Innerbichler v. Innerbichler

Decision Date16 June 2000
Docket NumberNo. 0149,0149
PartiesNicholas Raymond INNERBICHLER v. Carole Jean INNERBICHLER.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Allen J. Kruger (Elizabeth A. Proctor, on the brief), Laurel, for appellant.

Jerrold A. Thrope (Sheila K. Sachs and Gordon, Feinblatt, Rothman, Hoffberger & Hollander, LLC, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and HOLLANDER and ADKINS, JJ.

ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

HOLLANDER, Judge.

This appeal arises from the dissolution of the marriage of Nicholas R. Innerbichler, appellant, and Carole Jean Innerbichler, appellee.1 After more than fourteen years of marriage, the parties were granted a divorce by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, pursuant to an order dated July 27, 1998, and modified on January 13, 1999. Two aspects of the court's orders are at the heart of this appeal: 1) the monetary award to appellee, in the amount of $2,581,864.75, which was based, in part, on the court's determination that the appreciation in value of appellant's 51% ownership interest in Technical and Management Services Corporation ("TAMSCO") constituted marital property; and 2) the court's award to appellee of monthly alimony of $8000.00 for five years, followed by indefinite monthly alimony of $6,000.00.

Appellant noted a timely appeal to this Court,2 posing several questions for our consideration, which we have rephrased slightly:

I. Did the trial court err in granting the monetary award to appellee by:

A. Improperly finding that the increase in value in TAMSCO was marital property?

B. Failing to consider the tax liabilities of TAMSCO?

C. Improperly calculating the premarital value of TAMSCO?

II. Did the trial court err in the manner in which it required payment of the monetary award?

III. Did the trial court err in its granting of alimony to appellee?

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the court erred only with respect to its valuation of appellant's pre-marital interest in TAMSCO. For that reason, we shall vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

The parties were married on January 21, 1984, when Mr. Innerbichler (the "Husband") was 41 years old and appellee (the "Wife") was 33. Although appellant had been married twice before, it was appellee's first marriage. The parties have one child, Michelle Nicole, who was born on May 1, 1986. Appellant also has three adult children from prior marriages.

In 1995, after eleven years of marriage, the Husband moved out of the marital home.3 On September 12, 1995, he filed a Complaint for Limited Divorce, and the Wife filed a countersuit, seeking an absolute divorce on the ground of adultery. Her suit was later amended in court to include a two year separation as an additional ground for divorce.

Trial consumed almost eight days in January and February 1998, at which the court heard testimony from thirteen witnesses, including the parties; Raymond Grossman, an economist who testified for appellant as an expert in business valuation and appraised TAMSCO; Larry Stokes, an accountant for TAMSCO; William Bilawa, appellant's business partner; Charles Smolkin, appellee's vocational expert; Lawrence J. Eisenberg, an ERISA and pension benefits expert who testified for the Husband; and Douglas S. Land, an expert in the field of business valuation who testified for the Wife. Numerous exhibits were also admitted into evidence. The primary disputes centered on the fair market value of TAMSCO, whether the appreciation in value of TAMSCO constituted marital property, and, if so, the value of the marital interest. At the time of trial, appellant was 55 years old and resided with his paramour in a home that he purchased for about $600,000.00 and financed with a mortgage and a loan from his business. Appellee was a 47-year-old high school graduate who had completed one semester of college. The trial culminated in a divorce based on the parties' separation of two years. What follows is a summary of the evidence adduced at trial pertinent to the issues raised on appeal.

In October 1982, more than one year prior to the parties' marriage, appellant co-founded TAMSCO with his friend and colleague, William Bilawa. At the time, appellant was employed by Lockheed Corporation, and remained employed there until June 1983; in the evenings, appellant worked for TAMSCO. The company provides technical and management services to agencies of the federal government and to the private sector in various disciplines, including program management, integrated logistics support, software development, and data management. At the relevant time, appellant owned 51% of TAMSCO and Bilawa owned a 49% interest in the company.4

When TAMSCO was founded, appellant was married to Barbara Innerbichler ("Barbara"). In 1983, as part of his divorce settlement with Barbara, appellant claimed that he waived his interest in the home that they occupied, allegedly worth about $300,000.00, in exchange for Barbara's agreement to waive her claim to TAMSCO, which appellant contends was worth at least as much as the home.5

In June 1983, about six months before appellant's marriage to appellee, appellant submitted an application on behalf of TAMSCO to the United States Small Business Administration ("SBA") to obtain "8(a) certification." According to appellant, who is an Hispanic American, the "8(a) program" was established during the Nixon years to assist small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged persons. In order to qualify for such certification, the applicant company must demonstrate reasonable prospects for business success as well as financial stability and viability. Moreover, the disadvantaged individual upon whom eligibility is based must own at least 51% of the applicant business.

Appellee insists that TAMSCO was in its "embryonic stages" when the parties were first married. Ample evidence was presented at trial showing that TAMSCO was in its fledgling stage of development at the time of the marriage.

According to the 8(a) application, submitted in June 1983, TAMSCO was "a new business" with only two employees, and its operating equipment consisted of two electric typewriters, a bookcase, a file cabinet, a conference table, and chairs, having a total value of less than $2,000.00. Although appellant maintains in his brief that, at the time of TAMSCO's 8(a) application, TAMSCO "had already completed contracts of significant value and had other contracts pending, all of which established its viability to the SBA," the SBA application listed only two contracts that TAMSCO had completed in the preceding three years: a $13,000.00 contract commenced in February 1983 and a $6,000.00 contract completed in May 1983. The application also identified a contract of $131,000.00 and described it as "In Progress." Further, the application reflected that financing was "generally unavailable" to TAMSCO, either for working capital or long term loans, and noted that vendors would not extend "normal credit terms." Moreover, TAMSCO operated from Bilawa's kitchen until August 1984, when it opened its first office in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. In addition, TAMSCO's income tax return for 1983 revealed that the company had only $52,076.00 in gross receipts and $41,268.00 in assets.

On April 14, 1984, some 83 days after the parties' marriage, TAMSCO obtained the desired 8(a) certification. It is undisputed that the 8(a) program enabled TAMSCO to obtain lucrative sole source government contracts, the first of which was awarded to TAMSCO in September 1984. TAMSCO grew rapidly after the award of the 8(a) certification. For fiscal year 1983, the company reported approximately $52,000.00 in revenues, and $188,000.00 in revenues for fiscal year 1984. By the end of fiscal year 1992, TAMSCO had been awarded contracts totaling $356,439,719. For 1995, TAMSCO generated revenues of $46 million and employed over 500 people. In 1996, TAMSCO earned $47,000,000.00 in revenues, followed by $51,000,000.00 for fiscal year 1997.

From 1984 through 1989, approximately 85% of TAMSCO's work related to 8(a) contracts, and from 1989 until 1993, approximately 75% of TAMSCO's work derived from those contracts. When TAMSCO left the SBA's 8(a) program in 1993, it had already received approximately $356,000,000.00 in 8(a) revenue. By the time of the divorce trial, however, TAMSCO was no longer eligible to participate in the SBA's 8(a) program, although it still had residual 8(a) business. According to appellant, because TAMSCO could no longer "pursue contracts in a non-competitive marketplace," its business position had declined. Nevertheless, at the time of trial, appellant was earning in excess of $650,000.00 in annual salary.

Although appellant concedes that most of TAMSCO's lucrative contracts were obtained and performed after his marriage to appellee, he maintains that neither TAMSCO nor the post-marriage appreciation in the company's value constituted marital property. He argues that the company was created before the marriage and its success was directly linked to an Army contract awarded prior to the marriage. Appellant points out that, in October 1993, while the 8(a) application was still pending, TAMSCO was notified that it had "won" a non-8(a) contract with the Army, worth in excess of one million dollars. Thus, he claims that over 97% of TAMSCO's government contracts were "traceable to contracts won at the company's inception and prior to the marriage." To support his position at trial, appellant submitted an exhibit depicting the success of TAMSCO as a "family tree," with the 8(a) Army contract as the trunk. The branches of the tree refer to numerous other contracts with the government, including the Coast Guard and the Air Force, which generated millions of dollars in revenue for TAMSCO. Although the Army contract was "awarded" on ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
115 cases
  • Garcia v. FOULGER PRATT
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • December 4, 2003
    ...662, 719 A.2d 1262 (1998); see also Murphy v. 24th Street Cadillac Corp., 353 Md. 480, 497, 727 A.2d 915 (1999); Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md.App. 207, 229, 752 A.2d 291, cert. denied, 361 Md. 232, 760 A.2d 1107 (2000). The clearly erroneous standard requires an appellate court to "......
  • Brewer v. Brewer
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • March 31, 2004
    ...that award "the trial court abused its discretion or rendered a judgment that is clearly wrong." E.g., Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md.App. 207, 246, 752 A.2d 291 (2000) (quoting Digges v. Digges, 126 Md.App. 361, 386, 730 A.2d 202 (1999)). The evidence supports such a conclusion We be......
  • Abdullahi v. Zanini
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • June 26, 2019
    ...the [circuit] court's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the findings are not clearly erroneous." Innerbichler v. Innerbichler , 132 Md. App. 207, 230, 752 A.2d 291, cert. denied , 361 Md. 232, 760 A.2d 1107 (2000).Here, as indicated, Wife testified that the properties had been......
  • Jackson v. Sollie
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • July 19, 2016
    ...court may consider ‘any other factor’ it deems necessary to ‘arrive at a fair and equitable’ award.” Innerbichler v. Innerbichler, 132 Md.App. 207, 228, 237, 752 A.2d 291, 302, 307 (2000) (citations omitted). “After proper consideration of those factors, the ultimate decision of whether to ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT