Inland Lumber & Timber Co. v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 30 November 1905
• Citation: 83 P. 933,11 Idaho 508
• Parties: INLAND LUMBER AND TIMBER COMPANY v. THOMPSON
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

83 P. 933

11 Idaho 508

INLAND LUMBER AND TIMBER COMPANY v. THOMPSON

Supreme Court of Idaho

November 30, 1905

ASSESSMENT FOR TAXATION-LIST OF PROPERTY FURNISHED BY TAXPAYER-ESTOPPEL-ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENTS-ACTION OF BOARD OF EQUALIZATION-NOTICE.

1. Where a taxpayer has furnished the assessor with a statement of his property, and the assessor, relying thereon, has assessed the property therein described against the person furnishing the list, such person will thereafter be estopped from denying the ownership of the property in an action to enjoin the collection of the tax.

2. Under revenue act of 1901 (Sess. Laws 1901, p. 233) it is made the duty of the board of equalization to order the assessor to assess any property which has escaped assessment and where such assessment is made before the final adjournment of the session of the board convened on the fourth Monday in July, the taxpayer has his opportunity of being heard, and such assessment is not void for want of notice or opportunity to be heard in relation thereto.

3. The statutes (Act 1901, pp. 250, 254, secs. 53, 65) and published notice by the clerk of the board of commissioners (sec. 92) constitute notice to the taxpayer of the meeting of the board of equalization and of his right to appear at either or both of such meetings and protest against any assessment or action of the board in relation to assessments.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from the District Court in and for Kootenai County. Honorable Ralph T. Morgan, Judge.

Action by plaintiff to have canceled an assessment against certain property and to enjoin the collection of a tax assessed thereon. Judgment for defendant and plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.

Judgments affirmed. Costs awarded to respondents.

Hamblin Lund & Gilbert, for Appellant.

No part of the public domain is taxable by the state, and land is not severed from the public domain until at least the equitable title has passed to the individual and his right to a patent is complete. (Kansas etc. Ry. Co. v. Prescott, 16 Wall. 603, 21 L.Ed. 373; Union P. Ry. Co. v McShane, 22 Wall. 444, 22 L.Ed. 747; Hussman v. Durham, 165 U.S. 144, 17 S.Ct. 253, 41 L.Ed. 664; Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed., 135; 27 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 644, subd. "C," and notes 3 and 4, with numerous cases cited; Rose's Notes on U.S. Supreme Court Reports, 133, U.S. 496-514; Rose's Notes on U.S. Supreme Court Reports, 16 Wall. 603-610.) Adopting as settled law, then, the proposition that the public domain is not taxable until the equitable title is fully vested in the individual, we reach the real question in this branch of the case, viz.: When does the equitable title pass under a forest reserve lieu selection? In this connection we ask the court to examine the act of Congress authorizing these lieu selections. (Act of June 4, 1897, U.S. Comp. Stats. 3768, Rules 16 and 18. See 24 L. D. 589-592; Cosmos Expl. Co. v. Gray Eagle Oil Co., 190 U.S. 302, 23 S.Ct. 692, 24 S.Ct. 860, 47 L.Ed. 1064; Wisconsin Central Ry. Co. v. Price County, 133 U.S. 496, 10 S.Ct. 341, 33 L.Ed. 687.) The decisions are uniform to the effect that the owner of land is not estopped from questioning an assessment where he has handed in a list, as in this case, where such assessment is absolutely void. (See Charleston v. Middlesex, 109 Mass. 270; State v. Burrough, 174 Mo. 700, 74 S.W. 610; Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. Cass Co., 51 Neb. 369, 70 N.W. 955; Centennial Eureka M. Co. v. Juab Co., 22 Utah 395, 62 P. 1024; State v. Bellew, 86 Wis. 189, 56 N.W. 782; State v. Baker, 129 Mo. 482, 31 S.W. 924.) The effect of the assessment of appellant's lands without notice to the company, and at such a time as to preclude all opportunity to contest such assessment before the board of equalization is sufficient to render it illegal. (Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed., p. 624; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 4 S.Ct. 663, 28 L.Ed. 569; Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 13 S.Ct. 750, 37 L.Ed. 637; Winona etc. L. Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U.S. 526, 16 S.Ct. 83, 40 L.Ed. 247; Bellingham Bay Co. v. New Whatcom, 172 U.S. 315, 19 S.Ct. 205, 43 L.Ed. 460; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183, 30 Am. Rep. 289; County of San Mateo v. Southern P. Ry. Co., 13 F. 722; County of Santa Clara v. Southern P. Ry. Co., 18 F. 385; Hutson v. Woodbridge etc. Dist., 79 Cal. 90, 16 P. 549, 21 P. 435; Kuntz v. Sumpton, 117 Ind. 1, 19 N.E. 474, 2 L. R. A. 655; McEneney v. Sullivan, 125 Ind. 407, 25 N.E. 540; Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Iowa 290, 81 N.W. 604, 50 L. R. A. 92.) This applies to subsequent assessments. (Winona etc. L. Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U.S. 526, 16 S.Ct. 83, 40 L.Ed. 247; People v. Pittsburg Ry. Co., 67 Cal. 625, 8 P. 381.)

Ezra R. Whitla, for Respondent.

The question which this court has to decide in this case is: "Can a person furnish a list of property for taxation, and afterward come in and enjoin the collection of the tax on the same, without showing some equitable grounds for their action?" (People v. Stockton etc. R. R. Co., 49 Cal. 414; San Francisco v. Flood, 64 Cal. 504, 2 P. 264; Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., p. 671; In re Bank of Marion, 153 Ill. 516, 39 N.E. 118.) It is not even necessary that the statemen furnished by the taxpayer to the assessor should be verified. If he furnishes it for the purpose of assessment he is estopped just the same as if he had furnished a verified statement. (State v. Cooper, 59 Wis. 666, 18 N.W. 438; Phelps Mtg. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 84 Iowa 610, 51 N.W. 50; Lake Co. v. Sulphur Bank etc. Min. Co., 68 Cal. 14, 8 P. 593; People v. Atkinson, 103 Ill. 45; Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Pollak, 75 Ill. 292; American Union Exp. Co. v. St. Joseph, 66 Mo. 675, 27 Am. Rep. 382; Hubbard v. Windsor, 15 Mich. 146.) A party asking for relief from an improper assessment in view of taxation must show equity in his behalf and not attempt to evade just taxation. (Steele v. Dunham, 26 Wis. 393.) The appellant corporation contends that the state has no right to tax its property as property which has escaped taxation. We cite the following authorities to sustain the respondent's position in this contention: 27 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 698. The county had the right to assess property originally omitted from the tax-roll. (Oregon etc. R. Co. v. Lane Co., 23 Or. 386, 31 P. 964; Ramp v. Marion Co., 24 Or. 461, 33 P. 681; Kirkwood v. Ford, 34 Or. 552, 56 P. 411; Albany Mut. Bldg. Assn. v. City of Laramie, 10 Wyo. 54, 65 P. 1011; Aggers v. People, 20 Colo. 348, 38 P. 386; United States Trust Co. v. Territory, 10 N. Mex. 416, 62 P. 987; Sellers v. Barrett, 185 Ill. 466, 57 N.E. 422; People v. Sellars, 179 Ill. 170, 53 N.E. 545; Crowder v. Riggs, 153 Ind. 158, 53 N.E. 1019; Reynolds v. Bowen, 138 Ind. 434, 36 N.E. 756, 37 N.E. 962; City of Delphi v. Bowen, 138 Ind. 235, 36 N.E. 761; Louisville Water Co. v. Commonwealth, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 2, 34 S.W. 1064; State Tax Commrs. v. Assessors, 124 Mich. 491, 83 N.W. 209; Eldhorn Land etc. v. Dixon Co., 35 Neb. 426, 53 N.W. 382; Kink v. Parker, 73 Iowa 757, 34 N.W. 451; Cedar Rapids etc. Ry. Co. v. Carroll Co., 41 Iowa 153.) Now the appellant further contends that notice must be given before property can be taxed. My answer to that question is, that where, as in this case, the property had never been given into the assessor in time for assessment, section 53 of the Session Laws of 1901, page 250, is a standing notice to such property owner to appear at that time and see that his property is properly assessed and valued, or to waive his rights in this regard. For further authorities in this regard, we cite Oregon etc. Co. v. Lane Co., 23 Or. 386, 31 P. 964; Ramp v. Marion Co., 24 Or. 461, 33 P. 681; Kirkwood v. Ford, 34 Or. 552, 56 P. 411; Oregon etc. Sav. Bank v. Jordan, 16 Or. 113, 17 P. 621; 27 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 707; Erwin v. Hubbard, 4 Idaho 170, 37 P. 274. The allegation of the appellant that the assessment was unequal and unjust as to it is not sufficient. (State v. Sadler, 21 Nev. 13, 23 P. 799; Albuquerque Bank v. Perea, 147 U.S. 87, 13 S.Ct. 194, 37 L.Ed. 91; National Bank v. Kimball, 103 U.S. 732, 26 L.Ed. 469; Wagoner v. Loomis, 37 Ohio St. 571-583.)

AILSHIE, J., STOCKSLAGER, C. J., SULLIVAN, J. Sullivan, J., Stockslager, C. J., and Ailshie, J., concurring.

OPINION

The facts are stated in the opinion.

AILSHIE, J.

This action was commenced by the plaintiff, a Washington corporation, for the purpose of having an assessment against certain timber lands owned by plaintiff and situated in Kootenai county vacated and set aside, and to restrain and enjoin the collector from collecting a tax under such assessment. The plaintiff's first cause of action alleges that under the act of Congress approved June 4, 1897, the plaintiff had located forest reserve lieu land scrip on a body of government lands situated in Kootenai county, and that the location and selection had not been approved by the commissioners of the general land office up to January 12 1903, and that on January 12th, the title to all such lands was still in the United States, and that the same was not taxable by or under the authority of the state of Idaho. The second cause of action alleges that prior to January 1, 1903 the plaintiff made soldiers' additional homestead applications under the act of Congress as embodied in sections 2306 and 2307 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, for certain lands situated in Kootenai county, but that none of said applications were approved or allowed by the commissioner of the general land office up to and including January 12, 1903, and that on January 12th the title to such lands still remained in the United States government, and that the same was not taxable by the state of Idaho. It is further alleged in each of the foregoing causes of...