ended, as evidenced by the usual entry in such case, with admission that no other suit could be brought for the same cause, and that such payment by promissory note was ratified and confirmed by the plaintiffs, when their municipal officers authorized suit on the promissory note.

We hold the law to be other than as interpreted by defendant.

The levying of taxes is a power of sovereignty.

Municipal officers annually levy or assess taxes on persons and property within their bounds, for the state, their county, and their municipality.

When assessing and collecting such taxes, municipal officers are the agents of the state, which is sovereign.

And in so doing they proceed only under such agency, and they shall proceed strictly as authorized and empowered.

"A municipal corporation has no element of severeignty.It is a mere local agency of the state, having no other powers than such as are clearly and unmistakably granted by the law-making power.

"A doubtful corporate power, it has been said, does not exist; and when any power is granted, and the mode of its exercise is prescribed, that mode must be strictly pursued. * * *

"Now the power of taxation is not only an attribute of sovereignty, but it is essential to the existence of government. * * *

"Nor, strictly speaking, is this power of the Legislature transferable; for, as we shall presently see, whenever taxes are imposed, whether by a muncipality or the state, it is, in legal contemplation, the act of the state, acting either by her own officers or other agents designated for the purpose. * * *

"Hence, when delegated by the Legislature to a municipal corporation, the latter is considered as...