Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare

Decision Date26 March 1985
Docket NumberNos. 83-1696,No. 83-1722,C,No. 83-1696,83-1722,83-1696,s. 83-1696
Citation758 F.2d 897
PartiesINSTITUTIONALIZED JUVENILES in Pennsylvania institutions for the mentally ill and the mentally retarded, namely, Kevin S.; Richard S.; James Paul M.; Raymond C.; William B.; Francis B.; Maria L.; Thomas W.; Nancy Louise D.; Gina S.; and George S., by their next friend and guardian ad litem, David Ferleger, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellees inross-Appellants inv. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WELFARE, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Frank Beal; John Fong, Director of Haverford State Hospital; Nicholas D'Aluisio, Director of Polk State School and Hospital; C. Duane Youngberg, Director of Pennhurst State School and Hospital, sued as representative of all others similarly situated, Appellants inross-Appellees in
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Allen C. Warshaw (argued), Deputy Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, Pa., for appellants in No. 83-1696, cross-appellees in No. 83-1722.

Herbert B. Newberg (argued), Philadelphia, Pa., David Ferleger, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees in No. 83-1696, cross-appellants in No. 83-1722.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

                  I.  THE UNDERLYING LITIGATION ....................................... 901
                      A. Plaintiffs' Original Complaint ............................... 901
                      B. The 1973 Regulations ......................................... 903
                      C. Three-Judge Court Decision ................................... 903
                      D. The 1976 Act and Regulations ................................. 904
                      E. The 1977 Decision by the Supreme Court ....................... 905
                      F. The Second Three-Judge Court Decision ........................ 905
                      G. The 1978 Regulations ......................................... 906
                      H. The 1979 Decision by the Supreme Court ....................... 906
                 II.  PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR COUNSEL FEES ........................... 907
                      A. The Nature of the Request .................................... 907
                      B. The Proceedings in District Court ............................ 908
                III.  DISCUSSION ...................................................... 909
                      A. The Plaintiffs' Eligibility for Counsel Fees ................. 910
                         1. Prevailing Party Status ................................... 910
                            a. Statement of the Test .................................. 910
                            b. Application of the Test ................................ 912
                         2. Causation ................................................. 916
                         3. Conclusion ................................................ 917
                      B. The Disallowance of Fees for Hours Expended After the Full
                         Extent of Relief Was Obtained, and the Use of the Hensley
                         Reduction Factor ............................................. 918
                         1. The Hensley Decision ...................................... 918
                         2. The District Court's Complete Disallowance of Hours ....... 919
                         3. The District Court's General Reduction of the Lodestar .... 920
                      C. The Use of Enhancement Multipliers ........................... 921
                      D. The Fee Award for Preparing the Fee Petition ................. 924
                      E. The Failure to Award Fees for Work as Guardian Ad Litem ...... 925
                      F. The Award of Costs ........................................... 926
                      G. Post-Judgment Interest ....................................... 927
                 IV.  CONCLUSION ...................................................... 927
                

Before SEITZ, HUNTER, BECKER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BECKER, Circuit Judge.

These appeals require us to review a comprehensive award of counsel fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 (1982) against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in a protracted civil rights case dealing with procedures for admitting mentally ill and mentally retarded juveniles to mental health facilities. Both sides appeal virtually all aspects of the fee award. The appeal and cross-appeal present numerous questions, spanning the burgeoning jurisprudence of counsel fees. The appeals present particularly difficult questions concerning prevailing party status and the use of both negative and enhancement multipliers.

For the reasons that follow, we shall vacate the district court's judgment and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. THE UNDERLYING LITIGATION

Because these appeals present challenges to a fee award that are directly related to the history of the litigation, particularly in terms of the extent to which the plaintiffs are prevailing parties, we must trace in detail the course of the underlying litigation and the results it allegedly achieved.

A. Plaintiffs' Original Complaint

On November 16, 1972, six named plaintiffs filed a class action suit on behalf of all persons 18 years of age or under who have been, are, or may be committed to mental health facilities in Pennsylvania under sections 402 and 403 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 ("1966 Act") (codified at Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 50, Secs. 4402 & 4403 (Purdon 1969)). 1

The original action, Bartley v. Kremens, C.A. No. 72-2272, was brought against the Director of Haverford State Hospital, the Secretary of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth, and the Deputy Secretary for Mental Health and Mental Retardation of the Department of Public Welfare. Plaintiffs challenged the portion of the 1966 Act concerning "voluntary" admissions and commitments of mentally ill and retarded juveniles to mental health facilities. 2 Plaintiffs alleged that those provisions, which enabled a parent or guardian to admit or commit a juvenile to care without the juvenile's approval if a medical examination indicated a need for care or observation, violated the due process clause and equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.

Plaintiffs alleged that they had a constitutional right to a full panoply of procedural safeguards prior to any admission or commitment to a state mental health facility. The rights asserted were: (a) the right to notice; (b) the right to a pre-admission hearing; (c) the right to counsel (including appointment of counsel for indigent juveniles); (d) the right to present evidence and testimony; (e) the right to subpoena witnesses and documents; (f) the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against them and those favoring commitment; (g) the right to independent expert examination and assistance; (h) the right to involuntary commitment only after the decision of an impartial decision-maker; (i) the right to involuntary commitment only when clear and convincing evidence indicates that there is a need for care or observation; and (j) the right to appellate review, including appointment of counsel and a free hearing transcript if indigent. It is important to recognize as a general matter that the relief sought by plaintiffs related only to the procedures for admitting an individual to a mental health facility. The requested relief did not suggest in any way that the plaintiffs were challenging the quality of care provided to juveniles once they were admitted to facilities. The scope of relief sought by plaintiffs is critical when assessing plaintiffs' status as prevailing parties. See infra part III.A.1.

A three-judge court was convened to hear the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2281, 3 and the case was listed for trial.

B. The 1973 Regulations

Before the case reached trial, the Secretary of Public Welfare promulgated regulations, which became effective September 1, 1973, implementing the 1966 Act. See 3 Pa.Admin.Bull. 1840 (1973) ("1973 Regulations"). 4 The regulations conferred limited procedural rights upon all juveniles. They required a referral from a pediatrician, general physician, or psychologist that included a specific psychiatric evaluation indicating why institutional care was warranted. Following admission of an individual, the regulations called for an independent examination at the direction of the institution's director and for discharge of the patient if the findings indicated that institutionalization was not necessary. Juveniles 13 and older were to be given notification of their legal rights, the telephone number of either the local public defender or legal services organization, and the ability to object to their continued institutionalization.

In sum, the 1973 Regulations provided generally that parents could not unilaterally admit a juvenile to a mental health facility. Admission would follow only after evaluation by a health care practitioner that was subject to full review by the director of the institution. Plaintiffs, however, continued to contend that the procedures, even as substantially modified by the regulations, did not comport with due process requirements.

C. Three-Judge Court Decision

After a three-day trial in September and October, 1974, the three-judge court, with one judge dissenting, granted plaintiffs much of the relief sought. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F.Supp. 1039 (E.D.Pa.1975). The court declared unconstitutional sections 402 and 403 of the 1966 Act and enjoined the Secretary from enforcing them. The court based this conclusion upon a finding that plaintiffs were entitled to the following procedural safeguards: (a) a probable cause hearing within 72 hours of an individual's initial commitment; (b) a post-commitment hearing within two weeks of the initial commitment; (c) notice of the hearing and the grounds for any proposed commitment; (d) counsel at all "significant stages of the commitment process" and free counsel if indigent; (e) the right to be present at the commitment hearing; (f) the right to be committed only after a finding of clear and convincing proof of its need; and (g) the right to offer evidence and witnesses in his or her behalf and to confront and cross-examine...

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