Insurance Co. of Tex. v. Rainey

Decision Date14 March 1956
Citation86 So.2d 447
PartiesThe INSURANCE COMPANY OF TEXAS, Appellant, v. John Lee RAINEY and Joseph Schilitz Brewing Company, Appellees.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

James A. Smith and Wicker & Smith, Miami, for appellant.

George Kastenbaum, Miami Beach, for John Lee Rainey.

Dixon, DeJarnette, Bradford & Williams, Miami, for Joseph Schlitz Brewing Company.

HOBSON, Justice.

Appellee, Rainey, was injured in the course of his employment and was awarded workmen's compensation payments. He sued the Schlitz Brewing Company as a third party tort feasor and settled the case for $7,500. Appellant, Insurance Company of Texas, is the compensation carrier for Rainey's employer. As such compensation carrier, appellant was brought into the case for the purpose of determining its 'pro rata share' of the recovery pursuant to F.S. § 440.39(3), F.S.A., which provides for a lien in favor of the employer or compensation carrier for such share 'based upon such equitable distribution of the amount recovered as the court may determine'.

Appellant contended below and contends here that Section 440.39 is unconstitutional. We had occasion to consider this section at length in Arex Indemnity Co. v. Radin, Fla., 72 So.2d 393, 395, and we will not quote the section in full because it is plain that the language actually objected to by appellant here is that which we have quoted above from subsection (3) of Section 440.39.

It is first contended that Section 440.39(3) is offensive as denying to appellant the equal protection of the laws. Appellant states that by Section 440.39(3) 'the legislature has classified compensation carriers into a group by limiting their right of subrogation.' But the validity of this classification is not under attack. The only construction we can place upon appellant's contention is that the section denies equal protection to compensation carriers because in different situations which may give rise to a right to subrogation under the section, the amount of recovery awarded as an 'equitable distribution' may be different. As we pointed out in the Arex Indemnity Co. case, supra, 'An endless variety of situations may arise in cases where an employee covered by compensation through his own initiative effects a recovery against a third party tort feasor.' But there is nothing in the statute which would indicate that where the situation of the parties, and the amounts involved, are the same the statute would operate differently upon compensation carriers of a particular class than upon compensation carriers of any other class. The only classification involved is the one to which appellant does not object. Equal protection demands only that the rights of all persons must rest upon the same rule under similar circumstances. State ex rel. Vars v. Knott, 135 Fla. 206, 184 So. 752; State ex rel. Lane Drug Stores v. Simpson, 122 Fla. 582, 166 So. 227; Di Lustro v. Penton, 106 Fla. 198, 142 So. 898; Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Amos, 104 Fla. 609, 141 So. 153. As the Supreme Court of the United States has stated in a recent case, 'So long as the law applies to all alike, the requirements of equal protection are met.' State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 465, 67 S.Ct. 374, 377, 91 L.Ed. 422. The right to a 'pro rata share' based upon 'equitable distribution' is available to all compensation carriers under the statute, and there is no denial of equal protection here.

The next contention of appellant is that Section 440.39 is unconstitutional because it is vague, indefinite, and an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the judiciary. As we pointed out in the Arex Indemnity Co. case, supra, 72 So.2d 393, at page 396:

'We think any effort to establish a precise formula to encompass all variables that may be present in situations arising under Section 440.39(3), supra would be a simple case of judicial legislation. The statute sets up and prescribes the standard. If the language there used is undesirable, the matter is one for legislative action.'

We further suggested in the Arex case, however, that more particularity in the standard laid down for the determination of an equitable distribution would be virtually impossible in view of the innumerable situations which can arise thereunder and call for the exercise of discretion by the court. This is not a case where rights under the criminal or penal laws are made to depend upon a vague statutory definition, as in United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed. 516; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322; International Harvester Co. of America v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 34 S.Ct. 853, 58 L.Ed. 1284; and Locklin v. Pridgeon, 158 Fla. 737, 30 So.2d 102, cited by appellant. The statute places no duty upon the appellant and lays down no standard which the appellant itself is compelled at its peril to follow, nor does it seek to impose a duty upon an administrative body of a character so vague and perplexing that many results are possible on the same essential state of facts. Compare Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson, Fla., 74 So.2d 544. The statute, after all, deals with a judicial officer and authorizes him to make an ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • Corn v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • March 19, 1976
    ...So.2d 497 (Fla. 1969); McKee v. State, 203 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1967); Finlayson v. Conner, 167 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1964); Insurance Co. of Texas v. Rainey, 86 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1956); and DiLustro v. Penton, 106 Fla. 198, 142 So. 898 (1932). He contends that the questioned statute appropriately appli......
  • State v. Bruno
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • December 5, 1958
    ...on different factual situations, see Liquor Store, Inc., v. Continental Distilling Corp., Fla.1949, 40 So.2d 371; Insurance Company of Texas v. Rainey, Fla. 1956, 86 So.2d 447; People v. Hickman, 1928, 204 Cal. 470, 268 P. 909, 270 P. 1117; Commonwealth v. Levi, 1910, 44 Pa.Super. 253; Unit......
  • Hegeman-Harris Co., Inc. v. All State Pipe Supply Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • June 10, 1981
    ...Equal protection demands that the rights of all persons must rest upon the same rule under similar circumstances, Insurance Co. of Texas v. Rainey, 86 So.2d 447 (Fla.1956); Rodriguez v. Jones, 64 So.2d 278 (Fla.1953), and legislation allowing a particular class of litigants recovery of atto......
  • Dewing v. Davis, 1007
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • February 5, 1960
    ...So. 882. It has been recognized that this is not a definite standard but one appropriate for a court of equity. Insurance Company of Texas v. Rainey, Fla.1956, 86 So.2d 447. Where a debt exists and there is no express or implied agreement for security but where it is equitable that certain ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT