Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 90-1858

• Decision Date: 05 February 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-1858,90-1858
• Citation: 928 F.2d 33
• Parties: INMATES OF SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Dennis J. KEARNEY, et al., Defendants, Appellants. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 33

928 F.2d 33

INMATES OF SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v.Dennis J. KEARNEY, et al., Defendants, Appellants.

No. 90-1858.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Feb. 5, 1991.

Decided March 21, 1991.

Chester A. Janiak, with whom Walter M. Foster and Burns & Levinson, were on brief, Boston, Mass., for appellant, Sheriff of Suffolk County.

Jon Laramore, Asst. Atty. Gen., and James M. Shannon, Atty. Gen., on brief, Boston, Mass., for Massachusetts Com'r of Correction, amicus curiae.

Lynn Weissberg with whom Max D. Stern and Stern & Shapiro, were on brief, Boston, Mass., for appellees, Inmates of Suffolk County Jail.

Jane S. Schacter, Mark Simonoff, and Hill & Barlow, on brief, Boston, Mass., for Women's Bar Ass'n of Mass., amicus curiae.

Before BREYER, Chief Judge, CAMPBELL and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judges.

BREYER, Chief Judge.

In 1971 the inmates of the Suffolk County jail sued the Sheriff and the Massachusetts Commissioner of Correction, and others, claiming that overcrowded conditions at the Charles Street jail violated the federal Constitution.SeeInmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F.Supp. 676(D.Mass.1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977, 95 S.Ct. 239, 42 L.Ed.2d 189(1974).In 1979 all the parties entered into a consent decree, providing, in relevant part, that the defendants would

construct, maintain and operate as applicable a new facility for the detention of both males and females who are committed to the custody of the defendant Sheriff prior to and pending their trials and de novo appeals.

Consent Decreeat 2(emphasis added).Eventually, the Commonwealth built a new jail, which opened, in Boston on Nashua Street, in May 1990.But, by the time it opened, the need for jail capacity had grown--to the point where the new jail was too small.In order to make more efficient use of space in the new jail, the Sheriff decided to use it to house only men.He has pointed out that, if he wishes to use the jail to house any female prisoner, then (to maintain proper segregation)he must set aside an entire cell block for women.Yet, he adds, he cannot find enough female prisoners to fill even the smallest block of regular holding cells (which houses 34 prisoners) let alone the special cell block in the jail constructed especially for women (which would house 40).Consequently, to avoid wasted space, he decided to keep female prisoners in jail in Framingham (as he has done since 1973) and not to transfer them to Nashua Street.

The plaintiffs, a class of Suffolk County inmates, brought this action in federal district court.They complained that the Sheriff's refusal to transfer female prisoners to Nashua Street violated the consent decree.The district court agreed.It ordered the Sheriff to transfer female prisoners to Nashua Street, and it specified in the order that he may not transfer "female detainees" from Nashua Street "to other institutions unless more than forty female detainees are committed to his custody," in which case he can reduce the number held at Nashua Street to forty.The Sheriff did not ask the district court to modify the decree.Rather, he has simply appealed the district court's order, challenging the district court's interpretation of the decree.

The Sheriff's basic argument is that, given the operational need, the decree does not prohibit him from keeping all female prisoners in Framingham.But, like the district court, we do not understand how that is so.The language of the decree quite clearly says that he will "construct, maintain and operate as applicable a new facility for the detention of both males and females...."(emphasis added).The plaintiffs in the original suit, brought in 1971, included women, as well as men.The original 1973 order, which provided for transfer of women from the old, overcrowded Charles Street jail to Framingham, explicitly said that this housing arrangement was "temporary" and added "in the sense that the parties are directed to continue their planning for construction of a new jail...."Judge Garrity's Order ofNovember 12, 1973at 3.

The Sheriff argues that the decree was not meant to permit the federal district court to oversee the "operational management" of the new jail.Assuming that the decree does not authorize the district court to interfere with daily management decisions, we still do not see how the Sheriff can reconcile his "male only" prison with the decree's language.He has offered no assurance that the "male only" condition is temporary, nor given jail population problems, does that seem likely.Rather, he would like to operate a "male only" jail for the foreseeable future.And, any such operation--from the jail's opening day without any now foreseeable temporal limit--is inconsistent with the decree's language, requiring the Sheriff to "construct" and to "maintain," as well as to "operate," a jail for "both males and females."

The Sheriff also argues that the two words "as applicable" make a difference.(The whole sentence in the decree says that the "defendants[the Commissioner, the Sheriff, the Mayor, and City Councillors] shall construct, maintain and operate as applicable a new facility for ... both males and females....")The Sheriff says the "as applicable" language refers to state law, which permits him to transfer "female prisoners" to Framingham "if suitable facilities are not available" in the relevant county.Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 125, Sec. 16.As naturally read, however, the words "as applicable" refer to the preceding words, "construct, maintain and operate," for different defendants would seem likely responsible for supervising these different activities (i.e., the Mayor and the City Council for construction and the Sheriff for operations).The Sheriff points to nothing elsewhere in the consent decree, nor does he point to any extrinsic evidence, that might lead us to accept his reading of those two words.

Finally, the Sheriff, and the Massachusetts Attorney General, point to case law indicating that we are to review the district court's decision de novo, seeAMF, Inc. v. Jewett, 711 F.2d 1096, 1100(1st Cir.1983);South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610, 613(7th Cir.1985), that we should interpret a consent decree in public litigation flexibly and broadly to achieve its basic...