Injured Workers of Kansas v. Franklin

• Decision Date: 18 July 1997
• Docket Number: Nos. 77142,77561,WAL-MAR,A,s. 77142
• Citation: 942 P.2d 591,262 Kan. 840
• Parties: INJURED WORKERS OF KANSAS, et al., Appellants, v. Wayne L. FRANKLIN, Secretary of Human Resources, and Philip S. Harness, Director of Workers Compensation, Appellees. Oliver GETTLE, Appellant, v.ppellee, and National Union Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Carrier.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 591

942 P.2d 591

262 Kan. 840

INJURED WORKERS OF KANSAS, et al., Appellants, v. Wayne L. FRANKLIN, Secretary of Human Resources, and Philip

S. Harness, Director of Workers Compensation, Appellees.

Oliver GETTLE, Appellant, v. WAL-MART, Appellee, and National Union Fire Insurance Company, Insurance Carrier.

Nos. 77142, 77561.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

July 18, 1997.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Determining whether a statute violates the constitution is a question of law. When determining a question of law, this court may exercise an unlimited de novo standard of review. A statute is presumed constitutional, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity. If there is any reasonable way to construe a statute as constitutionally valid, the court must do so. A statute must clearly violate the constitution before it may be struck down. This court not only has the authority, but also the duty, to construe a statute in such a manner that it is constitutional if the same can be done within the apparent intent of the legislature in passing the statute.

2. The rational basis standard is stated and applied.

3. Equal protection law is reviewed and applied.

4. Due process law is reviewed and applied.

5. When the legislature must draw a line and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless the court can say that it was very wide of any reasonable mark.

6. The social security offset and private pension provision in K.S.A. 44-501(h) is rationally related to the valid state interest of preventing the duplication of wage loss replacement benefits. The offset does not unconstitutionally violate equal protection.

7. A substantive statute will operate prospectively rather than retrospectively unless its language clearly indicates that the legislature intended the latter.

8. The graduated contingency fee rates in the 1993 amendments to the Workers Compensation Act do not interfere with the court's inherent power to regulate the practice of law or unconstitutionally violate the separation of powers doctrine.

9. Major statutory enactments establishing a broad, comprehensive statutory remedy or scheme of reparation in derogation of a previously existing common-law remedy may be subsequently amended or altered without each subsequent change being supported by an independent and separate quid pro quo. In considering the adequacy of the quid pro quo of comprehensive legislation which substitutes a statutory remedy for one that formerly existed at common law, and its sufficiency to support subsequent amendments or modifications which diminish the substitute remedy originally granted, no hard and fast rule can apply to all cases. We recognize that all such legislation may need periodic modification; the proper test to apply is whether the substitute remedy would have been sufficient if the modification had been a part of the original act.

10. The 1993 amendments to the Workers Compensation Act are examined and it is held that the amendments as a whole and individually are constitutional.

Timothy A. Short, of Spigarelli, McLane & Short, Pittsburg, argued the cause, and Patrick R. Nichols, Topeka, Kelly W. Johnston, of The Johnston Law Offices, P.A., and Thomas E. Hammond, of Render, Kamas and Hammond, Wichita, were with him on the briefs for appellants.

Fred J. Logan, Jr., of Logan & Logan, Prairie Village, argued the cause, and A.J. Kotich, of Kansas Department of Human Resources, was with him on the brief for appellees Franklin and Harness.

Christopher J. McCurdy, of Wallace, Saunders, Austin, Brown & Enochs, Chartered, Wichita, argued the cause, and Michael D. Streit, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for appellee Wal-Mart.

ABBOTT, Justice:

The 1993 Kansas Legislature passed sweeping changes to the Workers Compensation Act (Act). Five of those amendments are challenged in this appeal, as well as the Act as a whole. The plaintiffs contend the amendments and the Act as a whole unconstitutionally violate due process, equal protection, and the separation of powers doctrine. The plaintiffs are a variety of individuals, groups, and labor organizations. The standing of the plaintiffs and the procedure they used to reach this court (declaratory action) are not an issue. The trial court held the Act and the amendments are constitutional, and this appeal followed.

At the start of the 1993 legislative session, legislators had before them the reports of the Governor's Task Force on Workers Compensation, the Insurance Commissioner's Workers Compensation Task Force, and the Legislative Post Audit Committee, all of which suggested areas of the workers compensation system that the various committees determined needed reform. Over the course of the session, the House Committee on Labor and Industry and the Senate Committee on Commerce conducted hearings and heard from witnesses representing employees, employers, trial lawyers, labor organizations, and business associations. S.B. 307, which dealt with safety issues, was used as the vehicle for workers compensation reform. The legislation passed unanimously in both the House and Senate, and Governor Finney signed the bill into law.

Once the bill passed in 1993, several parties filed a petition for declaratory judgment in Shawnee County District Court, asking the trial court to declare nine of the Act's amendments unconstitutional and void. These plaintiffs filed their declaratory judgment action against George Gomez, then the Director of the Division of Workers Compensation, and against Joe Dick, then the Secretary of Human Resources, who oversaw the Division of Workers Compensation and the implementation of the Act. Wayne L. Franklin is now the Secretary of Human Resources, and Philip S. Harness is the Director of Workers Compensation. These parties are now the named defendants in the declaratory judgment case.

The trial court heard oral arguments on summary judgment motions filed by both the plaintiffs and the defendants. On June 4, 1996, the trial court filed a memorandum decision and order. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that all nine challenged amendments to the Act withstood constitutional scrutiny. The plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals. This court granted the plaintiffs' motion to transfer the case to the Supreme Court.

On appeal, the plaintiffs raised only five issues instead of the nine issues that they raised at the trial court level. The four issues which were abandoned raised the constitutionality of certain amendments that were the only amendments affecting some of the individual plaintiffs. These plaintiffs still have standing in this appeal because they also challenge the constitutionality of the entire Act, not just certain amendments.

In a separate action, plaintiff Oliver C. Gettle filed a workers compensation claim with the Division of Workers Compensation on March 8, 1994. Gettle was a 64-year-old Wal-Mart employee who injured his right hand, right arm, and right shoulder while he was moving paint cans to overhead shelving. Upon treatment, it was discovered Gettle had partially torn the rotator cuff in his shoulder. Based on the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (4th ed. 1995) (AMA Guides), Gettle's doctor found that Gettle had a partial permanent impairment to the right shoulder of 15%, which was equivalent to 9% of the whole body.

The Division of Workers Compensation heard Gettle's workers compensation claim and awarded him compensation. The issue at the hearing was whether "K.S.A. 44-510d(a)(13), stating that the loss of an arm, including the shoulder joint, shoulder girdle, shoulder musculature or any other shoulder structures is a scheduled injury with recovery limited to 225 weeks [,is] constitutional?" The administrative law judge found that he had no jurisdiction to determine whether K.S.A. 44-510d was constitutional. Thus, following the statute, the judge limited Gettle to a 15% scheduled impairment to his right shoulder with benefits calculated for 225 weeks. The judge awarded Gettle compensation for 25.5 weeks at a rate of $101.88 per week, or $2,597.94, followed by 29.92 weeks at $101.88 per week, or $3,048.24, making a total award of $5,646.18.

Gettle filed an application for review with the Workers Compensation Board (Board). Gettle asked the Board to review the administrative law judge's award and challenged the constitutionality of K.S.A. 44-510d(a)(13), which classifies shoulder injuries as scheduled injuries. On August 28, 1996, the Board ruled that it was not a Kan. Const. art. III court and that it did not have the authority to hold an act of the Kansas Legislature unconstitutional. Thus, the Board found that it was obligated to enforce the provisions of K.S.A. 44-510d(a)(13), as enacted, and treat Gettle's shoulder injury as a scheduled injury. The Board affirmed the award entered by the administrative law judge.

Gettle appealed to the Court of Appeals and filed a motion to consolidate his case with this declaratory judgment case. This court granted Gettle's motion. Pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c), Gettle's case, No. 77,561, was transferred to this court and consolidated for review and determination under case No. 77,142. See Supreme Court Rule 2.06 (1996 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 16).

"Determining whether a statute violates the constitution is a question of law. When determining a question of law, this court may exercise an unlimited de novo standard of review. See State v. Mertz, 258 Kan. 745, 748, 907 P.2d 847 (1995). 'A statute is presumed constitutional, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity. If there is any reasonable way to construe a statute as constitutionally valid, the court must do so. A statute must clearly violate the constitution before it...