Inland Steel Company v. Ilko

• Decision Date: 28 October 1913
• Docket Number: 22,484
• Citation: 103 N.E. 7,181 Ind. 72
• Parties: Inland Steel Company v. Ilko
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

103 N.E. 7

181 Ind. 72

Inland Steel Company v. Ilko

No. 22,484

Supreme Court of Indiana

October 28, 1913

Rehearing Denied January 13, 1914.

From Lake Superior Court; Virgil S. Reiter, Judge.

Action by Mike Ilko against the Inland Steel Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant appeals. (Transferred from the Appellate Court under subd. 2, § 1394 Burns 1908, Acts 1901 p. 565.)

Affirmed.

L. L Bomberger, J. A. Bloomington, Bomberger, Sawyer & Curtis and John H. Gillett, for appellant.

F. N Gavit, T. M. C. Hembroff and J. E. Westfall, for appellee.

OPINION

Morris, J.

Appellee was injured in appellant's bar-mill warehouse, while employed in operating a cold saw used in cutting long I-beams into shipment lengths. The saw was propelled by an electric motor connected with a shaft to which the saw was attached, by an endless belt 41 feet long, 16 inches wide, and very heavy. While running at a high rate of speed, the belt broke into two pieces, one of which was hurled against appellee with such violence as to cause him serious bodily injuries, and by reason thereof, this action was brought against appellant for damages.

The complaint is in two paragraphs. The sufficiency, on demurrer, of the second is challenged by appellant. This paragraph is based on the alleged failure of appellant to guard the belt, in violation of § 9 of the act of 1899, commonly known as the Factory Act (Acts 1899 p. 231, § 8029 Burns 1908). It is alleged in the paragraph that appellee's duties required him to work at and about the belt, rapidly revolving, within one foot of the floor; that the belt was unguarded, that it was practicable to guard it, without materially impairing the efficiency of the machine driven thereby; that appellee in performing the duties of his employment was required to stand at a point about three feet from the revolving belt; that while he was in such position it broke and a portion thereof was hurled against him, causing certain enumerated injuries of a serious and permanent nature; that the proximate cause of his injuries was the failure to guard the belt.

Appellant zealously contends that, in the enactment of the statute, it was the legislative intent only to protect employes from coming in contact with dangerous belts and machinery, while in normal operation, and not to prevent injury caused by broken belts or machinery, and therefore the second paragraph of complaint is insufficient. The same theory is embodied in appellant's seventh requested instruction which was refused. If appellant's theory be correct, of course the paragraph is insufficient, for appellee was not injured by coming in contact with the belt while running in its normal position. The title of the Factory Act is as follows: "An Act concerning labor, and providing means for protecting the liberty, safety and health of laborers providing for its enforcement by creating a department of inspection, and making an appropriation therefor, repealing all laws in conflict therewith." Section 9 of the act provides "* * * all vats, pans, saws, planers, cogs, gearing, belting, shafting, set screws and machinery of every description therein shall be properly guarded * * *." In United States Cement Co. v. Cooper (1909), 172 Ind. 599, 88 N.E. 69 it was contended that this act did not apply to the mechanical device there in controversy, because of the doctrine of ejusdem generis. In the opinion, there was a determination of the legislative intent in the factory act, that bears on the point in controversy here. It was said on page 611: "To hold that the General Assembly, in devising a general plan for protecting the safety and health of factory laborers, as indicated by the title, has gone to the pains of ordaining an inspection of buildings, of providing safety devices for the use of elevators and of stairways, the manner of swinging doors of egress, for the control of belts and pulleys, for maintaining communication with engine rooms, and for the guarding of a few minor appliances, and has left the peril arising from the great body of dangerous machinery used in such places wholly unrestricted, is absurd, and it is discourteous to the legislature to impute to it such lawmaking imperfection. Considering the general purpose of the legislation, as distinctly shown by the various provisions of the act, it becomes plain that the design of the lawmakers was the selection of certain manufacturing instrumentalities, generally known to be dangerous, and susceptible of being guarded without impairing their usefulness, and the imposition upon masters of the general duty of properly guarding all such instrumentalities, on the penalty that failure to do so should be accounted negligence per se. * * * It is the duty of every employer of labor mentioned * * * to guard or to fence all dangerous machines, and all dangerous parts of machines, so as to decrease the danger to those working with or about them, as far as may reasonably be done; * * * What the law seeks is to lessen the danger to laborers in such establishments." It is a matter of common knowledge that belts used on manufacturing appliances frequently break, and, in breaking, are likely to produce serious injury to employes whose duties require them to work either at, or in the immediate vicinity of the machinery propelled by means of the belt. It is also worthy of consideration that while extreme vigilance would ordinarily prevent the workman from coming in contact with a belt revolving in normal position, no degree of care on his part might avoid the possibility of injury from the blow of a broken belt hurled from its normal place by powerful machinery. It is also a matter of common knowledge that it is extremely difficult to determine, by careful inspection, the lasting qualities of belts manufactured for use on some of the great machines employed in modern manufacturing establishments. The belt in controversy here was, in the language of appellant's brief, "brand new"; it had only been in use about three days, was purchased by appellant of a reputable manufacturer, and was inspected by appellant's foreman thirty minutes before the accident, and by him declared safe for use. Belts of the same manufacture and the same presumed quality, had theretofore lasted from six to seven months, running on the same machine. In United States Cement Co. v. Cooper, supra, it was said on page 607 that the legislature may go further than the common law, and set up a particular standard of duty to promote the safety of factory employes, and that "It is obvious that this is what the lawmakers sought to accomplish by the act in question." In our opinion, appellant's theory of the legislative intent would unreasonably limit the scope of the act. Its language does not suggest such interpretation, and it is difficult to conceive why, in throwing additional safeguards around the employe to protect him against accidents that might be avoided by due vigilance, it left him without...