Inland Oil and Transport Co. v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 29 June 1979
• Docket Number: No. 79-1031,79-1031
• Citation: 600 F.2d 725
• Parties: INLAND OIL AND TRANSPORT CO., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Clifford L. Alexander, Secretary of the Army of the United States, Leon McKinney, District Engineer of the St. Louis District Corps of Engineers and James Fogilphol, James Stewart and Vernon Drew, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 725

600 F.2d 725

INLAND OIL AND TRANSPORT CO., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, United States Army Corps of

Engineers, Clifford L. Alexander, Secretary of the Army of

the United States, Leon McKinney, District Engineer of the

St. Louis District Corps of Engineers and James Fogilphol,

James Stewart and Vernon Drew, Appellees.

No. 79-1031.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted May 17, 1979.

Decided June 29, 1979.

Paul R. Hales, of Goldstein & Price, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant; Gary T. Sacks, St. Louis, Mo., on brief.

David V. Hutchinson, Atty., Torts Branch, Civ. Div., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee; Barbara Allen Babcock, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., Robert D. Kingsland, U. S. Atty., St. Louis, Mo., and William Kanter, Atty., Washington, D. C., on brief.

Before LAY, BRIGHT and HENLEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Inland Oil and Transport Co. (Inland) brought this action against the United States, the Army Corps of Engineers, and a number of individual defendants in the district court ¹ to enjoin the continued enforcement of a Special Notice to Navigation Interests issued by the St. Louis District of the Army Corps of Engineers on March 16, 1977. Inland also asked the district court to declare the procedures established by the Special Notice to be illegal and to award Inland actual and punitive damages.

The effect of the Special Notice was to establish a locking precedence procedure for towboats and barges using the main locking chamber of Locks and Dam No. 26 on the Mississippi River near Alton, Illinois. In order to keep its place on the waiting list for transit through the main chamber, a tugboat had to be willing to assist other vessels using the locks. This assistance was required to be furnished without compensation or indemnification for loss and a boat which failed to follow this procedure lost its place in line. A smaller, auxiliary chamber was not subject to this locking precedence procedure.

Inland, which is in the business of transporting petroleum and petroleum by-products on the Mississippi River by means of barges, refused to allow its towboats to render assistance as required by the procedure. As a result it alleged that its boats suffered delays and incurred other additional expenses in using the locks on three occasions. The district court considered the case on cross motions for summary judgment and held that the discontinuance of the procedure had eliminated the necessity for injunctive and declaratory relief. It also found that Inland had not sustained any damages and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. ² We affirm.

Inland argues that the district court erred in holding that its claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were rendered moot by the discontinuance of the procedure. Although the district court did raise the possibility that Inland's claims were moot, it is clear from the unpublished memorandum opinion and the authorities cited therein that the district court considered these claims on their merits and declined to order such relief. Inland Oil & Transport Co. v. United States, 462 F.Supp. 763 at 765 (E.D.Mo.1978).

Although the district court arguably had the power to grant the relief sought, it does not follow that it was required to do so.

(T)he moving party must satisfy the court that relief is needed. The necessary determination is that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive. The chancellor's decision is based on all the circumstances; his discretion is necessarily broad and a strong showing of abuse must be made to reverse it.

United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953). See also Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). In this case the district court found that the Special Notice had...