Insurance Company of North America v. Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company
Decision Date | 28 March 1899 |
Docket Number | 17,994 |
Parties | The Insurance Company of North America v. The Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company et al |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Marion Superior Court.
Affirmed.
W. A Ketcham, Lewis G. Farmer and F. E. Matson, for appellant.
W. H H. Miller, Ferdinand Winter, John B. Elam, McCullough & Spaan, A. C. Harris, John E. Iglehart and Edwin Taylor, for appellees.
Suit by the appellant against the Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company, the Evansville and Terre Haute Railroad Company, and the Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Company, as members of an association known as the "Midland Line," for the loss of fifty bales of cotton shipped under a bill of lading from Memphis, in the state of Tennessee, (U. S. A.) to Liverpool, England.
The Midland Line was an association of steamship and railroad companies acting as common carriers between the points named.
The appellant had issued a policy of insurance upon the cotton, and the property so insured having been destroyed by fire while in transit, appellant was compelled to pay the amount of the risk. Upon such payment, the bill of lading, with all rights of action thereunder, was assigned and transferred to appellant by the owner of the cotton. As such assignee, and claiming to be subrogated to the rights of such owner, the appellant sued to recover damages for the loss of the cotton.
The complaint was in two paragraphs, to the first of which a demurrer was sustained. The answer to the second paragraph was a general denial. The case was tried by a jury, and, at the conclusion of the evidence, the court refused to give any of the instructions asked for by appellant, and directed a verdict for appellees. Thereupon judgment was rendered and the insurance company appeals. The only error assigned is that the court erred in overruling the motion of the appellant for a new trial.
The paragraph of the complaint upon which the case was tried sets out the traffic arrangement between the defendants; the shipment of the cotton over defendants' lines under a bill of lading exonerating appellees from liability in case of the loss of the cotton by fire; and it alleges the destruction of the cotton by fire while in the possession of the Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company, one of the appellees. It charges that the loss of the cotton was occasioned by the negligence of the appellees, and states with some particularity, the circumstances under which the fire occurred. The other facts necessary to show a right of action in appellant are fully and properly pleaded.
That part of the contract in the bill of lading which limited the liability of the appellees, was in these words:
It is settled by the decisions in this State that the carrier may by a stipulation contained in the bill of lading limit, to some extent, his strict common law liability. Adams Express Co. v. Fendrick, 38 Ind. 150; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Smuck, 49 Ind. 302; Bartlett v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 94 Ind. 281; Rosenfeld v. Peoria, etc., R. Co., 103 Ind. 121, 53 Am. Rep 500, 2 N.E. 344. He cannot, however, by contract, exempt himself from liability for loss or damages resulting from his own negligence. Michigan, etc., R. Co. v. Heaton, 37 Ind. 448, 10 Am. Rep. 89; Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Allen, 31 Ind. 394; Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Selby, 47 Ind. 471, 17 Am. Rep. 719; Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Cox, 29 Ind. 360.
It has often been held that a special contract relieving the carrier from responsibility for loss or damage by fire is valid, but it is generally understood that such exemption from liability does not protect the carrier when the fire or the consequent loss is the result of his own negligence. 4 Elliott on Railroads, section 1508, note 3.
The effect of a special contract limiting the common law liability of the carrier is to change the character of that liability by removing from it the important element of insurance of the goods by the carrier, and to place his responsibility for loss or damage upon the ground of negligence alone. The carrier does not, indeed, cease to be a carrier, but he is no longer an insurer. In numerous cases he is held, under such circumstances, to be a private carrier for hire, and hence subject to an entirely different rule from that which would have fixed his responsibility if no special contract had been made.
The controlling question in the present case is as to the burden of proof. On this subject there is an irreconcilable conflict among the decisions, and it would be a fruitless task to institute a comparison between them. The great weight of modern authority, and, as we think, the better reason sustain the rule that where the action is upon a bill of lading which limits the liability of the carrier by excepting certain perils, and it appears that the loss was within the restrictions of the special contract, the burden is upon the plaintiff to show that the accident or loss was the result of the negligence of the carrier.
This rule was long ago adopted by the English courts.
In Harris v. Packwood, 3 Taunt. 264, the carrier had given notice that he would not be accountable for any package whatsoever, above the value of twenty shillings, unless entered, and an insurance paid over and above the price charged for carriage according to value, no such insurance having been paid by the plaintiff. It was said by Mansfield (Sir J.) Ch. J.:
In Marsh v. Horne, 5 Barn. & Cress. 322, Abbott, C. J., said:
In Muddle v. Stride, 9 Car. & P. 380, which was an action against the proprietors of a steam vessel to recover damages for goods sent by such vessel and lost, Lord Chief Justice Denman, in summing up to the jury, observed that the jury were "to see clearly that the defendants were guilty of negligence before they could find a verdict against them."
Many cases in the Supreme Court of the United States hold that, when the loss falls within the exception in the bill of lading or contract of the carrier, the onus probandi is upon the shipper to show negligence on the part of the carrier.
Clark v. Barnwell, 53 U.S. 272, 12 HOW 272, 13 L.Ed. 985:
In Transportation Co. v. Downer, 78 U.S. 129 11 Wall. 129, 20 L.Ed. 160, Field J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: ...
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