Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp.
Citation | 99 F.Supp.3d 610 |
Decision Date | 02 March 2015 |
Docket Number | Case No. PWG–14–111. |
Parties | INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP., et al., Defendants. |
Court | United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Maryland) |
Michael Edward McCabe, Jr., Bryan D. Bolton, Funk and Bolton PA, Baltimore, MD, Clayton Walter Thompson, II, David L. Alberti, Ian Neville Feinberg, Jeremiah Armstrong, Marc Belloli, Margaret Elizabeth Day, Sal Lim, Yakov Zolotorev, Feinberg Day Alberti and Thompson LLP, Menlo Park, CA, David Taylor Rudolph, Eric B. Fastiff, Patricia Ann Dyck, Lieff Cabraser Heimann and Bernstein LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Brent P. Ray, David W. Higer, Kenneth R. Adamo, Kristina Hendricks, Megan M. New, Ryan M. Hubbard, Vishesh Narayen, Kirland and Ellis LLP, Kristopher Davis, Latham and Watkins, Chicago, IL, Mary Catherine Zinsner, Lesley Whitcomb Fierst, Syed Mohsin Reza, Troutman Sanders LLP, Tysons Corner, VA, Adam M. Greenfield, Elizabeth V. Johnson, Marguerite M. Sullivan, Matthew Moore, Peter O. Schmidt, Latham And Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, Alan J. Devlin, Christopher St. John Yates, Latham and Watkins LLP, San Francisco, CA, Clement Naples, Latham and Watkins LLP, New York, NY, Dabney J. Carr, IV, Robert A. Angle, Troutman Sanders LLP, Richmond, VA, Ethan Y. Park, Jeffrey G. Homrig, Katherine M. Schon, Michelle Patricia Woodhouse, Patricia Young, Latham and Watkins LLP, Menlo Park, CA, James P. Ulwick, Kramon and Graham PA, Baltimore, MD, Paul E. McGowan, Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs/Counter–Defendants Intellectual Ventures I LLC and Intellectual Ventures II LLC (together, “Intellectual Ventures companies” or “IV”), two companies whose “businesses include purchasing important inventions from individual inventors and institutions and then licensing the inventions to those who need them,” bring patent infringement claims against Defendants/Counterclaimants Capital One Financial Corp., Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., and Capital One, N.A. (collectively, “Capital One companies”). Compl., ECF No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that the Capital One companies infringed four patents “[i]n connection with the[ ] online banking services and other [electronic] systems and services” that they provide. Id. ¶ ¶ 13 & 23.1
The Capital One companies filed, and then twice amended, an Answer, Defenses, and Counterclaims, seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement or invalidity of each patent, as well as unenforceability of one patent due to inequitable conduct. ECF Nos. 28, 72, 103. They now timely seek to amend their Second Amended Answer, Defenses and Counterclaims to add three antitrust counterclaims “alleging that IV's creation and abuse of monopoly power to hold up Capital One and other banks violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act [15 U.S.C. § 2 ] and Section 7 of the Clayton Act [15 U.S.C. § 18 ].”2 Countercls.' Mot. to Am. 1, ECF No. 106. Their new counterclaims are “based on IV's new and continuing conduct, internal documents that IV produced near the end of its first action against Capital One in Virginia, and from events occurring during and after IV's first case against Capital One.” Id. Given that Counterclaimants filed similar counterclaims in the earlier suit between the parties in the Eastern District of Virginia, I must determine whether res judicata bars the proposed counterclaims and, if not, whether the proposed counterclaims are plausible. Because Counterclaimants base the proposed counterclaims on events that occurred after they filed their counterclaims in the Eastern District of Virginia, res judicata is not a bar. Further, Counterclaimants sufficiently state claims in their proposed counterclaims for purposes of surviving a plausibility challenge and to warrant proceeding to discovery on the counterclaims. Therefore, I will grant their Motion to Amend.
Whether to grant a motion for leave to amend is within this Court's discretion. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). When, as here, a party moves to amend for a third time but before the deadline established in the Scheduling Order for doing so, Rule 15(a)(2) provides the standard for whether to grant the motion. See id.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). Rule 15(a)(2) states that “[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” “The Court only should deny leave to amend if amendment ‘would prejudice the opposing party, reward bad faith on the part of the moving party, or ... amount to futility.’ ” Rao v. Alaska Airlines, 22 F.Supp.3d 529, 540 (D.Md.2014) (quoting MTB Servs., Inc. v. Tuckman–Barbee Constr. Co., No. RDB–12–2109, 2013 WL 1819944, at *3 (D.Md. Apr. 30, 2013) ); Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir.2006). Otherwise, “[i]f the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a [counterclaimant] may be a proper subject of relief,” and the counterclaimant moves to amend, the Court should grant the motion so that the counterclaimant has the “opportunity to test his claim on the merits.” Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227.
Here, Plaintiffs/Counter–Defendants do not oppose Counterclaimants' proposed amendment insofar as they seek to add as counter-defendants new entities related to the existing Counter–Defendants. Therefore, Counterclaimants' Motion to Amend IS GRANTED as to the addition of the new counter-defendants. Nor do the Intellectual Ventures companies contend that amendment would be prejudicial or that the Capital One companies acted in bad faith. Plaintiffs/Counter–Defendants argue only that amendment to include three antitrust claims would be futile.
Determining whether amendment would be futile does not involve “ ‘an evaluation of the underlying merits of the case.’ ” MTB Servs., 2013 WL 1819944, at *3 (quoting Next Generation Grp. v. Sylvan Learning Ctrs., LLC., No. CCB–11–0986, 2012 WL 37397, at *3 (D.Md. Jan. 5, 2012) ). Rather, “the merits of the litigation” are only relevant to the Court's ruling on a motion for leave to amend if “a proposed amendment may clearly be seen to be futile,” Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir.1980), such as “if the proposed amended complaint fails to state a claim under the applicable rules and accompanying standards,” Katyle v. Penn Nat'l Gaming Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 471 (4th Cir.2011) ; see MTB Servs., 2013 WL 1819944, at *3. Notably, a claim is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim “ ‘when the face of the complaint clearly reveals the existence of a meritorious affirmative defense.’ ” Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 116 (4th Cir.2013) (quoting Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 506 (4th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 1057 (4th Cir.1991).
Plaintiffs/Counter–Defendants oppose the amendment, arguing that it would be futile because res judicata bars the proposed counterclaims. Pls.' Opp'n 9–10. They also contend that the proposed counterclaims do not state plausible claims for relief. Id. at 12. Counterclaimants reply that res judicata is not a bar because the earlier opinion was limited to the facts as pleaded, and now there are new facts that were not in existence or known during the earlier litigation, and the counterclaims are plausible. Countercls.' Reply 3, 8.
As noted, this is not the parties' first time facing each other in court. In June, 2013, the Intellectual Ventures companies filed suit against the Capital One companies in the Eastern District of Virginia, and the Capital One companies filed counterclaims in October, 2013 that, as amended, “assert [ed] [three] antitrust claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act and...
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