Inhabitants of Wellington v. Inhabitants of Corinna

• Decision Date: 11 June 1908
• Citation: 104 Me. 262,71 A. 889
• Parties: INHABITANTS OF WELLINGTON v. INHABITANTS OF CORINNA.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

71 A. 889

104 Me. 262

INHABITANTS OF WELLINGTON

v. INHABITANTS OF CORINNA.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

June 11, 1908.

(Official.)

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Piscataquis County, at Law.

Assumpsit by the Inhabitants of Wellington against the Inhabitants of Corinna. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepts. Exceptions overruled.

Action of assumpsit, brought against the defendant town to recover the expense incurred by the plaintiff town for pauper supplies furnished to one Frank M. Moody, his wife, and four minor children, and whose pauper settlement was alleged to be in the defendant town. Writ dated August 17, 1905. Plea, the general issue, with brief statement as follows:

"That the woman called Jane Moody is not the legal wife of Frank M. Moody.

"That the children called Jennie Moody, Harry Moody, Herbert Moody, and Benny Moody are not the legal children of Frank M. Moody.

"That Frank M. Moody had no legal wife and no legal children at the date of this writ in this action.

"That Frank M. Moody had no legal wife and no legal children at the time of the alleged furnishing of supplies, as set out in this writ in this action."

Tried at the February term, 1907, Supreme Judicial Court, Piscataquis county. At the conclusion of the evidence the presiding justice directed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff town for the amount claimed in the writ, with interest from the date of the writ, and thereupon the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff town for $218.83. To this ruling the defendant town excepted, and also took exceptions to the admission of certain evidence during the trial.

The case appears in the opinion.

Argued before EMERY, C. J., and WHITEHOUSE, SAVAGE, SPEAR, CORNISH, and KING, JJ.

Hudson & Hudson, for plaintiff.

J. B. & F. C. Peaks and Charles W. Hayes, for defendant.

WHITEHOUSE, J. This is an action of assumpsit, brought to recover the expense incurred by the plaintiff town for pauper supplies furnished between February 21, 1904, and June 4, 1905, to Frank M. Moody, his wife, and four minor children. After the introduction of evidence was closed on both sides, the presiding judge, on motion of the plaintiff's counsel, directed the jury to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the amount claimed in the writ, with interest. The jury thereupon returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $218.83. The case comes to the law court on exceptions to this ruling, and also to the admission of certain evidence during the progress of the trial.

It is a well-established and familiar rule of procedure in this state that the court may properly instruct the jury to return a verdict for either party when it is apparent that a contrary verdict would not be allowed to stand. Bennett v. Talbot, 90 Me. 229, 38 Atl. 112; Bank v. Sargent, 85 Me. 349, 27 Atl. 192, and cases cited. In Woodstock v. Canton, 91 Me. 62, 39 Atl. 281, it clearly appeared from the testimony introduced by the plaintiff, which was not contradicted in any material point, that the pauper had gained a settlement in the defendant town, and the presiding justice, finding that the evidence would not authorize a verdict for the defendant, directed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff. In the opinion of the law court overruling the exceptions to this order the following quotation is made from Heath v. Jaquith, 68 Me. 433, viz.: "It would be but an idle ceremony to submit the case to the jury by instructions authorizing them to find for a party, when he has introduced no evidence which would authorize it, and when, if they find a verdict in his favor, it would be the duty of the court to set it aside because there was no evidence to support it." See, also, Young v. Chandler, 102 Me. 251, 66 Atl. 539.

The question, accordingly, presented for the determination of the court in the case at bar is whether the material and admissible evidence in the case afforded sufficient proof to support a verdict in favor of the defendant. If not, and it would have been the duty of the court to set aside such a verdict if it had been rendered, the ruling of the presiding justice directing a verdict for the plaintiff was obviously correct.

It was not in controversy that the supplies charged in the plaintiffs' account were actually furnished by the plaintiff town during the period above stated, and that they were necessary for the relief of Frank M. Moody and his family, consisting of Mary J. Moody, who was living with him as his wife, and their four minor children named in the declaration, and that the expenditures for which the plaintiff town seeks reimbursement in this action were actually made by the town for the supplies thus furnished. It was satisfactorily established by uncontradicted evidence that the supplies in question were received and consumed in the family of Frank M. Moody, composed of the members above stated, with full knowledge, on the part of Frank M. and Mary J. Moody, that they were pauper supplies, and that the prices charged therefore were reasonable. It also appeared that two notices, dated March 28, 1904, and March 22, 1905, respectively, were seasonably given by the plaintiff town to the defendant, purporting to state the facts respecting the Moody family in question, in compliance with section 39, c. 27, Rev. St., and representing that they had a legal settlement in the defendant town, and requesting their removal.

It is admitted that no answer was returned to these notices by the overseers of the defendant town within two months, as required by section 40, c. 27, Rev. St., stating their objections to the removal; but the defendant town, besides interposing an objection to the sufficiency of the first notice, now invokes the rule of law settled in Turner v. Brunswick, 5 Greenl. 31, that while, under the provisions of the statute last cited, the defendant is estopped to deny that the settlement of the paupers in question is in any other than the plaintiff town of Wellington, it is not precluded from showing that it was in fact in that town. The defendant claims that there is evidence showing that pauper settlement of Frank M. Moody was in fact in the town of Wellington during the period in question. But the defendants' principal contention appears to be in accordance with the defense set up in his brief statement that, even if the settlement of Frank M. Moody himself was in the defendant town, Mary J. Moody was not his lawful wife, and had a separate settlement of her own, and the four minor children were illegitimate, and had a separate settlement derived from their mother; and, if such were the fact, it is conceded that the defendant would not be estopped to show it by reason of its failure to return an answer to the plaintiffs' notices above specified. Glenburn v. Oldtown, 63 Me. 582.

These objections urged by the defendants' counsel in support of the exceptions will be considered in their order, and the conclusions of the court stated without extended discussion of the testimony.

With respect to the objection to the sufficiency of the notice from the plaintiff to the defendant town, dated March 28, 1904, the statute above cited provides that overseers "shall send a written notice * * * stating the facts respecting a person chargeable in their town, to the overseers of the town where his settlement is alleged to be, requesting them to remove him, which they may do." The statement of "facts" must contain a sufficiently definite description of the person whose distress has been relieved to enable the overseers receiving the notice, at least by reasonable inquiry, to establish the identity of the person described. Thomaston v. Greenbush, 98 Me. 140, 56 Atl. 621.

The notice in question of March 28, 1904, states that "Frank M. Moody and wife and children" have fallen into distress, etc. It fails to give either the names or the number of the children, and in that respect is obviously an insufficient compliance with the statute as interpreted by the court. But, as the authorized agents of the town, the overseers of the poor may waive any objection arising from such an informality or defect in the notice. Unity v. Thorndike, 15 Me. 182. Although the overseers of the defendant town failed to make any reply to this notice within two months, it appears that on the 4th of the following February, an answer was in fact returned by them, as follows, viz.:

"We send you herewith check for amount of the inclosed bill for medical attendance on Frank Moody. Please receipt bill and return and in regard to the bill of $73.49 for supplies furnished said Moody and family, we will say that upon investigation it does not appear clear to us that Mrs. Moody and children are paupers of this town. It will be further investigated and what bills you have for the support of Frank Moody himself we will settle and investigate the other."

It appears from this letter, which was authorized by a majority of the overseers of the defendant town, that the notice, to which this was a reply, was accepted without objection as a sufficiently definite statement of the facts to enable the overseers to investigate the question of the liability of the defendant town for the support of the "wife and children" of Frank M. Moody. The overseers thereby admitted that "Mrs. Moody and children" were sufficiently identified to them, and they must be deemed to have waived any objection arising from the failure of the notice to give a more definite description. York v. Penobscot, 2 Greenl. 1; Embden v. Augusta, 12 Mass. 307; Shutesbury v. Oxford, 16 Mass. 102; Weymouth v. Gorharn, 22 Me. 385; Auburn v. Wilton, 74 Me. 437.

The notice of March 22, 1905, was admitted, without objection arising from any alleged defect or informality therein, and it appears to be sufficient. It states that Frank M. Moody and his wife, Jane Moody, and their four minor children have fallen into distress, etc. Construed in connection with the information...