Inks v. Healthcare Distributors of Indiana, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 3:93-CV-812RM.,3:93-CV-812RM.
• Citation: 901 F. Supp. 1403
• Parties: Patricia A. INKS, Plaintiff, v. HEALTHCARE DISTRIBUTORS OF INDIANA, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

901 F. Supp. 1403

Patricia A. INKS, Plaintiff, v. HEALTHCARE DISTRIBUTORS OF INDIANA, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 3:93-CV-812RM.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

June 5, 1995.

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Aladean M. DeRose, South Bend, IN, for Patricia A. Inks.

Thomas J. Brunner, Jr., Paul J. Peralta, Baker and Daniels, South Bend, IN, for Healthcare Distributors of Indiana, Inc. and Bergen Brunswig Corp.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MILLER, District Judge.

This cause comes before the court on Patricia Inks' motion to reconsider denial of front pay and petition for attorney's fees and costs, and the defendants' motion for remittitur of damages or in the alternative for a new trial. For the following reasons the court denies Mrs. Inks' motion to reconsider the front pay issue, denies the defendants' motion for remittitur or in the alternative for new trial and grants Mrs. Inks' motion for an award of attorney's fees and costs.

Patricia Inks sued her former employer, Healthcare Distributors of Indiana, Inc. ("HDI"), and the company that subsequently acquired HDI, Bergen Brunswig Corporation, under the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging sex and age discrimination. After a four-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict for Mrs. Inks on her age discrimination claim with an additional finding that HDI's conduct with regard to Mrs. Inks' age was willful. The jury awarded Mrs. Inks $15,000.00 in back pay (including prejudgment interest), and in an advisory verdict, awarded Mrs. Inks $10,000.00 in front pay. See, e.g., Downes v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 41 F.3d 1132, 1142 (7th Cir.1994) ("The court may submit the issue of front pay to the jury for advice, but it is not bound by the jury's advisory verdict.").

At a post-trial hearing, the court noted that prejudgment interest is not awardable when liquidated damages are awarded. See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 397 (7th Cir.1991). Therefore, the court discounted the jury's $15,000.00 award of back pay by a rate of 6% to subtract out the award of prejudgment interest, reducing the back pay award to $12,797.00. That calculation is not at issue in any of the present motions. The court also determined that front pay should not be awarded, and accordingly refused to award Mrs. Inks any amount of front pay damages. Because the jury found that HDI's conduct in violating the ADEA was willful, the $12,797.00 back pay award was doubled to $25,594.00, and the clerk entered judgment in that amount.

I. Motion to Reconsider Denial of Front Pay

Mrs. Inks seeks reconsideration of the court's denial of front pay, contending that front pay is required as a "make whole" remedy when reinstatement is not feasible. She makes this motion pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e), which simply states that a "motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment."

Rule 59(e) permits a district court to entertain a motion to alter or amend a judgment. A claimant can invoke the rule to direct a court's attention to matters such as newly discovered evidence or a manifest error of law or fact. The rule essentially enables a district court to correct its own errors, sparing the parties and the appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings.

Russell v. Delco Remy Division of General Motors Corporation, 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir.1995) (citations omitted).

A motion to alter or amend a judgment is not appropriately used to advance arguments or theories that could and should have been made before the district court rendered a judgment, or to present evidence that was available earlier. Instead, a Rule 59(e) motion "must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence." The decision to grant or deny relief on such a motion is one we entrust to the district court's sound judgment.

LB Credit Corporation v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).

At the post-trial hearing, the court declined to award front pay to Mrs. Inks after weighing several factors: (1) although an award of liquidated damages cannot be the sole basis for precluding an award of front pay, the court found that the liquidated damages award nevertheless was a factor to be considered; (2) the court also considered the degree of certainty of continued employment, and concluded that it was entirely less than clear that Mrs. Inks would have stayed employed at HDI or Bergen Brunswig; (3) the court found no basis or authority for the requested award of seven years of front pay; (4) the court found that there was no evidence that Mrs. Inks would actually suffer significant future damages because the salary and benefits received from her new employer, Nephrology, Inc., are reasonably close to those received from HDI. Indeed, Mrs. Inks' supervisor at Nephrology, Inc. testified at trial that Mrs. Inks had not received a raise at Nephrology, Inc. only because of oversight.

Although Mrs. Inks' motion does not clearly articulate that it is founded on an alleged manifest error of law, the absence of newly acquired evidence suggests that this is the motion's premise. Her motion primarily relies upon a policy statement issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 1988, which suggests that the district court should award front pay when necessary to ensure that the plaintiff is made whole, and that an award of liquidated damages should not militate against front pay. This court, however, is bound by the holdings of the Seventh Circuit, rather than by the policy statements of the EEOC, and the Seventh Circuit has spoken to these issues:

When reinstatement is infeasible or inappropriate, front pay may be appropriate to make the plaintiff whole. In determining whether to award front pay, the court should consider all the circumstances of the case.... Front pay may be indicated especially when the plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of obtaining comparable employment or when the time period for which front pay is to be awarded is relatively short.... On the other hand, front pay may be less appropriate when liquidated damages are awarded.... The decision to award front pay is, of course, within the discretion of the district court.

McNeil v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 800 F.2d 111, 118-19 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041, 107 S.Ct. 1983, 95 L.Ed.2d 823 (1987); see also Downes v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 41 F.3d at 1141 ("In deciding whether to award front pay, the court considers such factors as whether the plaintiff has a reasonable prospect of obtaining comparable employment, whether the time period for the award is relatively short, whether the plaintiff intended to work or was physically capable of working and whether liquidated damages have been awarded."); Tennes v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 944 F.2d 372, 381 (7th Cir.1991) ("Neither reinstatement nor front pay are mandatory relief under the ADEA; both lie within the sound discretion of the trial court after careful consideration of the particular facts of the case."); United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 957 F.2d 1446, 1463-64 (7th Cir.1992) (award of liquidated damages is relevant to front pay issue if "a front pay award would be highly speculative due to the lengthy period for which damages are sought and the lack of certainty that plaintiff would have remained employed during such a lengthy period"); Price v. Marshall Erdman & Associates, Inc., 966 F.2d 320, 327 (7th Cir.1992) (risk of noncontinuity of future employment in a volatile field must be considered in determining an award of front pay).

The court applied the governing law of the Seventh Circuit when it declined to award front pay to Mrs. Inks. Aside from the fact that Mrs. Inks was awarded liquidated damages, the court also found that front pay was a speculative award because HDI was acquired by Bergen Brunswig soon after Mrs. Inks' discharge, and that there was no evidence suggesting that Mrs. Inks would have been rehired as an employee of Bergen Brunswig, or that she would have continued her employment for seven years. See United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 957 F.2d at 1463-64 (award of liquidated damages is relevant to front pay issue if "a front pay award would be highly speculative due to the lengthy period for which damages are sought and the lack of certainty that plaintiff would have remained employed during such a lengthy period"); Downes v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 41 F.3d at 1142 ("It is, of course, true that a front pay award must be grounded in available facts, acceptable to a reasonable person and not highly speculative."). Finally, the court also based its determination on the fact that Mrs. Inks had found comparable employment within four months of her termination. See McNeil v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 800 F.2d at 118 ("front pay may be indicated especially when the plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of obtaining comparable employment"). After reviewing its decision, the court is unconvinced that the decision not to award front pay constituted a manifest error of law,¹ and so denies Mrs. Inks' Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration of the denial of front pay.

II. Motion for Remittitur or New Trial

The defendants have moved for remittitur, or in the alternative, for a new trial, with respect to the $12,797.00 back pay award. The defendants contend that the $12,797.00 amount awarded as back pay bears no reasonable relationship to Mrs. Inks' evidence presented at trial, and thus that the award could only have been the product of passion, a manifest disregard of the evidence and law, or both. Therefore, the defendants request that the back pay damages be reduced to the sum...