Innes v. Dalsheim

• Decision Date: 29 December 1988
• Docket Number: D,No. 187,187
• Citation: 864 F.2d 974
• Parties: James INNES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Stephen DALSHEIM, Superintendent of Downstate Correctional Facility, Robert Abrams, New York State Attorney General, John Santucci, Queens County District Attorney, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 88-2109.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 974

864 F.2d 974

James INNES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Stephen DALSHEIM, Superintendent of Downstate Correctional Facility, Robert Abrams, New York State Attorney General, John Santucci, Queens County District Attorney, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 187, Docket 88-2109.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Oct. 19, 1988.

Decided Dec. 29, 1988.

Jonathan Silbermann, New York City, for plaintiff-appellant.

Michael O'Brien, Asst. Dist. Atty., Queens County, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John J. Santucci, Dist. Atty., of counsel, Kew Gardens, N.Y.), for defendants-appellees.

Before VAN GRAAFEILAND, CARDAMONE and PIERCE, Circuit Judges.

CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:

This appeal is from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Nickerson, J.) entered February 22, 1988 denying appellant James Innes's application for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition for habeas relief arose from a dispute concerning the effect of appellant's plea bargain in New York State Supreme Court. It is widely recognized that whether an individual plea agreement is a good bargain is an open question; that the process of plea bargaining is essential to the administration of the criminal justice system, however, is no longer open to question. On this appeal, we must decide whether appellant's plea agreement was one to which appellees may insist that he adhere.

I PRIOR LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Appellant was indicted on four separate counts of robbery in the first degree committed in 1983 in Queens County, New York. In exchange for concurrent sentences of four and one-half to nine years imprisonment, Innes withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of guilty to four counts of robbery in the second degree in New York State Supreme Court, Queens County. At the plea proceeding, the state trial judge asked Innes whether he had discussed the charges with counsel, and whether he understood them and the sentence that would be imposed under the plea arrangement. The following colloquy between the court and appellant occurred:

THE COURT: Have any promises been made except the following promise to induce you to plead guilty to the charge, the first thing you are going to remain at liberty pending sentence, secondly, you come back for sentence, your sentence will be four and a half to nine years as a maximum, in other words it will be a concurrent sentence, if you owe any parole violation time as a matter of law that parole violation time must be in addition to the sentence to be imposed upon you by this Court; do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes....

THE COURT: Do you further understand this Court is conditioning your remainig [sic] at liberty and the pleas in this case on the following, number one, that you show up for sentence, number two, that you cooperate with probation, number three, most important, that you don't get re-arrested and charged with any other crimes or offenses; do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: If you violate any of the conditions outlined by the Court, do you understand that you are facing the possibility of consecutive sentence totalling thirty to sixty years which would be the maximum sentence to be imposed by you under each one of these indictments as a second or predicate felon, you would owe seven and a half to fifteen--withdraw that, on the C felony, yes, it would be thirty to sixty years, you could face seven and a half to fifteen years consecutive sentence on each one of these; do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

The trial court judge then carefully explained to Innes that his plea of guilty waived his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to a jury trial and his right to call upon and confront witnesses.

Two months later, Innes appeared before the same state court judge for sentencing. The court noted that while at liberty during the interim between the plea hearing and the date of sentencing, appellant had been arrested in Nassau County, New York on three robbery charges. The trial court then ruled that the plea agreement had been breached, and that it was not required to impose a reduced sentence, stating

THE COURT: ... [P]art of the provisions of the Court's promise is that the defendant would be left at liberty and the Court made three conditions in addition to the fact that the Court would live up to this promise and the three conditions were that the defendant would show up for sentence, he would cooperate with probation and not get rearrested. It is my understanding, sir, and I have documentation here from the District Court in Nassau County, that your client was arrested and charged with four separate robbery charges, three of which occurred while the defendant was at liberty between the time the Court took the plea and the time sentence was to be imposed.... Under those circumstances this Court does not feel bound to live up to it's [sic] obligation as the promise made by the Court to the defendant to give him four and a half to nine years sentence.

Defense counsel immediately moved to withdraw Innes's guilty plea. The court summarily denied that motion, and proceeded instead to impose two consecutive terms of seven and a half to 15 years--or a total sentence of 15 to 30 years--covering the four indictments. Counsel took timely objection to the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea and to the sentence.

Innes appealed to the Appellate Division, Second Department, which reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for imposition of the promised sentence or to permit withdrawal of the guilty plea. People v. Innes, 107 A.D.2d 712, 484 N.Y.S.2d 68 (2d Dep't 1985). When the People moved for reargument on the ground that the decision was inconsistent with People v. DiDonato, 100 A.D.2d 912, 474 N.Y.S.2d 957 (2d Dep't 1984), the Appellate Division granted the motion, vacated its prior decision, and affirmed the 15 to 30-year sentence. People v. Innes, 111 A.D.2d 356, 489 N.Y.S.2d 121 (2d Dep't 1985). The New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. 65 N.Y.2d 982, 494 N.Y.S.2d 1050, 484 N.E.2d 680 (1985).

Innes thereupon petitioned for habeas relief in federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (1982). He raised two arguments: first, he contended that conditioning his sentence on not being re-arrested prior to sentencing denied him due process and the presumption of innocence, thereby entitling him to specific performance of the plea agreement; second, he argued that due process required that he be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court rejected both contentions and denied his petition for a writ, though it did grant a certificate of probable cause. 680 F.Supp. 517, 520 (1988). This appeal followed.

II DISCUSSION

The sole issue before us is whether due process requires that this appellant be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and stand trial on the four original counts of robbery in the first degree.

A. Significance of Plea Agreements

Most criminal convictions are achieved through pleas of guilty, usually made under a plea bargaining arrangement. In fact, it has been estimated that as high as 90 percent of all criminal convictions are obtained by guilty pleas. See A.W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 Colum.L.Rev. 1059, 1059 n. 1 (1976). Plea agreements are obviously vital to the efficient administration of criminal justice.

Such agreements involve interests significant to the state and to the criminal defendant. They permit the state to avoid the expense and the over-burdensome demands on court personnel and facilities that formal prosecution of every case would exact. A plea-bargaining defendant obtains the opportunity to reduce or fix the exact punishment that he will receive, and avoid exposure to the greater punishment to which he might otherwise be subject.

B. Plea as a Waiver of Constitutional Right

A plea of guilty "is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction...." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). By entering such a plea, a defendant waives his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 243, 89 S.Ct. at 1712. Upon its entry, a defendant also simultaneously waives nearly all of the safeguards that attend prosecution in a criminal trial. A defendant waives his right to call witnesses in his own behalf, his right to confront and cross-examine his accusers, and his right to trial by jury. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319-20, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 2376-77, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-45, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2257-58, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976). As a result, the Supreme Court has long held that a defendant's waiver of significant constitutional rights must be knowingly and intelligently made. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1448, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). In Brady, for example, the Court held that "[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 397 U.S. at 748, 90 S.Ct. at 1469. If the guilty plea is not "equally voluntary and knowing," it is inconsistent with the requirements of due process, and is therefore void. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969).

The interrelationship between a plea of guilty and the waiver of rights involved was illuminated recently in Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 2680, 2682-86, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). Ricketts considered whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the first degree murder prosecution of a defendant, following his breach of a plea agreement under which he had pled guilty to a lesser offense, been sentenced, and begun serving his time. Id. ...