Int'l Longshore & Warehouse Union v. Ictsi Or., Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:12-cv-1058-SI |
| Parties | INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE UNION, Plaintiff, v. ICTSI OREGON, INC., Defendant. ICTSI OREGON, INC., Counterclaim-Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE UNION; INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE UNION Local 8; and INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE AND WAREHOUSE UNION Local 40, Counterclaim-Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Before the Court is a motion for partial summary judgment filed by ICTSI Oregon, Inc. ("ICTSI") against several affirmative defenses alleged by International Longshore and Warehouse Union ("ILWU"), International Longshore and Warehouse Union Local 8 ("Local 8"), and International Longshore and Warehouse Union Local 40 ("Local 40") (collectively, the "ILWU Entities"). ICTSI also seeks partial summary judgment based on issue preclusion, arising out of the earlier opinions of this Court and the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. For the reasons discussed below, ICTSI's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
A party is entitled to summary judgment if the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). Although "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment," the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position [is] insufficient . . . ." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 255 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, "is designed to 'bar [ ] successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination.'" Paulo v. Holder, 669 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008)); see also Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir. 1988) ( . Thus, the party asserting issue preclusion must demonstrate: (1) the issue at stake was identical in both proceedings; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceedings; (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the issue was necessarily decided, also described as necessary or essential to the judgment.1 Howard v. City of Coos Bay, 871 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2017).
" Pauma v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 888 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting B & B Hardware v. Hargis Indus., --- U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 (2015)). The Ninth Circuit "has held that preclusion 'doctrines apply to administrative determinations . . . of the [National Labor Relations] Board.'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Bldg. Materials & Constr. Teamsters v. Granite Rock Co., 851 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988)). "Generally speaking, so long as an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolv[ing] disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the federal common law rules of preclusion . . . extend to . . . administrative adjudications of legal as well as factual issues, even if unreviewed." Id. (alterations in original) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Airline Prof'ls Ass'n of the IBT, Local No. 1224 v. Allegiant Air, LLC, 788 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2015) ().
This lawsuit is the last remaining active case out of six separate actions that were filed in 2012 arising from a labor dispute at Terminal 6 ("T6") at the Port of Portland ("Port").2 Briefly stated, the dispute concerns who is entitled to perform two jobs of plugging, unplugging, and monitoring refrigerated shipping containers (the "reefer" jobs) at T6. This case was originally filed by the ILWU and Pacific Maritime Association ("PMA"). They alleged that theircollective bargaining agreement—the Pacific Coast Longshore and Clerks Agreement3 ("PCL&CA")—required ICTSI, the then-operator of T6 and a PMA member, to assign the reefer jobs to ILWU members. ICTSI, the Port of Portland (the "Port"), and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("IBEW") Local 48 contended that other contracts—including the T6 Lease Agreement between the Port and ICTSI and the District Council of Trade Unions Agreement ("DCTU Agreement") between the Port and IBEW—required that the reefer jobs be assigned to IBEW members.
Beginning in March 2012, ILWU began filing grievances under the PCL&CA grievance and arbitration procedures, alleging that ICTSI was refusing to assign the reefer jobs to ILWU members in violation of the PCL&CA. In May and June 2012, ILWU and PMA arbitrated ILWU's grievances. An arbitrator issued two decisions directing ICTSI to assign the reefer work to ILWU members. In response to ILWU's attempts to obtain the reefer work for ILWU-represented employees, ICTSI and the Port filed several charges with the NLRB.
When IBEW learned of ILWU's grievances, IBEW threatened to picket if ICTSI re-assigned the reefer work from IBEW-represented employees to ILWU-represented employees. On May 10, 2012, ICTSI filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB against IBEW, alleging that IBEW violated the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") by engaging in proscribed activity with an object of forcing ICTSI to assign the reefer work to IBEW-represented employees rather than to ILWU-represented employees. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 358 NLRB No. 102, 2012 WL 3306478 (Aug. 13, 2012). The NLRB considered ICTSI's charge to trigger § 10(k) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(k), which empowers the NLRB to resolve jurisdictional disputes between unions.
The NLRB held a § 10(k) hearing in which ICTSI, IBEW, and ILWU presented evidence. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 2012 WL 3306478, at *1. Those parties, as well as the Port as amicus, also presented post-hearing briefing to the NLRB. Id. While that proceeding was pending before the NLRB, the ILWU and PMA brought this action on June 13, 2012, under § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185, to enforce the two arbitration awards issued by arbitrators pursuant to the PCL&CA assigning the reefer jobs to ILWU members. After the ILWU and PMA filed their complaint, the Port and the IBEW intervened as defendants. The Port and ICTSI filed counterclaims against the ILWU Entities. The Port also filed crossclaims against ICTSI.
The NLRB also filed an action in this Court, on June 18, 2012, requesting a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief to enjoin the ILWU Entities from engaging in alleged improper secondary boycott activity under the NLRA. Hooks v. Int'l Longshore & Warehouse Union, Case No. 3:12-cv-1088-SI. The NLRB alleged that the ILWU Entities had engaged and were continuing to engage in work slowdowns, stoppages, withholding of services, threats, coercion and restraint of persons engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B). The Court held a hearing on June 22 and 29 and July 3, 2012, and issued a temporary restraining order on July 3, 2012. The Court held another hearing on July 19, 2012, which included witness testimony, and issued its preliminary injunction that same day. The Court held that the ILWU Entities "have engaged in, and are engaging in, acts and conduct in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) and affecting commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(6) and (7), and that such acts and conduct will likely be repeated or continued unless enjoined." Hooks, Case No. 3:12-cv-1088-SI, ECF 50 at 2. Neither the temporary restraining order or the preliminary injunction were based on the § 10(k) charges or proceeding.
On August 13, 2012, the NLRB issued its § 10(k) decision and awarded the reefer work to IBEW-represented employees. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 2012 WL 3306478, at *7. The NLRB relied on three factors to reach its conclusion: the terms of the collective-bargaining agreements, the employer's preference, and past practices. Id. at *7. With respect to the collective bargaining agreements, the NLRB determined that the Port, which is not a party to the PCL&CA, controlled the assignment of the reefer work. Thus, the NLRB found that it was irrelevant that the PCL&CA purportedly requires ICTSI to assign reefer work to ILWU-represented employees because under the DCTU Agreement and the T6 Lease Agreement, the Port, not ICTSI,...
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