Institute of Inno. Med. v. Lubf., Civil No. 06-1155 (DRD).
| Citation | 613 F.Supp.2d 181 |
| Decision Date | 24 March 2009 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 06-1155 (DRD). |
| Parties | INSTITUTE OF INNOVATIVE MEDICINE, INC., Plaintiff v. LABORATORIO UNIDOS DE BIOQUIMICA FUNCTIONAL, INC., Laboratories San Agustin, Inc.; San Agustin Medical Services, Inc; Julio Martorell, His Wife Jane Doe and Insurance Corporations X, Y and/or Z, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Francisco M. Lopez-Romo, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Miguel A. Nazario-Briceno, Briceno Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Pending before the court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 32), Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement (Docket No. 33), Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgement (Docket No. 34), and Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement (Docket No. 35).
Defendants, Laboratorio Unidos de Bioquímica Funcional, Inc., Laboratorio San Agustin Medical Services, Inc., and Julio Martorell (hereinafter jointly referred as "LUBF") allege that Plaintiff's request to compel Plaintiff Instituto of Innovative Medicine, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "IIM") to arbitration should be summarily dismissed on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitation and/or laches doctrine and because (2) Plaintiff did not enforce any of the judgments entered by the state and federal court within the five-year time frame prescribed by local law1.
On the other hand, Plaintiff contends that (1) Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment because genuine issues of fact exist over material facts and because (2) Defendants' statute of limitations or laches doctrine defense is inapplicable since they have not provided proof of lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted or that they have been prejudiced in any manner by IIM's prolonged acquiescence. Moreover, IIM avers that the "time frame allotted to any party to seek remedy for breach of contract is a term of fifteen (15) years." Plaintiff states that the contract in question is a dealership agreement (Docket No. 35) Consequently, IIM contends that Defendants' allegation that Plaintiffs action is time barred is wrong as a matter of law.
After carefully reviewing the instant case's record and the pending motions, the Court, for the reasons stated below, GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 32).
The instant case's Complaint alleges that on February 12, 1997, IIM and LUBF entered into a dealership agreement, where LUBF was appointed IIM's exclusive dealer in Puerto Rico (Docket No. 33-2). As IIM's exclusive dealer, LUBF was granted exclusive rights to represent IIM's stateside laboratory services already under contract with IIM, in order to develop the local market for IIM's laboratory services promoting its use which was only available through IIM's own existing network. Furthermore, Defendant Julio Martorell, IIM dealer, assumed personal liability by guaranteeing payment for all products or services under the dealership agreement. The dealership agreement clearly stated that: "Any dispute, disagreement or controversy between the Institute and the Dealer shall be resolve[d] within five business days or professional mediation or arbitration by any impartial party as agree by the Institute and the Dealer will be necessary." (Docket No. 33-2)
IIM avers that LUBF did not comply with its duties and obligations comprised in the dealership agreement as IIM's exclusive dealer in Puerto Rico. Accordingly, IIM filed an action in Puerto Rico state courts on February 3, 1998, alleging breach of contract and failure to honor payment obligations. Nevertheless, on June 5, 1998, a complaint was also filed before this court against the same parties, premised on the same nucleus of operative facts, and with the same allegations.
On December 21, 2000, the state court entered a judgment dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of prosecution. Likewise, on January 16, 2001, the district court dismissed the case without prejudice for want of prosecution. On February 8, 2006, IIM filed a diversity action for damages pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in order to compel arbitration, and alleging the same causes of action that were previously raised in both state and federal court.
The Court shall briefly list the facts that have been admitted by LUBF pursuant to Defendants' Statement of Uncontested Facts (Docket No. 32):
1. Paragraph 1: On February 12, 1997, IIM and Laboratorios Unidos de Bioquímica Funcional, Inc. entered into an agreement. In essence, IIM was to serve as a referral laboratory to Laboratorios Unidos for certain medical tests.
2. Paragraph 3: On June 5, 1998, IIM filed a similar complaint before federal courts against the same parties, premised on the same nucleus of operative facts as those contained in the state court complaint, and based on the same allegations as raised in the instant case. Said complaint raised the same causes of action i.e. "collection of monies owed, breach of contract, breach of non-competition agreement and tortuous interference."
3. Paragraph 5: On March 18, 1999, IIM filed a notice of appeal after judgment was entered dismissing the case with prejudice for lack of prosecution on April 16, 1999.
4. Paragraph 7: On November 30, 1999, IIM filed its appellate brief before the United States First Circuit Court of Appeals.
5. Paragraph 8: On June 26, 2000, the state court amended its judgment dismissing the case for want of prosecution without prejudice.
6. Paragraph 10: After the appellate process concluded and several memoranda were filed by the parties, on January 16, 2001, this court entered a judgment dismissing the case without prejudice.2
7. Paragraph 11: On February 15, 2006, IIM filed the instant case, alleging the same causes of action that were previously raised in the state and federal courts against the Defendants. The Court notes that IIM filed the complaint in federal court on February 8, 2006, and not on February 15, 2006. See Complaint, Docket No. 1.
The following facts have been admitted in part or denied due to errors in dates which clarifications were not opposed:
1. Paragraph 2 of Defendants' Statement of Uncontested Material Facts (Docket No. 32). "As previously stated, the Dealership Agreement was signed on February 12th, 1997, not February 10, 1997 as stated." See Docket No. 34, 2 and Dealership Agreement, Docket No. 33-2. After examining the dealership agreement, the Court notes that both parties signed and sealed the agreement on February 10, 1997, although it was subscribed before a notary public by Mr. Julio Martorell on February 12, 1997.
2. Paragraph 4 of Defendants' Statement of Uncontested Material Facts (Docket No. 32). The judgment dismissing the case with prejudice for lack of prosecution was entered on April 15,1999 and not on February 23, 1999. See Docket No. 34, 4.
The following uncontested facts were denied without further opposition:
1. Paragraph 6 of Defendants' Statement of Uncontested Material Facts (Docket No. 32). In relation to Defendants' statement that IIM's state court complaint was dismissed with prejudice for lack of prosecution because it languished in court, plaintiff contends that See Docket No. 34, 6.
2. Paragraph 9 of Defendants' Statement of Uncontested Material Facts (Docket No. 32). Plaintiff denies without further clarification that "[o]n December 21, 2000, the state court issued another amended judgment as plaintiff requested to clarify that judgment entered without prejudice and it intended to try the case in Federal Court." See Docket No. 34, 9.
The framework of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 provides that it is appropriate to enter summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Abbadessa v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 987 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir.1993). Pursuant to the language of the rule, the moving party bears the twofold burden of showing that there are "no genuine issue as to any material facts," and that he is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir.1997). When the moving party asserts that the competent evidence clearly demonstrates that it is entitled to judgment and after the moving party has satisfied this burden, the onus shifts to the resisting party to show that there still exists "a trial worthy issue as to some material fact." Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporation Insular, 111 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir.1997).
At the summary judgment stage, the trial court examines the entire record ...
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