Institute for Weight Control, Inc. v. Klassen
Decision Date | 06 October 1972 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 1384-72. |
Parties | INSTITUTE FOR WEIGHT CONTROL, INC., Plaintiff, v. Elmer T. KLASSEN, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service and Joseph C. Thomas, Postmaster, Englewood, New Jersey, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Herbert Alterman, Passaic, N. J., Bass & Ullman, by Sheldon S. Lustigman, New York City, Fensterwald & Ohlhausen, by William G. Ohlhausen, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
Herbert J. Stern, U. S. Atty. by Marc L. Dembling, Asst. U. S. Atty., Newark, N. J. (James J. Robertson, Staff Atty., Consumer Protection Office, Law Dept., United States Postal Service, Washington, D. C., of counsel) for defendants.
This matter comes on by way of cross motions for summary judgment.*
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against enforcement of what it alleges is an illegal mail stop order, issued by defendants under 39 U.S.C. § 3005, after an administrative determination of false advertising. This Court has jurisdiction under 39 U.S.C. § 409.1
Defendants (hereinafter sometimes referred to collectively as "Postal Service") initiated administrative proceedings against the plaintiff by filing a Postal Service complaint on May 17, 1972, charging a violation of 39 U.S.C. § 3005 by magazine advertisements allegedly constituting a scheme for obtaining money through the mails by means of false representations.2
Concurrent with the filing of the administrative action, the Postal Service caused the Justice Department to institute proceedings in this Court against the plaintiff in accordance with 39 U.S.C. § 3007.3 A temporary restraining order (on May 25, 1972), and thereafter a preliminary injunction (on May 31, 1972), issued, directing the Postal Service to detain the plaintiff's incoming mail during the pendency of the aforesaid administrative hearing and any appeal therefrom. See United States Postal Service v. Jay Kaplan, d/b/a Institute for Weight Control, District of New Jersey, Civil Action No. 899-72. The injunction was founded upon a finding by this Court that there was the requisite "probable cause" to believe that the plaintiff's advertising violated 39 U.S.C. § 3005.4
The answer of the plaintiff in the administrative proceeding was filed on June 7, 1972. It denied that the representations charged were made by the plaintiff and also denied that the representations made in its advertising material were materially false.
The administrative hearing took place in Washington, D. C. on June 13, and 14, 1972, before Judicial Officer Adam G. Wenchel, whose decision was that plaintiff was soliciting money through the United States mail through false representations, in violation of 39 U.S.C. § 3005. However, the effective date of the administrative order was voluntarily deferred by the Postal Service when plaintiff commenced the instant proceeding for judicial review.
Plaintiff's complaint herein was originally filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. On the application of the Postal Service the matter was transferred to this district. In the meantime, plaintiff had moved for summary judgment. Defendant, without objection by plaintiff, having similarly moved orally before this Court, I treat the matter as being before me on cross motions for summary judgment. F.R. Civ.P. 56.
The parties have submitted extensive briefs, and oral argument was held herein on September 11, 1972, and September 15, 1972.
My review of the decision of the Judicial Officer is limited to determining whether there is, considering the record as a whole, substantial evidence to support his findings of fact, and whether he has committed errors of law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 618-621, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291-292, 85 S.Ct. 980, 13 L.Ed.2d 839 (1964); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 497, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1954); Mark Eden v. Lee, 433 F.2d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 1970); 4 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (1958), § 29.01, 114. Cf. Stein's v. Pilling, 256 F.Supp. 238 (D.N.J.1966), aff'd. 379 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1967); Pinkus v. Reilly, 71 F.Supp. 993 (D.N.J.1947), aff'd. 170 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1948), aff'd. 338 U.S. 269, 70 S.Ct. 110, 94 L.Ed. 63 (1949).
The advertisement at issue reads as follows;
The Postal Service administrative complaint charged that this advertisement violated 39 U.S.C. § 3005 in that the plaintiff herein by "materially false" representations, represented:
In his Findings of Fact the Judicial Officer found that representations 1, 3 and 4 were in fact made in the advertisement. As to representation 2, he stated: "While I believe that representation 2 is substantially made, I do not make a finding with respect to it." Postal Service Decision at p. 9 Counsel on oral argument, and this Court, are in agreement that by this the Judicial Officer meant that he did not find that representation 2 was in fact made by the advertisement involved.
As thus limited, under his Conclusion of Law, the Judicial Officer found that the plaintiff herein "is engaged in conducting a scheme or device for obtaining money or property through the mail by means of false representations within the meaning of 39 U.S.Code 3005." As is clear from both the briefs filed on this motion and oral argument, counsel interpret this determination as being applicable to all three of the charged representations (1, 3 and 4).
There is abundant support for the administrative finding that representations 1, 3 and 4 were made, as charged by defendants. Given a fair, reasonable and pedestrian construction, and read in its totality, Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, 189, 68 S.Ct. 591, 92 L.Ed. 628 (1948), Stein's v. Pilling, supra, 256 F.Supp. at 243, the advertising matter obviously represents that through daily use of Skini-Minis one can "lose ten pounds in two weeks"; that the product is "an effective aid to appetite control"; and that the product "will have a substantial and material contribution to a weight loss of at least 10 pounds in 2 weeks without the necessity of adhering to a dietary regimen." Indeed, on this proceeding, plaintiff has not seriously argued against this portion of the administrative determination. I find substantial evidence to support the Judicial Officer's findings in this regard.
I turn now to the more seriously disputed administrative determinations, that the aforesaid representations were false, and to the subissue of the efficacy of the advertised product.
Of the ingredients of the product Skini-Mini, the only two related to the advertising claims, and with which we need be concerned, are benzocaine and sodium carboxymethylcellulose (SCMC). The former is claimed to alleviate hunger pains in the stomach; the latter is said to cause hunger-sensation reduction by creating a feeling of stomach fullness. There was sharp disagreement among the medical experts called by the respective parties over the effectiveness of the two ingredients, particularly in the quantities involved in the product when used as recommended.
One of the cornerstones of the Judicial Officer's opinion is as follows:
Considering the evidence as a whole, I find that benzocaine in the quantity here involved would not appreciably affect the users' appetite or hunger. . . . Postal Service Decision at p. 8.
I find substantial evidence to support the administrative determination that "benzocaine in the quantity here involved would not appreciably affect the user's appetite or hunger."
Dr. Cardaro, associated with the Food and Drug Administration, testified for the Postal Service that benzocaine did not "have a medically recognized use as an anesthetic for the stomach," and that benzocaine, being insoluble in water, and therefore safe for topical application on the skin and some mucuous membranes, would because of its insolubility in water not be available as an anesthetic in the stomach if taken with water.
To support its claim of benzocaine's efficacy in dealing with hunger, plaintiff relied principally on its counsel's cross examination of Dr. Cardaro. However, the Judicial Officer, being in a better position to judge demeanor and other subjective indications of credibility, obviously concluded that Dr. Cardaro's credibility remained substantially unaffected by cross examination. I cannot override this determination on the record presented. See NLRB v. Scoler's Inc., 466 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1972); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); Mak-All Manufacturing Inc. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 404, 405 (2d Cir. 1964).
Plaintiff's only other...
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