Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.

• Decision Date: 10 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. CV-97-N-3023-NE.,CV-97-N-3023-NE.
• Citation: 88 F.Supp.2d 1288
• Parties: INTERGRAPH CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. INTEL CORPORATION, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

88 F.Supp.2d 1288

INTERGRAPH CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. INTEL CORPORATION, Defendants.

No. CV-97-N-3023-NE.

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Northeastern Division.

March 10, 2000.

N Lee Cooper, James L Priester, Luther M Dorr, Jr, Maynard Cooper & Gale, Birmingham, AL, William J Baxley, Joel E Dillard, Baxley Dillard Dauphin & McKnight, Birmingham, AL, David V Lucas, Intergraph Corporation, Huntsville, AL, Justine Young Gottshall, Sharis Arnold Pozen, Hogan & Hartson LLP, Washington, DC, William L Jaeger, William J Bohler, KT Cherian, George Marcus Schwab, Stephen James Akerley, David E Sipiora, Richard Lee Grossman, Townsend Townsend & Crew, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Byron W Cooper, James W Soong, Townsend and Townsend and Crew, LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for Intergraph Corporation, plaintiff.

Thad G Long, Michael D McKibben, James F Archibald, III, Matthew H Lembke, Anne Marie Seibel, Bradley Arant Rose & White, Birmingham, AL, Gary C Huckaby, Kimberly Bessiere Martin, Bradley Arant Rose & White, Huntsville, AL, Michael L Denger, Joseph Kattan, Jeffrey T Gilleran, David J Arp, David WT Daniels, Michael F Flanagan, Danielle K Moskowitz, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher Washington, DC, Joel M Freed, Marc Gary Schildkraut, Anthony W Shaw, Joseph A Micallef, Darren B Bernhard, Howard T Rosenblatt, Cono A Carrano, Robert J Worrall, Lawrence G McDonough, Michael Neill Clark, Joseph V Colaianni, Jr, Mary Floweree Walters, Howrey & Simon, Washington, DC, Robert E Cooper, James P Fogelman, Daniel S Floyd, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, Los Angeles, CA, Peter N Detkin, Thomas C Reynolds, Intel Corporation, Santa Clara, CA, Joel S Sanders, Hill B Wellford, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, San Francisco, CA, Michael Francis Bailey, Brown & Bain PA, Phoenix, AZ, Christopher L Kelley, Erik Keith Moller, Buckmaster DeWolf, Evangelina Maria Almirantearena, Howrey & Simon, Menlo Park, CA, for Intel Corporation, defendant.

Kenneth B Wildstein, International Business Machines Corporation, White Plains, NY, for International Business Machines Corporation, movant.

Mark S VanderBroek, Toni A Friess, Troutman Sanders, Atlanta, GA, for Matrox Graphics, Inc, movant.

John W Harbin, Simon H Bloom, Powell Goldstein Frazer & Murphy, Atlanta, GA, Brett M Bloomston, David Cromwell Johnson & Associates, Birmingham, AL, for American Megatrends, Inc., movant.

Memorandum of Opinion

EDWIN L. NELSON, District Judge.

This memorandum addresses the continuing viability of Intergraph's remaining antitrust claims after the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated the Preliminary Injunction entered by this court on April 10, 1998. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed.Cir.1999). Since the Federal Circuit opinion was rendered, the court has requested and received from the parties written statements regarding their respective positions on the antitrust claims. After reviewing these submissions, the court requested additional briefs on the law of the case doctrine and how that doctrine would impact the remaining antitrust claims.¹ Moreover, the parties have been heard orally, and Intel has moved in open court for summary judgment based upon the opinion of the Federal Circuit as to any and all of the plaintiff's remaining antitrust claims. After some wavering and uncertainty, it is now clear that Intergraph claims only that it is entitled to pursue a claim that Intel has unlawfully maintained a monopoly in the computer microprocessor market.

The court having carefully considered all these matters, finds that Intel's motion for summary judgment should be granted. The opinion of the Federal Circuit effectively forecloses Intergraph's further pursuit of its monopoly maintenance claim. The motion for summary judgment will be granted and the remaining antitrust claim will be dismissed with prejudice.

Intel argues that Intergraph has no anti-trust claims following the opinion or the Federal Circuit because that court concluded that Intergraph could not demonstrate anti-competitive conduct by Intel in any market in which Intergraph and Intel compete an because it further held that a holder of intellectual property has the right to refuse to deal or license that intellectual property to any other entity without running afoul of the antitrust laws except in very limited circumstances. On the other hand, Intergraph asserts that it may still pursue its claim that Intel has unlawfully maintained a monopoly in the relevant market for computer microprocessors. According to Intergraph, the Federal Circuit did not foreclose its monopoly maintenance claim because that claim was not before the appeals court and, thus, could not have been the subject of any ruling by that court.² Contrary to Intergraph's position, the court finds that the Federal Circuit did address the claim that Intel has unlawfully maintained a monopoly in the computer microprocessor market and that it did so in such a way as to preclude its further litigation in this action.

I. Law of the Case Doctrine.

On the subject of the law of the case doctrine, the Federal Circuit has said:

The law-of-the-case doctrine is well established in the patent jurisprudence of this court. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 900-01, 221 USPQ 669, 678-79 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857, 105 S.Ct. 187, 83 L.Ed.2d 120 (1984); Central Soya Co. v. Geo A. Hormel & Company, 723 F.2d 1573, 1580-81, 220 USPQ 490, 495 (Fed. Cir.1983). The doctrine is that as a matter of sound judicial practice, under which a court generally adheres to a decision in a prior appeal in the case unless one of three "exceptional circumstances" exists: "the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different, controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues, or the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Central Soya, supra, 723 F.2d at 1580, 220 USPQ at 495, quoting from Short v. United States, 661 F.2d 150, 154, 228 Ct.Cl. 535 (Ct.Cl.1981), cert. denied sub nom. Hoopa Valley Tribe of Indians v. Short, 455 U.S. 1034, 102 S.Ct. 1738, 72 L.Ed.2d 153 (1982). United States v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 612 F.2d 517, 222 Ct.Cl. 1 (1979). The doctrine is designed "to provide finality to judicial decisions." Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 612 F.2d at 521.

Smith International, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 759 F.2d 1572, 1576, 225 U.S.P.Q. 889 (Fed.Cir.1985). In Aydin Corporation v. Widnall, No. 96-1267, 1997 WL 413329, at *3 (Fed.Cir. July 24, 1997), the Court further stated:

[T]he trial tribunal ... "has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court." Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306, 68 S.Ct. 1039, 92 L.Ed. 1403 (1948); See In re Roberts, 846 F.2d 1360, 1363 (Fed. Cir.1988) ("Unlike the authority to reconsider its own rulings, a district court is without choice in obeying the mandate of the appellate court."); see also Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl. 194, 634 F.2d 557, 560 (1980). The mandate constitutes the law of the case on issues that were either explicitly or implicitly decided by the appellate tribunal. See Exxon Corp. v. United States, 931 F.2d 874, 877 n. 7 (Fed.Cir.1991) (citing 1B James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.404[10] at 172-174 (2d ed.1988)). Thus, a trial court on remand may not reexamine, beyond the scope of the remand order, any issues that were addressed, either explicitly or implicitly, by an appellate court.

If, as is probably true, because these issues relate to antitrust claims, the Federal Circuit would apply the law of the Eleventh Circuit, the rule is similar. In decisional authority binding on this court, the Fifth Circuit³ has written that "[t]his and other courts ... have developed the doctrine known as the law of the case: once a case has been decided on appeal, the rule adopted is to be applied, right or wrong, absent exceptional circumstances, in the disposition of the lawsuit." Schwartz v. NMS Industries, Inc., 575 F.2d 553, 554-555 (8th Cir.1978); see also, Royal Ins. Co. v. Quinn-L Capital Corp., 3 F.3d 877, 880-881 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that ruling on appeal from entry of preliminary injunction establishes law of the case as to legal issues actually determined though the same rule may not apply to factual questions).

As the Fifth Circuit explained in White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428 (5th Cir.1967):

The "law of the case" rule is based on the salutary and sound public policy that litigation should come to an end. It is predicated on the premise that "there would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to criticisms on their opinions or speculate on chances from changes in its members," and that it would be impossible for an appellate court "to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently" and expeditiously "if a question, once considered and decided by it were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal" thereof.

While the "law of the case" doctrine is not an inexorable command, a decision of a legal issue or issues by an appellate court establishes "the law of the case" and must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case in the trial court or on a later appeal in the appellate court, unless the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different, controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues, or the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. (Footnotes omitted).

Id. at 431-32. Presumably, all the parties agree that this court is bound to follow and apply the mandate of the Federal Circuit to the extent its opinion is applicable to the legal issues in this action.

II. The Federal Circuit's Decision.

As an initial matter, the court notes that in an email directed to the court on January...