Inn at Saratoga Associates v. F.D.I.C., No. 935

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
Writing for the CourtVAN GRAAFEILAND
Citation60 F.3d 78
PartiesThe INN AT SARATOGA ASSOCIATES, a New York limited partnership; Myra Rynderman, as Administratrix of the Estate of Monia S. Rynderman; William F. Chandler; Steven N. Fischer; Roy Fischer; John S. Gijanto; Lawrence A. Kotlow; and John E. Wolfgang, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as receiver of the Bank of New England, N.A., Defendant-Appellee. ocket 94-6205.
Docket NumberD,No. 935
Decision Date10 July 1995

Page 78

60 F.3d 78
The INN AT SARATOGA ASSOCIATES, a New York limited
partnership; Myra Rynderman, as Administratrix of the
Estate of Monia S. Rynderman; William F. Chandler; Steven
N. Fischer; Roy Fischer; John S. Gijanto; Lawrence A.
Kotlow; and John E. Wolfgang, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as receiver of the
Bank of New England, N.A., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 935, Docket 94-6205.
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Argued Dec. 19, 1994.
Decided July 10, 1995.

Page 79

Phillip G. Steck, Albany, NY (Cooper, Erving, Savage, Nolan & Heller, Albany, NY, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellants.

Kathryn R. Norcross, F.D.I.C., Washington, DC (Ann S. Duross, Richard J. Osterman, Jr., F.D.I.C., Washington, DC, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.

Before: VAN GRAAFEILAND, WALKER and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge:

On August 1, 1986, the Inn at Saratoga Associates, a limited partnership, Monia Rynderman, its general partner, and seven of its limited partners sued Berkshire Bank & Trust Company in New York Supreme Court alleging that Berkshire reneged on a loan contract. Thereafter, Berkshire was acquired by the Bank of New England, N.A., which subsequently was declared insolvent. When the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") took over as receiver for the Bank of New England, the case was removed to federal court. There, the FDIC moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs' claims were barred under 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1823(e) and the equitable estoppel doctrine articulated in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 62 S.Ct. 676, 86 L.Ed. 956 (1942). The district court (Gagliardi, J.) granted the motion and judgment was entered in favor of the FDIC. Plaintiffs appeal from that judgment. We affirm.

The facts have been stipulated by the parties. On January 15, 1985, Rynderman met with William Porter, a vice president and regional loan officer of Berkshire, to discuss a possible $617,500 loan for the purchase and renovation of a hotel known as the Coachman Inn. Rynderman told Porter that he planned to form a limited partnership, of which he would be the general partner, for the purpose of this renovation project. On January 24, Berkshire sent Rynderman a loan commitment letter which provided that the commitment would expire if Rynderman did not sign and return the letter and pay an

Page 80

origination fee within fourteen days. Rynderman neither returned the letter nor paid the fee.

Shortly thereafter, Rynderman informed the bank that he would like to increase his loan request so that rooms could be added to the hotel. On April 9, Berkshire issued a second commitment letter in the amount of $875,000, which again specified a limited period for acceptance. Once more, Rynderman failed to indicate his acceptance within the specified period.

On April 25, Rynderman and two of his associates, Steven Fischer and Richard Kotlow, met with Porter to discuss increasing the proposed loan to over $1 million. While this request was pending, Rynderman, acting on behalf of the partnership, entered into a contract to purchase the Coachman Inn.

On July 3, plaintiffs agreed to provide $200,000 in personal guarantees to induce Berkshire to approve a loan of $1.3 million. That same day, Berkshire's loan committee approved the $1.3 million loan subject to ten conditions, including participation by a second lender in the amount of $500,000. This action is memorialized in the committee minutes.

On July 15, Porter sent a letter to Kotlow. The letter states in pertinent part as follows:

In order that we might conform to existing holding company policy, I must ask that you forward to me ... personal financial statements on the five limited partners who are willing to sign the $200,000 recourse guaranty.

Our Loan Committee, subsequent to a formal review of the March 31, 1985 financial statements on the Lookout Inn [another entity owned by Rynderman], have ratified the $1.3 million loan. I assumed [sic] that the financial statements on the Lookout Inn will give us the comfort that we seek in those statements and I look forward to ironing out all the final details relative to this mortgage loan at the earliest possible convenience.

On August 21, plaintiffs forwarded proposed closing documents to Berkshire, referring to the total loan amount as $1.3 million. A few days later, Berkshire officers drafted a proposed commitment letter in the amount of $1.3 million. However, Berkshire did not approve the letter and it did not execute plaintiffs' closing documents.

On August 30, plaintiffs met with Berkshire officials for a loan closing, bringing the personal financial statements requested by Berkshire. The outcome of this meeting was that plaintiffs received a $375,000 loan from Berkshire. Although plaintiffs contend that this was the first installment of a $1.3 million loan, none of the signed documents in the transaction mentions the larger amount. Plaintiffs repaid this loan within four months.

On September 10, Berkshire lending officers, meeting with representatives of the partnership, informed them that they still lacked supporting documentation for their proposed $1.3 million loan. The bankers also questioned the appraisal of the hotel provided by plaintiffs. At this meeting, the need for a participating lender was discussed.

While Berkshire searched for a participating lender on the $1.3 million loan, construction on the hotel commenced. On October 3, 1985, an Inn representative telephoned Berkshire and asked for an advance to pay construction expenses. Because no participating lender had yet been found, Berkshire refused this request. A week later, Rynderman demanded the advance and confirmation of the $1.3 million commitment and threatened legal action if Berkshire did not comply. Berkshire declined to comply with this demand.

On August 1, 1986, plaintiffs commenced this litigation against Berkshire in state court, contending that an agreement had been reached as to the $1.3 million loan. After this suit was brought, the Bank of New England acquired Berkshire. On January 6, 1991, the Bank of New England was declared insolvent and the FDIC was appointed as its receiver. The FDIC removed plaintiffs' action to federal court and the grant of summary judgment followed. The district court's opinion is reported at 856 F.Supp. 111.

The principles which compel the rejection of the plaintiffs' claim were set forth first in D'Oench, Duhme, supra....

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15 practice notes
  • Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. By and Through Motorcity of Jacksonville, Inc. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 93-4634
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
    • May 8, 1996
    ...the federal common law D'Oench doctrine to fill in the inevitable gaps left by the statutory language. See Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 60 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir.1995) (adhering to the common law D'Oench doctrine to fill in a gap left by the statute because failing to do so "would undercut......
  • Point Developers, Inc. v. F.D.I.C., No. CV 94-0950 ADS.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of New York)
    • April 5, 1997
    ...the scheme or arrangement as a defense to an FDIC collection action. Id. at 460, 62 S.Ct. at 680-81; see Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 60 F.3d 78, 80-81 (2d Cir.1995) (summarizing D'Oench, Duhme); FDIC v. LDM Properties, Inc., CV 94-5778(CPS), 1996 WL 449346 *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 1996). ......
  • OCI Mortgage Corp. v. Marchese, (SC 16300)
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • March 20, 2001
    ...may be one of few federal common-law rules viable after O'Melveny & Meyers), Inn at Saratoga Associates v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 60 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 1995) (although "asset" requirement for application of § 1823 [e] not satisfied, common-law equitable estoppel rule in D'Oench, Duhm......
  • Fortunoff v. Triad Land Associates, No. 93-CV-0368 (JS).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of New York)
    • October 30, 1995
    ...were precluded under D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e)); Inn At Saratoga Associates v. FDIC, 856 F.Supp. 111, 117-18 (N.D.N.Y.1994), aff'd, 60 F.3d 78 (2d Cir.1995) (barring plaintiff's tort claims of negligent misrepresentation and fraud pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) because the tort claims......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
15 cases
  • Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. By and Through Motorcity of Jacksonville, Inc. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 93-4634
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
    • May 8, 1996
    ...the federal common law D'Oench doctrine to fill in the inevitable gaps left by the statutory language. See Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 60 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir.1995) (adhering to the common law D'Oench doctrine to fill in a gap left by the statute because failing to do so "would undercut......
  • Point Developers, Inc. v. F.D.I.C., No. CV 94-0950 ADS.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of New York)
    • April 5, 1997
    ...the scheme or arrangement as a defense to an FDIC collection action. Id. at 460, 62 S.Ct. at 680-81; see Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 60 F.3d 78, 80-81 (2d Cir.1995) (summarizing D'Oench, Duhme); FDIC v. LDM Properties, Inc., CV 94-5778(CPS), 1996 WL 449346 *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 1996). ......
  • OCI Mortgage Corp. v. Marchese, (SC 16300)
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • March 20, 2001
    ...may be one of few federal common-law rules viable after O'Melveny & Meyers), Inn at Saratoga Associates v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 60 F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 1995) (although "asset" requirement for application of § 1823 [e] not satisfied, common-law equitable estoppel rule in D'Oench, Duhm......
  • Fortunoff v. Triad Land Associates, No. 93-CV-0368 (JS).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of New York)
    • October 30, 1995
    ...were precluded under D'Oench doctrine and § 1823(e)); Inn At Saratoga Associates v. FDIC, 856 F.Supp. 111, 117-18 (N.D.N.Y.1994), aff'd, 60 F.3d 78 (2d Cir.1995) (barring plaintiff's tort claims of negligent misrepresentation and fraud pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) because the tort claims......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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