Inlet Harbour v. Sc Prt

Decision Date17 March 2008
Docket NumberNo. 26459.,26459.
Citation659 S.E.2d 151
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesINLET HARBOUR, a South Carolina General Partnership, Respondent v. The SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PARKS, RECREATION AND TOURISM, Appellant, v. Inlet Harbour Property Owners Association, Inc., Respondent.

Mark Andrew Nappier, of Joye, Nappier & Risher, of Murrells Inlet, James B. Richardson, Jr., of Columbia, and Ezizze Davis Foxworth, of Loris, for Appellant.

Dominic A. Starr, of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, of Myrtle Beach, for Respondents.

Chief Justice TOAL:

This appeal arises out of a dispute involving road access to oceanfront property in Murrells Inlet, South Carolina. The crux of this matter is the scope of an easement over a private road implied in a deed from Respondent Inlet Harbour, a South Carolina general partnership, to the South Carolina Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism. The trial court held that the implied easement was limited in scope and the Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism appealed. We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The circumstances giving rise to this case are best explained by way of historical narrative. In the early 1970's, a group of investors formed the Inlet Harbour general partnership and acquired a large tract of land on the peninsula forming the northern border of the entrance to the coastal waterway known as Murrells Inlet. The partnership made this acquisition for the purpose of developing this area into a residential subdivision.

At the time the partnership purchased this land, it was aware that the United States Army Corps of Engineers was preparing a substantial engineering project to solve navigability problems in the Murrells Inlet waterway. This project, referred to as the "Murrells Inlet Navigability Project," called for the construction of jetties at the north and south entrances to the inlet and for routine dredging of the inlet. The project was to be funded with both state and federal resources, and the South Carolina Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism ("the Department") was charged with acquiring the land necessary for the project. The Department was to acquire the necessary property and transfer that property to the Corps of Engineers.

The land at issue in this case was acquired for the construction and maintenance of the jetty at the inlet's north entrance. Inlet Harbour sold a first parcel of land to the Department in March 1976. This rather large tract (approximately 4.2 acres) was located very near the end of the peninsula. The tract bordered the ocean on the east and undeveloped property on the west and south. Undeveloped residential lots bordered the tract on the north, and Inlet Harbour Drive — the yet-to-be-developed thoroughfare through the development — abutted portions of the tract's north and west borders. In addition to describing the property by metes and bounds, the deed to the Department referenced a plat recorded roughly two weeks earlier. This plat showed the 4.2-acre tract, the adjacent undeveloped lots, and the future site of Inlet Harbour Drive. The deed to the Department additionally contained an express easement to use Inlet Harbour Drive to access the property "for the sole purpose of constructing and maintaining the north sand dike and jetty for the Murrells Inlet, South Carolina, Navigation Project."

Some time after this transfer, the Corps of Engineers directed the Department to acquire a second tract of land from Inlet Harbour. The Corps required this second purchase in the event that it proved necessary to construct a "deflector dike" to maintain the project. The Department believed this second acquisition to be unnecessary, but nevertheless acquired this smaller tract of approximately 3.56 acres located immediately to the south of the Department's larger tract. The parties completed this transaction in July 1977. Like the initial land sale, this deed described the conveyed property by reference to a plat. Unlike the initial sale, however, this deed did not contain any easement over or reference to Inlet Harbour Drive. After this second transaction, the Department owned contiguous tracts which comprised the south and southeast corners of the north Murrells Inlet peninsula.

The Department transferred the 4.2-acre tract of property to the Corps of Engineers roughly one month after acquiring the 3.56-acre tract. Because the Department felt that the acquisition of the second tract was unnecessary, the Department leased the 3.56-acre tract to the Corps instead of transferring title to the Corps. Although the transfer of the 4.2-acre tract had the effect of cutting the 3.56-acre tract off from road access, it appears that the Corps and the Department continued to access the 3.56-acre tract, albeit very infrequently, by using Inlet Harbour Drive and then traversing the 4.2-acre tract. The Department's lease with the Corps expired in the mid-1990's, and the Corps determined that it would not need to construct a deflector dike in order to maintain the Navigability Project. The Department then began investigating the subdivision and sale of the 3.56-acre tract, and this litigation followed.

The Inlet Harbour partnership initiated this declaratory judgment action against the Department requesting that the court declare the scope of the Department's right to use Inlet Harbour Drive to access the 3.56-acre tract. The Department asserted the creation of an express easement and an easement implied by necessity as counterclaims, and the Department sought to add Respondent Inlet Harbour Property Owners Association as a third-party defendant.1 Although the property owners association answered that it had assigned all of its rights in this litigation to the partnership, there appears to be no continuing dispute involving the property owners association's inclusion as a party in this case.

The trial court entered a grant of partial summary judgment to the Department. Relying on the authority of Blue Ridge Realty Company v. Williamson, 247 S.C. 112, 145 S.E.2d 922 (1965), the trial court held that the Department had an easement for ingress and egress over Inlet Harbour Drive which arose out of the reference in the Department's deed to a plat depicting subdivided lots and streets. Although the trial court held that there was no doubt as to the existence of this easement, the court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the scope of the Department's easement was unrestricted or was restricted to purposes relating to the Murrells Inlet Navigability Project. The parties proceeded to trial, and at the conclusion of the trial, the court held that the Department's easement over Inlet Harbour Drive was limited to environmental purposes associated with maintaining the navigability of Murrells Inlet. The Department appealed.

This Court certified the appeal from the court of appeals pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR. The Department raises the following issue for review:

Did the trial court err in holding that the Department's easement to use Inlet Harbour Drive is limited to environmental purposes associated with maintaining the navigability of Murrells Inlet?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The determination of the existence of an easement is a question of fact in a law action, Jowers v. Hornsby, 292 S.C. 549, 551, 357 S.E.2d 710, 711 (1987), and this Court reviews factual issues relating to the existence of an easement under a highly deferential standard. See Townes Associates, Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 85-86, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1976) (providing that questions of fact in a law action are generally reviewed under the "any evidence" standard).

Apart from the issue of an easement's creation, however, the determination of the scope of an easement is an action in equity. Tupper v. Dorchester County, 326 S.C. 318, 323, 487 S.E.2d 187, 190 (1997). In an action at equity, tried by a judge alone, an appellate court may find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Townes, 266 S.C. at 86, 221 S.E.2d at 775.

LAW/ANALYSIS

The Department argues that the trial court erred in holding that the Department's easement over Inlet Harbour Drive is limited to environmental purposes associated with maintaining the navigability of Murrells Inlet. We disagree.

An easement is a right of use over another's property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 457 (5th ed. 1979). Easements can arise by both express creation and by implication. Implied easements are based upon the theory that whenever one conveys property, he intends to convey whatever is necessary for the property's use and enjoyment. 17A Am.Jur. Easements § 37 (1957). The purpose of an implied easement is to give effect to the intentions of the parties to a transaction, and because the implication of an easement in a conveyance goes against the general rule that a written instrument speaks for itself, implied easements are not favored. Id.; see also 28A C.J.S. Easements § 61 (1996).

The creation of an implied easement generally requires that the facts and circumstances surrounding the conveyance, the property, the parties, or some other characteristic demonstrate that the objective intention of the parties was to create an easement. 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 19 (2004); 28A C.J.S. § 62. Courts have, over time, developed various presumptions regarding the creation of implied easements in certain circumstances. One such presumption arises when an owner subdivides his land and has the land platted into lots and streets. This Court has recognized the general rule that when an owner conveys subdivided lots and references the plat in the deed, the owner grants the lot owners an easement over the streets appearing in the plat. See, e.g., Blue Ridge Realty Co., 247 S.C. at 118, 145 S.E.2d at 924-25.2

In the instant case, the Department argues that the scope of their easement over Inlet Harbour Drive,...

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