Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local Union No. 279 v. City of Cheyenne

• Citation: 316 P.3d 1162
• Decision Date: 20 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. S–13–0038.,S–13–0038.
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 279, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. CITY OF CHEYENNE, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

316 P.3d 1162

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 279, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.CITY OF CHEYENNE, Appellee (Defendant).

No. S–13–0038.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Dec. 20, 2013.

Representing Appellant: Julie Nye Tiedeken of McKellar, Tiedeken & Scoggin, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Steven F. Freudenthal of Freudenthal & Bonds, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Before KITE, C.J., and HILL, VOIGT, DAVIS, JJ., and GOLDEN, J., Ret.

KITE, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] The International Association of Firefighters Local Union No. 279 (the Union) appeals from the district court's declaratory judgment on issues related to its 2012–2013 collective bargaining session with the City of Cheyenne (the City). The district court ruled on summary judgment that under the statutory definition of “corporate authorities,” the City could negotiate through “either the mayor or any member of the city council” and a quorum of the city council was not required to negotiate. The district court also determined there were no justiciable controversies over whether the Public Meetings Act and the Public Records Act applied under the circumstances presented.

[¶ 2] We reverse the district court's decision that the mayor and/or a single city council member are corporate authorities and conclude the statutes mandate a quorum of the city council to negotiate with the Union. We affirm its decision that the other two issues are not justiciable, although our reasoning differs on the public meetings issue.

ISSUES

[¶ 3] In its primary brief, the Union presents the following issues on appeal:

1. Was the District Court's declaration that “either the mayor or any member of the city council is a corporate authority within the meaning of Wyoming Statute § 27–10–104” in error?

2. Did the District Court err in determining that it did not have jurisdiction to consider whether Wyoming's Public Meetings Act applies to collective bargaining negotiations?

3. Did the District Court err in determining that there was no justiciable controversy on the issue of whether proposals exchanged by the parties during collective bargaining negotiations are public record?

4. Are proposals exchanged by the parties during collective bargaining negotiations public records?

The City restates the issues as:

A. Under W.S. § 27–10–101(a)(ii), does a mayor and/or city council person constitute a corporate authority authorized to negotiate with the union or is a quorum of the city council the corporateauthority that must conduct the negotiations?

B. Does the obligation to “meet and confer in good faith” under W.S. § 27–10–104 impose a blanket rule that negotiations must be conducted in executive session?

C. With respect to issues D and E, infra, is the Union seeking an advisory opinion?

D. Assuming that a quorum of the city council is required to conduct the negotiations, is it mandatory for the negotiations to be conducted in executive session?

E. Assuming that a quorum of the city council is required to conduct the negotiations and the city council properly votes to adjourn to an executive session, are proposals exchanged between the parties public records?

FACTS

[¶ 4] The material facts of this case are undisputed. The Union is the exclusive bargaining agent for the members of the Cheyenne fire department, and the City is a city of the first class under Wyoming law. Pursuant to the collective bargaining rules set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27–10–101 through § 27–10–109 (LexisNexis 2013), the Union and the City typically negotiate the wages and other employment terms for fire department members on an annual basis.

[¶ 5] The Union and the City entered into “Ground Rules” for their negotiation of the 2012–2013 collective bargaining agreement. The mayor, one city council member, and other members of the City's administration and staff were the City's negotiating team. A dispute arose over whether a quorum of the city council was required to negotiate on behalf of the City. Eventually, the city council adopted a resolution stating that the mayor and a single city council member had the authority to negotiate on its behalf. The City also released to the press the proposals exchanged by the parties during negotiation.¹

[¶ 6] The Union filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that a quorum of the city council was required to negotiate with the Union; the City could not, in good faith, unilaterally decide to conduct the negotiating sessions in public; and the proposals exchanged by the parties were not public records. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment declaring the City could be represented by the mayor and one other council member during the negotiations and a quorum of the city council was not obligated to participate. It ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to consider whether or not the negotiations should be open to the public because a quorum of the city council was not required to participate and, therefore, the Public Meetings Act did not apply. The district court also concluded the issue of whether the proposals were public records was not justiciable because it was not based upon a current dispute.

[¶ 7] The Union appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 8] W.R.C.P. 56(c) governs summary judgments:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Our standard of review for a summary judgment decision is de novo, and we use the same materials and follow the same standards as the district court. Michael's Constr., Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank, 2012 WY 76, ¶ 8, 278 P.3d 701, 703–04 (Wyo.2012); Grynberg v. L & R Exploration Venture, 2011 WY 134, ¶ 16, 261 P.3d 731, 736 (Wyo.2011). The de novo standard of review also applies to the legal exercise of interpreting statutory language.

Western Wyo. Constr. Co v. Board of County Comm'rs of Sublette County, 2013 WY 63, ¶¶ 10, 15, 301 P.3d 512, 514–16 (Wyo.2013); Vogel v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2011 WY 163, ¶ 21, 267 P.3d 1057, 1063 (Wyo.2011). Likewise, jurisdictional issues regarding the justiciability of a declaratory judgment action are questions of law subject to de novo review. See William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrrell, 2009 WY 62, ¶ 9, 206 P.3d 722, 726 (Wyo.2009).

DISCUSSION

1. Corporate Authority

[¶ 9] A municipality's powers are prescribed entirely by statute. Coffinberry v. Town of Thermopolis, 2008 WY 43, ¶ 5, 183 P.3d 1136, 1138 (Wyo.2008). When interpreting statutory language,

[our] paramount consideration is to determine the legislature's intent, which must be ascertained initially and primarily from the words used in the statute. We look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the statute is ambiguous. A statute is clear and unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning with consistency and predictability. Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.

Office of State Lands and Invs. v. Mule Shoe Ranch, Inc., 2011 WY 68, ¶ 13, 252 P.3d 951, 954–55 (Wyo.2011), quoting Dorr v. Smith, Keller & Assoc., 2010 WY 120, ¶ 11, 238 P.3d 549, 552 (Wyo.2010). See also Vogel, ¶ 21, 267 P.3d at 1063. The court determines whether a statute is clear or ambiguous as a matter of law. Office of State Lands, ¶ 13, 252 P.3d at 955. In arriving at the meaning of a statutory provision, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony. Mountain Cement Co. v. South of Laramie Water & Sewer Dist., 2011 WY 81, ¶ 13, 255 P.3d 881, 885 (Wyo.2011).

[¶ 10] Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27–10–101 et seq. provides for collective bargaining between municipalities and firefighters. Section 27–10–104 states:

It shall be the obligation of the city, town or county, through its corporate authorities, to meet and confer in good faith with the representative or representatives of the [firefighters'] bargaining agent within ten (10) days after receipt of written notice from said bargaining agent of the request for a meeting for collective bargaining purposes. This obligation shall include the duty to cause any agreement resulting from negotiations to be reduced to a written contract, provided that no such contract shall exceed the term of two (2) years.

The term “corporate authorities” is defined at § 27–10–101(a)(ii) as “the council, commission or other proper officials of any city, town or county, whose duty or duties it is to establish wages, salaries, rates of pay, working conditions, and other conditions of employment of fire fighters.”

[¶ 11] The district court determined that the mayor or a city councilman satisfied the “corporate authorities” requirement of § 27–10–104. The Union claims the mayor and/or a single councilman were not “corporate authorities” under the statute because they could not, by themselves, establish wages, salaries, rates of pay, working conditions or other conditions of employment for the firefighters. Instead, the Union argues, a quorum of the city council was required to negotiate.

[¶ 12] The City counters that the district court correctly ruled the mayor and one councilman met the “corporate authorities” requirement according to our decision in City of Casper v. Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters, Local 904, 713 P.2d 1187 (Wyo.1986). In Casper, we held that three employees of the City of Casper, including the personnel director, the chief of the fire department and an administrative analyst, were not “corporate authorities” who could negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with the firefighters. Id. at 1189–90. Quoting an earlier case, Nation v. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local...