Inmobiliaria Borinquen, Inc. v. Garcia Santiago

• Citation: 295 F. Supp. 203
• Decision Date: 07 February 1969
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 533-68.
• Parties: INMOBILIARIA BORINQUEN, INC., Plaintiff, v. Ramon GARCIA SANTIAGO, the Planning Board of Puerto Rico, Francisco Lizardi, the Public Works Department of Puerto Rico, Felix Mejias, the Land Administration of Puerto Rico, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

295 F. Supp. 203

INMOBILIARIA BORINQUEN, INC., Plaintiff, v. Ramon GARCIA SANTIAGO, the Planning Board of Puerto Rico, Francisco Lizardi, the Public Works Department of Puerto Rico, Felix Mejias, the Land Administration of Puerto Rico, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 533-68.

United States District Court D. Puerto Rico.

February 7, 1969.

Wallace González, of González, Jr., González, Oliver & Novak, San Juan, P. R., for plaintiff.

Jose C. Ramos Vazquez, Arturo Aponte Pares, San Juan, P. R., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

CANCIO, Chief Judge.

The Complaint in this action alleges that Plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of two parcels of land adjacent to each other, with a total area of 27,800.62 square meters, located in the Municipality of Guaynabo, Puerto Rico; that on or about July 1965, Plaintiff was informed by the Planning Board that one of the two parcels was to be condemned by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico for the future construction of Lomas Verdes Avenue; and that on or about August 1965, the Plaintiff was also informed by the Planning Board that the other of the two parcels had to be reserved by Plaintiff for future acquisition by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to be utilized in the communal center of Los Frailes area.

The Complaint further alleges that in pursuance of such directives, Plaintiff has reserved the two parcels as instructed since 1965 and that notwithstanding many efforts on the part of Plaintiff to have said parcels either condemned or approved for development, the defendant officials of the Commonwealth agencies have taken no action, as a result of which, Plaintiff further alleges that the parcels have remained paralyzed or "frozen," and that Plaintiff has suffered severe damages.

Plaintiff charges that the facts outlined hereinabove constitute a taking of its property without just compensation, contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and a deprivation of its constitutional and civil rights which is actionable under the Federal Civil Rights Act. The Complaint seeks the liberation of the parcels from their present status and damages, or both.

Two motions to dismiss the complaint were filed—one on behalf of the Puerto Rico Land Administration and its Executive Director, and another on behalf of the President of the Planning Board and the Secretary of Public Works.

Extensive arguments and briefs were presented by counsel in support of, and against, the motions to dismiss.

The first argument for dismissal advanced by both motions to dismiss is that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, which contains the main provisions of the Federal Civil Rights Legislation invoked by Plaintiff; and this argument is supplemented by the further argument that the Complaint fails to state a cause of action and that there is no substantial federal question involved.

The Court does not agree with defendants.

It should be stated at the outset that in considering motions to dismiss, it is the function of the Court to determine whether or not the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint could support the cause of action stated therein. Birnbaum v. Trussell, 347 F.2d 86 (C.C. A.2, 1965); and Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446 (C.C.A.7, 1954) certiorari denied 350 U.S. 915, 76 S.Ct. 199, 100 L.Ed. 802 (1955).

The Civil Rights statute invoked by Plaintiff, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, which dates back to Reconstruction times, reads as follows:

"§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights.

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. R.S. § 1979."

Having before it a Complaint which alleges acts of Defendants in their official capacities which have paralyzed Plaintiff's property and property rights without just compensation, and, consequently, without due process, the Court cannot accept Defendants' attempt to exclude § 1983.

The availability and applicability of the Civil Rights Legislation (42 U.S.C. A. § 1983) against misuses of the power of eminent domain has been already established, in Progress Development Corporation et al. v. Mitchell et al., 286 F.2d 222 (C.C.A.7, 1961), where the Court said:

"It is our considered judgment that the complaint on its face states a federal cause of action, Snowden v. Hughes, 1944, 321 U.S. 1, 7, 8, 10, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497; Miles v. Armstrong, 7 Cir., 1953, 207 F.2d 284, 286, and that the resale policy of plaintiffs as found by the district court does not bar them from enforcing their rights under the relevant sections of the Civil Rights Act."

Furthermore, in the case of Jiménez v. Hernández Agosto, 588-67, wherein the complaint charged misuse of condemnation powers, this Court, per Judge Kilkenny, stated:

"* * * It is my belief that the second claim or the second cause of action, however you may view it, does state a claim against the defendants under the Civil Rights Act. (November 9, 1967)."

And that ruling was reiterated in the same case by Judge Graven, on January 19, 1968:

"It is the ruling of this Court that its jurisdiction, in the case at bar, has been properly invoked pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. 1983, 1985 and 28 U.S.C.A. 1343. Furthermore, the Complaint herein filed does state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted under the Civil Rights Act."

The second major group of arguments advanced in the motions to dismiss center upon the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The motions to dismiss broach the matter under diverse allegations and headings but, in essence, the argument is that this action is ultimately an action against the Commonwealth, and that it constitutes an attempt to interfere with the administration of lawful governmental functions of the Commonwealth.

The Court does not agree with these arguments.

The action herein is not an action against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The action is against officials of the Commonwealth acting in their official capacity, and who, as such, are not protected by the sovereign immunity.

This same question was considered by the panel of three judges who sat in this Court in Jiménez v. Hernández Agosto, 265-66, and in their opinion of November 21, 1966, the Court, relying upon the cornerstone Supreme Court decision of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)...