INT. ORG. MASTERS, ETC., LOC. NO. 2 v. INT. ORG. MASTERS, ETC.

• Decision Date: 01 May 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 71-2940.
• Citation: 342 F. Supp. 212
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION MASTERS, MATES AND PILOTS OF AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 2, an unincorporated organization by Edmund H. Stoughton, et al., Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION MASTERS, MATES AND PILOTS OF AMERICA, INC., a corporation, et al., Defendants, and Trustees of International Organization Masters, Mates and Pilots of Pension and Welfare Plan, a Trust, Added Party Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

342 F. Supp. 212

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION MASTERS, MATES AND PILOTS OF AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 2, an unincorporated organization by Edmund H. Stoughton, et al., Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION MASTERS, MATES AND PILOTS OF AMERICA, INC., a corporation, et al., Defendants, and Trustees of International Organization Masters, Mates and Pilots of Pension and Welfare Plan, a Trust, Added Party Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 71-2940.

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

May 1, 1972.

Kip D. Denega, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

James J. Leyden, Philadelphia, Pa., Howard Ganz, New York City, for employer-designated trustees of added party defendant.

Richard H. Markowitz, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

Melvin A. Bank, Philadelphia, Pa., for Union-designated trustees of added party defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FULLAM, District Judge.

The issue before the Court is whether an action removed to this Court should be remanded to the state court.

In 1956, the twelve individual plaintiffs commenced an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, alleging their improper expulsion from membership in the defendant International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots (IOMMP) of America and its Local No. 2. That court determined in 1970 that defendants were liable, and proceedings commenced on the issue of damages. With the encouragement of the court, eleven of the plaintiffs agreed to a settlement, providing that the defendants would make payments to the IOMMP Pension Plan (Plan) sufficient to allow plaintiffs to receive the pensions to which they would have been entitled had they not been expelled from the union. The court's approval of the settlement was made contingent on acceptance of its terms by the Trustees of the Plan. No approval was forthcoming; the Trustees' vote was evenly divided, the union-designated Trustees voting affirmatively and the employer-designated Trustees negatively.¹ Six of the plaintiffs then sought to join the Trustees as "added party defendants." The court approved, and a complaint was served, seeking to require the Trustees to accept the union's contributions, and to pay pensions to plaintiffs. The employer-designated Trustees filed a removal petition in this Court, alleging that the cause of action set forth in the new complaint would, if sued upon alone, fall within the Court's original jurisdiction. The union (original defendant), the union-designated Trustees, and the six plaintiffs who sued the Plan have moved to remand on the grounds that (1) not "all defendants" have joined in the removal petition, as the removal statute requires, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1446(a) (1970); 1A J. Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 0.1683.-2 (1965) hereinafter Moore, and (2) that the cause of action sought to be removed is ancillary to state proceedings and, under a judicially-created exception to the removal statute,² nonremovable. I believe that the latter contention is meritorious, and therefore, need not consider the former.

The policies underlying the rule against removal of ancillary causes of action are nowhere well-articulated. Several can be discerned or imagined, however. A party should not, as a general principle,³ be permitted to relitigate a state court action in the equivalent federal court.⁴ The notion of comity between state and federal courts also supports the view that a court should have control over its own process, including its mode of execution.⁵ Bifurcation of a case into two forums might do it "practical violence."⁶ From a pragmatic viewpoint, it "would be wasteful to have the appendage in federal court when the principal claim is being litigated in state court."⁷ The state courts may have more expeditious methods for adjudicating issues bearing on matters already sub judice.⁸ Finally, it might be thought unduly burdensome for a federal court to be forced to concern itself with sometimes minor matters (e. g., garnishment) arising out of state court proceedings.

Many formulations of a rule, but perhaps inevitably, no useful working definitions of "ancillary," have been suggested. To be removable, an action must be "independent," not "supplementary or incidental to another action." 1A Moore, ¶ 0.1574.-11 at 170. It must be "practically severable," so as not to do "practical violence." Id. at 173. It must not be a "mere mode of execution or of relief, inseparably connected with the original judgment or decree"; but a "supplemental proceeding which in fact involves an independent controversy with some new and different party" may be removed. Buford & Co. v. Strother & Conklin, 10 F. 406, 407 (D.Iowa 1881). The mere fact that a controversy had its origin in a state action does not require remand; the issue is whether it is a "separate suit." 1A Moore, ¶ 0.1574.-11 at 171.

The cases are few, old, and sometimes difficult to reconcile. It is not surprising that research discloses no precedent squarely in point. The garnishment cases, constituting the most numerous category of "ancillariness" decisions, provide the closest analogy. The courts are hopelessly divided in their results and reasoning however,⁹ some looking to state law to determine whether garnishment is regarded as ancillary or independent,¹⁰ others making their own independent judgment, informed, but not concluded, by the states' characterization,¹¹ and in both cases, coming out on both sides of the issue of removability.

I cannot regard state court determinations of ancillariness as conclusive. The removal statutes create a federal right the enjoyment of which states by mere semantic alteration without any real substantive change should not be permitted to prevent.¹² Accordingly, I do not give controlling weight to the fact that the trial court permitted joinder of the Plan in the principal action, rather than requiring the institution of a separate suit. Substance, rather than form, must govern, but substantially the two causes of action are so closely intertwined that removal of one without the other would "do practical violence" to the entire action.¹³ Surely, the parties to the two causes of action are different, and the alleged wrongful acts of the two sets of defendants are in no way similar, but this alone is insufficient to establish nonancillariness; the same can be said about most garnishment proceedings and, as has been seen, the question of their removability is hardly a settled one.¹⁴ The employer-designated Trustees seem to rely upon the novelty of the claim asserted against the Plan as a basis for removal: the complaint against it seeks damages although no liability has been established. It should be borne in mind that in garnishment proceedings, the garnishee's liability to the defendant is not always free from question. That the alleged basis for the Plan's liability in the present case does not fall neatly into such a well-defined category as contract or tort does not strengthen the case for removal. The merits are not before me, and reliance on the assumption that liability is unlikely to be established might prove to be misplaced.

The "practical violence" which might result from a holding of removability relates to the state court's power to fashion a remedy for the wrong committed against the plaintiffs. Certainly the court could order the payment of monetary damages, or it could require the defendant union to purchase commercial annuities for the plaintiffs. But plaintiffs have sought a different remedy, one which might (or might not) be more appropriate on these facts. The cause of action is state-created; so must the remedy be. I am not aware of any factor making Plan pensions more desirable than cash or annuities, but neither is there evidence in the record to the contrary; the point is that these matters are none of this Court's concern. There are practical considerations, also. I can conceive of cases in which the propriety or nature of the pension remedy might depend upon the evidence adduced at the trial on the issue of liability (assuming arguendo that such a remedy is ever appropriate); for example, requiring the Plan to pay pensions to improperly expelled union members might be more appropriate when the grounds for expulsion were so...