Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 03 July 1957
• Citation: 3 N.Y.2d 137,143 N.E.2d 895,164 N.Y.S.2d 699,59 A.L.R.2d 1072
• Parties: , 143 N.E.2d 895, 59 A.L.R.2d 1072 William F. INMAN, an Infant, by Shirley M. Inman, His Guardian ad Litem, et al., Respondents, v. BINGHAMTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent. Arthur T. Lacey at al., Partners, Doing Business under the Name of A. T. Lacey& Sons, et al., Third-Party Defendants-Appellants. William F. INMAN, an Infant, by Shirley M. Inman, His Guardian ad Litem, etal., Respondents, v. Arthur T. LACEY et al., Partners Doing Business under the Name of A. T. Lacey& Sons, et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 699

164 N.Y.S.2d 699

3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 59

A.L.R.2d 1072

William F. INMAN, an Infant, by Shirley M. Inman, HisGuardian ad Litem, et al., Respondents, v.BINGHAMTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant and Third-Party

Plaintiff-Respondent.

Arthur T. Lacey at al., Partners, Doing Business under the

Name of A. T. Lacey& Sons, et al., Third-Party

Defendants-Appellants.

William F. INMAN, an Infant, by Shirley M. Inman, HisGuardian ad Litem, etal., Respondents, v.Arthur T. LACEY et al., Partners Doing Business under the

Name of A. T. Lacey& Sons, et al., Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 3, 1957.

Paul C. Gouldin, Binghamton, for Vincent J. Smith, Inc., third-party defendant-appellant and appellant.

Conrad E. Stearns, Binghamton, for Arthur T. Lacey and others, third-party defendants-appellants and appellants.

Willard E. Pierce, Jr., Binghamton, for defendant and third-partyplaintiff-respondent.

Israel Margolis, Binghamton, for respondents.

FULD, Judge.

Six years after an apartment house had been completed and turned over to the owner, this action was brought against the architects who designed the structure and the builder who constructed it, as well as the owner, to recover for injuries suffered by a child of a tenant when he fell off a stoop or porch.We are here concerned with the sufficiency of plaintiffs' complaint and defendant owner's third-party complaint against the builder and architects.

William Inman, an infant, lived with his parents in an apartment leased by them from the Binghamton Housing Authority.When he was two years old he fell off the stoop, a built-up area at the rear entranceway to the apartment, one 'step' above the concrete pavement, and was injured.¹Two separate suits were brought on behalf of the child, one against the Housing Authority and the other against the architects, defendants Lacey, and the builder, defendantVincent J. Smith Inc.In the action in which it was named as defendant, the Housing Authority served a third-party complaint against the builder and the architects, asserting a right to indemnification in the event of a recovery against it.

The Inmans' complaint against the architects and builder alleges that they were tenants residing in a first-floor apartment in Saratoga Terrace, a public housing project in the City of Binghamton, owned and operated by the Binghamton Housing Authority; that the building had been erected in 1948 by the defendant Smith following the 'plan and design' of the defendants Lacey; that on May 24, 1954, while the two-year-old plaintiff was attempting to enter his apartment, he fell from the stoop, sustaining severe injuries; that the architects and builder, the former in designing and planning and the latter in proceeding with construction, created a 'hazardous and extremely dangerous condition,' in the stoop area, 'well-knowing that * * * (it) would be used by infant children'.The danger created, according to the complaint, stemmed from three alleged defects: first, and this is the crux of the asserted negligence, the absence of 'a protective railing, guard, or any device whatever to protect the occupants' and other persons 'from falling' off the stoop; second, the fact that the rear door opended outward to the porch 'in such manner' that those on the porch 'are required to back precariously close to the edge'; and, finally, that the 'step leading from (the) porch or stoop to the sidewalk' was 'grossly inadequate' in that it was in the center of the porch and did not extend along its entire length.

The third-party complaint, brought by the Housing Authority against the architects and builder, sets forth two couses of action against each, one founded on a common-law right to indemnification and the other upon provisions of contract.

Upon motions by the builder and the architects to dismiss the thirdparty complaint, the court at Special Term dismissed the causes of action not based on contract.Some time later, when they moved to dismiss the Inmans' complaint against them, the court, holding that no actionable negligence was alleged, granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.

Appeals from the various orders and judgments subsequently entered in each action were consolidated by stipulation, and the Appellate Division, reversing in part, decided that the Inmans' complaint stated a cause of action within 'The doctrine announced in the case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A.1916F, 696' and that, except for the contract cause of action against the architects, which it dismissed, the third-party complaint presented issues of fact requiring trial.The Appellate Division granted permission to appeal and certified five questions of law.

Putting aside for the moment the third-party complaint and addressing ourselves solely to the suit brought by the Inmans, the questions presented are, first, do the principles underlying the rule announced in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A.1916F, 696 holding a manufacturer of an inherently dangerous chattel, defectively made, liable for injuries to remote users also apply to those who plan and put up structures on real property and, second, if they do, do the allegations in the present complaint establish the existence of liability.

Although this court has not had occasion to cite MacPherson v. Baick Motor Co., supra, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A.1916F, 696, in cases dealing with structures erected upon real property, it is to be noted that this is not the first case in which we considered whether a builder or a building contractor may be held accountable in negligence for injuries to a third person not in privity with him.(SeeAdams v. White Construction Co., 299 N.Y. 641, 87 N.E.2d 52reversing274 App.Div. 1072, 85 N.Y.S.2d 837.)We decided in favor of responsibility, our decision therein, as well as that of the Appellate Division in this case, stemming from an awareness that 'there is no visible reason for any distinction between the liability of one who supplies a chattel and one who erects a structure'.(Prosser on Torts (2d ed., 1955), § 85, p. 517.)And a number of other courts, likewise encountering nothing more persuasive than arguments that had proved unavailing when advanced to protect the manufacturers of chattels from liability, have reached the same conclusion.See, e. g., Hanna v. Fletcher, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 310, 231 F.2d 469, 472, certiorari deniedGichner Iron Works, Inc., v. Hanna, 351 U.S. 989, 76 S.Ct. 1051, 100 L.Ed. 1501;Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 3 Cir., 166 F.2d 908, 916;Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal.2d 228, 230-232, 201 P.2d 1, 13 A.L.R.2d 183;Del Gaudio v. Ingerson, 142 Conn. 564, 568-569, 115 A.2d 665;Hunter v. Quality Homes, 6 Terry 100, 45 Del. 100, 105-106, 68 A.2d 620;Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 333 Ill. 78, 164 N.E. 162, 60 A.L.R. 353;Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa.. 1, 34-37, 68 A.2d 517;Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 518, 525, 231 P. 832;Colton v. Foulkes, 259 Wis. 142, 146-147, 47 N.W.2d 901;see, also, 2 Restatement, Torts, § 385, p. 1030;2 Harper and James on Law of Torts (1956), § 28.10, pp. 1556-1557;Note, 13 A.L.R.2d 191.As the Pennsylvania high court declared, 'there is no reason to believe that the law governing liability * * * should be, or is, in any way different where real structures are involved instead of chattels.There is no logical basis for such a distinction * * *.The principle inherent in the MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. case and those that have followed it * * * cannot be made to depend upon the merely technical distinction between a chattel and a structure built upon the land.'Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., supra, 363 Pa. 1, 34-35, 68 A.2d 517, 533.

While, therefore, we conclude that the 'principle inherent' in the MacPherson doctrine applies to determine the liability of architects or builders for their handiwork, it does not follow that the complaint against the defendants Lacey and the defendant Smith necessarily states a valid cause of action.It must be further examined to ascertain whether it also alleges the other elements deemed essential under MacPherson-Buick.

The cases establish that the manufacturer of a machine or other article, 'dangerous because of the way in which it functions, and patently so, owes to * * * (remote users) a duty merely to make it free from latent defects and concealed dangers.'Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 471, 95 N.E.2d 802, 803.'We have not yet reached the state,'we wrote in the Campocase, supra, 301 N.Y. at pages 472-473, 95 N.E.2d at page 804, 'where a manufacturer is under the duty of making a machine accident proof or foolproof.* * * Suffice it to note that, in cases dealing with a manufacturer's liability for injuries to remote users, the stress has always been upon the duty of guarding against hidden defects and of giving notice of concealed dangers.(Cases cited.)In point of fact, several of the cases actually declare that a duty is owed, a liability imposed, only if the defect or danger be not 'known' or 'patent' or discoverable 'by a reasonable inspection." And, since the presence of a latent defect or a danger not generally known is precedent to the manufacturer's liability, the absence of such a recital in the complaint is fatal to the existence of a cause of action.

Examination of the pleading before us discloses its invalidity.It contains no allegation of any latent defect or concealed danger.It simply complains of (1) the absence of 'a protective railing, guard or any device', (2) the arc made by the door when opened and (3) the fact that the step did not extend the full length of the stoop, all patently obvious defects, if, indeed, they are defects at all.From none of these recitals may it be said that the architects or the builder violated a duty owed to users of the stoop.Entirely lacking, to paraphrase...