Inmates of Sybil Brand Institute for Women v. County of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 24 March 1982
• Citation: 181 Cal.Rptr. 599,130 Cal.App.3d 89
• Parties: INMATES OF SYBIL BRAND INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants and Cross-Respondents, v. The COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; et al., Defendants, Respondents and Cross-Appellants. Civ. 61642.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 599

181 Cal.Rptr. 599

130 Cal.App.3d 89

INMATES OF SYBIL BRAND INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN, et al., Plaintiffs, Appellants and Cross-Respondents, v. The COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; et al., Defendants, Respondents and Cross-Appellants.

Civ. 61642.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

March 24, 1982.

Hearing Denied July 14, 1982.

ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Terry Smerling, Fred Okrand and Mark D. Rosenbaum, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs, appellants and cross-respondents.

John H. Larson, County Counsel and Frederick R. Bennett, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for defendants, respondents, and cross-appellants.

McCLOSKY, Associate Justice.

Plaintiffs in a class action brought on behalf of "all women who are or in the future will be incarcerated at Sybil Brand Institute for Women" against the County of Los Angeles and others, appeal from judgment entered therein, contending: ¹

1. The due process clause of the California Constitution mandates strict scrutiny of substantial restraints on pretrial detainees' liberty beyond those which inhere in detention.

2. The challenged substantive restraints on pretrial detainees are imposed on the basis of wealth and therefore must be subjected to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the California Constitution, article I, section 7.

3. Conditions and privileges (at Sybil Brand Institute) inferior to those experienced by male prisoners in the county jail system are forms of sex discrimination which must be subjected to careful scrutiny.

4. The due process clause of the 14th Amendment requires that jail regulations which intrude upon fundamental interests must be tailored to serve legitimate interests of jail administration.

5. The procedure for processing prisoners to and from court abridges the right of fair trial and invidiously discriminates against pretrial detainees.

6. Defendants' practice of routinely and without exception denying female inmates contact visitation cannot pass constitutional muster.

7. Plaintiffs' meager opportunity to go out-of-doors is unconstitutional.

8. Access to telephones enjoyed by prisoners at Sybil Brand Institute is inferior to that enjoyed by male prisoners in other facilities and consequently discriminatory.

9. Defendants' disciplinary procedures do not comport with due process of law.

10. Defendants' procedures for placing prisoners into the administrative segregation area known as "control" do not satisfy due process of law.

Respondents County of Los Angeles, et al, cross-appeal from an order of the trial court awarding attorneys' fees to appellants in the amount of $105,760, contending 1. An award of attorneys' fees should not include compensation for efforts expended on the application for attorneys fees, unless there exist special circumstances that would make a denial of such additional fees unjust.

2. Not only are there no special circumstances in the present action that warrant reimbursement for efforts expended on the application for attorneys fees, but the particular circumstances of this action make the inclusion of compensation for such efforts particularly inappropriate.

I. FACTS

Sybil Brand Institute for Women (hereinafter SBI), is a four-story concrete building in which the County of Los Angeles maintains a jail facility for women inmates including pretrial, sentenced and other types of prisoners. Its rated capacity is 950 inmates, but the average daily population at the time of the judgment ranged from 700 to 850 persons, of whom 275 to 300 are sentenced and the balance are pretrial detainees. The average period of incarceration is 14 days for pretrial detainees ² and 80 days for sentenced inmates. The inmate turnover is 70 to 100 inmates per day. The facility contains dormitories which house 90 percent of the inmates and cell blocks which house the remaining 10 percent. The dormitories are large, clean and bright, lighted not only with artificial lighting but also with sunlight from large windows along the length of both sides. Each housing area has its own dayroom equipped with benches, tables, stools, a television set, a tub, a sink, a washer and dryer, a bidet, and shower and toilet facilities.

Appellant inmates brought this class action against the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, some of his subordinates who are concerned with the administration of SBI, and the members of the County Board of Supervisors, challenging the legality of numerous conditions of confinement and practices at SBI. The plaintiff class contains two subclasses: pretrial detainees and sentenced prisoners.

Trial of the case involved approximately 14 days of testimony, the receipt of many exhibits, an inspection visit by the trial judge to the SBI and the submission of pretrial and post-trial briefs.

The trial court held that certain of respondents' practices were not sufficiently justified by legitimate governmental interests and enjoined those practices. ³ It also found that although certain practices, which were in effect at the time of trial, were not sufficiently justified by legitimate governmental interests, intervening modifications by the sheriff justified those modified practices current at the time of the judgment. ⁴ The trial court held that the In this appeal appellants contend that the trial court erred in its ruling relating to the denial of "contact" visits, disciplinary procedures, court transportation procedures, the use of "control" facilities, outdoor recreation procedures, and access to telephones. The facts relevant to each of these issues will be set forth below in the discussion of the issues.

remaining challenged practices either met constitutional requirements (e.g. disciplinary practices, see par. 21 of the judgment) or were reasonable and sufficiently justified by legitimate government interests. Those practices included: (1) the denial of "contact" visits; (2) rules relating to dining room behavior; (3) medical and dental care; (4) disciplinary procedures; (5) the limited involvement of male deputies with the disrobing of violent and unstable inmates whose clothes must be removed for their own protection; (6) court transportation procedures; (7) use of "control" facilities; (8) booking procedures; (9) alleged overcrowding; (10) differences in treatment between male and female inmates within the Los Angeles County jail system; (11) educational and vocational programs; (12) training and experience of officers and deputy personnel; and (13) attorney room facilities.

II. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The scope of review in cases challenging the constitutionality of procedures and conditions at custodial institutions varies depending upon the nature of the right asserted.

A condition of confinement which impinges upon a fundamental interest must be justified under both state and federal Constitutions by compelling governmental interest which cannot be satisfied by less intrusive means and is subjected to strict scrutiny on review. (People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 243 [131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375].) Under the California Constitution the same is true of regulations which accord different privileges on the basis of gender, a "suspect" classification. (Molar v. Gates (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 1, 13 .)

However, where the challenged condition touches on neither equal protection of the law nor a fundamental interest, it will survive judicial review if substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose. This is true whether the challenge is asserted by sentenced prisoners (In re Gatts (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1029 ) or pretrial detainees (Bell v. Wolfish (1979) 441 U.S. 520 [99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447] ).

Appellants argue vigorously that Bell v. Wolfish, supra, does not, under the California Constitution, control conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees because personal liberty is a fundamental interest, and substantial restraint thereon must be subjected to strict scrutiny under the due process clause of the state Constitution. They also argue that restraints upon the liberty of pretrial detainees are the result of a wealth-based classification which is regarded, under the California Constitution, as a suspect classification which must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.

They acknowledge that another division of this court held in In re Smith (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 956 that Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 controlled in cases where pretrial detainees challenged conditions of their confinement, but argue that the Smith court's analysis was improper and urge this court to "overrule" that decision.

In re Smith, supra, stands unobliterated. We have no power of review over a decision of another division of this district and we, of course, may not "overrule" it. (See In re Ruth H. (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 77, 86 [102 Cal.Rptr. 534].) In re Smith specifically held, at page 967, 169 Cal.Rptr. 564, that: "[W]hile we are cognizant that the ' "bail system ... frequently works an injustice on those who cannot afford to post a bail bond ..." ' [citation], we do not find that the inability to make bail per se constitutes a denial of equal protection."

Certain parole violators and certain other pretrial detainees are not entitled to release on bail, and some persons charged with violations of law are released on their own recognizance. The amount of bail set for serious crimes is often set in amounts which even the wealthy might have difficulty meeting. Yet we consider it undeniable that factors of wealth do enter into considerations of whether to release a pretrial detainee on bail or on his or her own recognizance. Those factors, include among others, the detainee's employment or other sources of income and his property holdings. (See Van Atta v. Scott (1980) 27 Cal.3d 424, 444 [166 Cal.Rptr. 149, 613 P.2d...