Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Bd. of Defiance Cnty. Comm'rs
| Citation | 2013 Ohio 5198 |
| Decision Date | 25 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 4-13-05 |
| Parties | INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 8, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. BOARD OF DEFIANCE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
Appeal from Defiance County Common Pleas Court
Judgment Affirmed
APPEARANCES:
Joseph M. D'Angelo for Appellant
Jack Rosati, Jr. and Russell R. Herman for Appellee
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 8 ("Local No. 8"), appeals the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Defiance County granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee, Defiance County Commissioners ("the County"), and denying Local No. 8's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, Local No. 8 contends that the trial court committed the following errors: (1) denying Local No. 8's motion for summary judgment and granting the County's motion for summary judgment; (2) finding that federal funds were used to pay both the principal and interest obligations on the bonds; and (3) finding that the Project was exempt from the application of Ohio Prevailing Wage Law under R.C. 4115.04(B)(1). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
{¶2} On June 17, 2011, Local No. 8 filed a R.C. 4115.16(B) interested party prevailing wage enforcement action against the County, alleging violations of the Ohio prevailing wage law during a Defiance County building project at the Historic Jail Building ("the Project"). The County filed its answer on July 15, 2011. The following relevant facts were stipulated by both parties.
{¶3} The County began planning the Project in Fall 2009. The County then advertised for bids on the Project, initially stating that Ohio prevailing wage law would apply to the Project. On December 24, 2009, the County adoptedResolution No. 09-12-848, which declared the entire area within the County as a "Recovery Zone." On February 4, 2010, the County issued County Building Improvement General Obligation Bonds, Series 2010 (Federally Taxable - Recovery Zone Economic Development Bonds) ("the Bonds") to finance the construction of the Project. The United States Treasury agreed to pay the County an amount equal to 45 percent of the interest payable on the Bonds, which triggered the application of the Davis-Bacon Act. Funding for the Treasury payments derived from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ("ARRA").
{¶4} On January 5, 2010, the County requested that each of the lowest bidders for the Project execute an acknowledgment stating that the provisions of Ohio prevailing wage law no longer applied, and that instead, the provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act applied to the Project. Each of the bidders executed the acknowledgments by January 14, 2010. These acknowledgments were then attached to the original construction contracts. On February 4, 2010, the Bonds were issued by the County and sold to Fifth Third Securities, Inc. The County deposited the proceeds from the Bonds into the County's Permanent Improvement Fund, which was used to pay for the construction of the Project.
{¶5} Meanwhile, the County deposited the Treasury's reimbursement payments into a Bond Retirement Fund in order to "extinguish its interest and principal obligations under the Bonds." (Docket No. 7, p. 4). Although no moneyfrom the Bond Retirement Fund was transferred into the Permanent Improvement Fund, the funding for the Project was obtained from the Bonds that will be retired through the Bond Retirement Fund. Checks to pay Project expenses were linked to the Permanent Improvement Fund.
{¶6} The parties stipulated that the Davis-Bacon Act does not preempt the Ohio prevailing wage laws and that the Project was a "public improvement" as defined by R.C. 4115.03(C).
{¶7} On June 25, 2012, both parties filed competing motions for summary judgment on the basis of these stipulated facts. On April 23, 2013, the trial court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, denied Local No. 8's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed Local No. 8's complaint.
{¶8} Local No. 8 filed this timely appeal, presenting the following assignments of error for our review.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING LOCAL 8'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING THE COUNTY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Assignment of Error No. II
Assignment of Error No. III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROJECT WAS EXEMPTED FROM APPLICATION OF OHIO PREVAILING WAGE LAW UNDER R.C. 4115.04(B)(1) WHERE FEDERAL FUNDS WERE NOT USED IN CONSTRUCTING THE PROJECT, BUT RATHER WERE USED SOLELY TO REIMBURSE A PORTION OF THE COUNTY'S INTEREST PAYMENT OBLIGATION ON THE BONDS IT ISSUED TO FINANCE THE PROJECT.
{¶9} Due to the nature of the assignment of errors, we elect to address them together.
{¶10} In its first, second, and third assignments of error, Local No. 8 essentially argues that the trial court erred by granting the County's motion for summary judgment and denying its motion for summary judgment. We disagree.
{¶11} An appellate court reviews a summary judgment order de novo. Hillyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 131 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (8th Dist. 1999). Accordingly, a reviewing court will not reverse an otherwise correct judgment merely because the lower court utilized different or erroneous reasons as the basis for its determination. Diamond Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. DaytonHeidelberg Distrib. Co., 148 Ohio App.3d 596, 2002-Ohio-3932, ¶ 25 (3d Dist.), citing State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 222 (1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when, looking at the evidence as a whole: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civ.R. 56(C). In conducting this analysis the court must determine "that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, [the nonmoving] party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the [nonmoving] party's favor." Id. If any doubts exist, the issue must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358-59 (1992).
{¶12} The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of producing some evidence which demonstrates the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). In doing so, the moving party is not required to produce any affirmative evidence, but must identify those portions of the record which affirmatively support his argument. Id. at 292. The nonmoving party must then rebut with specific facts showing the existence of a genuine triable issue; he may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. Id.; Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶13} This matter implicates both the federal and Ohio prevailing wage laws. The Davis-Bacon Act, passed in 1931, requires that "contractors and subcontractors on federal construction projects pay qualified employees * * * the prevailing wage rate for their job classification as determined by the Secretary of Labor." Frank Bros., Inc., v. Wisconsin Dept. of Transp., 409 F.3d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 2005); see 40 U.S.C. 3142(b); 23 U.S.C. 113; 23 C.F.R. 633.102. To show compliance with the Davis-Bacon Act, contractors and subcontractors who are subject to the federal wage provisions must give weekly payroll records to the Department of Labor. Frank Bros, at 882. In addition to complying with federal prevailing wage laws, on construction projects that have state and federal funding, contractors must also abide by supplemental state prevailing wage laws. Id. at 883.
{¶15} However, under R.C. 4115.04(B), certain public improvements are exempt from R.C. 4115.03 through 4115.16. R.C. 4115.04(B) states, in relevant part:
{¶16} Local No. 8 contends that the trial court erred in making a finding of fact that was contrary to the stipulated record. Specifically, Local No. 8 argues that both parties stipulated that the federal funds are being paid to reimburse a portion of the County's interest payments exclusively, and did not go...
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