Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority

• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: FULD; CONWAY
• Citation: 3 N.Y.2d 137,143 N.E.2d 895,164 N.Y.S.2d 699,59 A.L.R.2d 1072
• Decision Date: 03 July 1957
• Parties: , 143 N.E.2d 895, 59 A.L.R.2d 1072 William F. INMAN, an Infant, by Shirley M. Inman, His Guardian ad Litem, et al., Respondents, v. BINGHAMTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent. Arthur T. Lacey at al., Partners, Doing Business under the Name of A. T. Lacey& Sons, et al., Third-Party Defendants-Appellants. William F. INMAN, an Infant, by Shirley M. Inman, His Guardian ad Litem, etal., Respondents, v. Arthur T. LACEY et al., Partners Doing Business under the Name of A. T. Lacey& Sons, et al., Appellants.

Page 699

164 N.Y.S.2d 699 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 59
A.L.R.2d 1072 William F. INMAN, an Infant, by Shirley M. Inman, His
Guardian ad Litem, et al., Respondents,
v.
BINGHAMTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant and Third-Party
Plaintiff-Respondent.
Arthur T. Lacey at al., Partners, Doing Business under the
Name of A. T. Lacey& Sons, et al., Third-Party
Defendants-Appellants.
William F. INMAN, an Infant, by Shirley M. Inman, His
Guardian ad Litem, etal., Respondents,
v.
Arthur T. LACEY et al., Partners Doing Business under the
Name of A. T. Lacey& Sons, et al., Appellants. Court of Appeals of New York. July 3, 1957.

Page 701

[143 N.E.2d 897] [3 N.Y.2d 139] Paul C. Gouldin, Binghamton, for Vincent J. Smith, Inc., third-party defendant-appellant and appellant.

[3 N.Y.2d 140] Conrad E. Stearns, Binghamton, for Arthur T. Lacey and others, third-party defendants-appellants and appellants.

[3 N.Y.2d 141] Willard E. Pierce, Jr., Binghamton, for defendant and third-party plaintiff-respondent.

Israel Margolis, Binghamton, for respondents.

[3 N.Y.2d 142] FULD, Judge.

Six years after an apartment house had been completed and turned over to the owner, this action was brought against the architects who designed the structure and the builder who constructed it, as well as the owner, to recover for injuries suffered by a child of a tenant when he fell off a stoop or porch. We are here concerned with the sufficiency of plaintiffs' complaint and defendant owner's third-party complaint against the builder and architects.

William Inman, an infant, lived with his parents in an apartment leased by them from the Binghamton Housing Authority. When he was two years old he fell off the stoop, a built-up area at the rear entranceway to the apartment, one 'step' above the concrete pavement, and was injured. ¹ Two separate suits were brought on behalf of the child, one against the Housing Authority and the other against the architects, defendants Lacey, and the builder, defendant Vincent J. Smith,

Page 702

Inc. In the action in which it was named as defendant, the Housing Authority served a third-party complaint against the builder and the architects, asserting a right to indemnification in the event of a recovery against it.

The Inmans' complaint against the architects and builder alleges that they were tenants residing in a first-floor apartment in Saratoga Terrace, a public housing project in the City of Binghamton, owned and operated by the Binghamton Housing Authority; that the building had been erected in 1948 by the defendant Smith following[143 N.E.2d 898] the 'plan and design' of the defendants Lacey; that on May 24, 1954, while the two-year-old plaintiff was attempting to enter his apartment, he fell [3 N.Y.2d 143] from the stoop, sustaining severe injuries; that the architects and builder, the former in designing and planning and the latter in proceeding with construction, created a 'hazardous and extremely dangerous condition,' in the stoop area, 'well-knowing that * * * (it) would be used by infant children'. The danger created, according to the complaint, stemmed from three alleged defects: first, and this is the crux of the asserted negligence, the absence of 'a protective railing, guard, or any device whatever to protect the occupants' and other persons 'from falling' off the stoop; second, the fact that the rear door opended outward to the porch 'in such manner' that those on the porch 'are required to back precariously close to the edge'; and, finally, that the 'step leading from (the) porch or stoop to the sidewalk' was 'grossly inadequate' in that it was in the center of the porch and did not extend along its entire length.

The third-party complaint, brought by the Housing Authority against the architects and builder, sets forth two couses of action against each, one founded on a common-law right to indemnification and the other upon provisions of contract.

Upon motions by the builder and the architects to dismiss the thirdparty complaint, the court at Special Term dismissed the causes of action not based on contract. Some time later, when they moved to dismiss the Inmans' complaint against them, the court, holding that no actionable negligence was alleged, granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.

Appeals from the various orders and judgments subsequently entered in each action were consolidated by stipulation, and the Appellate Division, reversing in part, decided that the Inmans' complaint stated a cause of action within 'The doctrine announced in the case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A.1916F, 696' and that, except for the contract cause of action against the architects, which it dismissed, the third-party complaint presented issues of fact

Page 703

requiring trial. The Appellate Division granted permission to appeal and certified five questions of law.

Putting aside for the moment the third-party complaint and addressing ourselves solely to the suit brought by the Inmans, the questions presented are, first, do the principles underlying the rule announced in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A.1916F, 696 holding a manufacturer of an inherently dangerous chattel, defectively made, liable for injuries to [3 N.Y.2d 144] remote users also apply to those who plan and put up structures on real property and, second, if they do, do the allegations in the present complaint establish the existence of liability.

Although this court has not had occasion to cite MacPherson v. Baick Motor Co., supra, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, L.R.A.1916F, 696, in cases dealing with structures erected upon real property, it is to be noted that this is not the first case in which we considered whether a builder or a building contractor may be held accountable in...