INTERN. ASS'N IRON WORKERS v. Burtman Iron Works

• Decision Date: 30 May 1996
• Docket Number: CA No. 95-11571-JLT.
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL AND ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKERS, SHOPMEN'S LOCAL UNION 501, Plaintiff, v. BURTMAN IRON WORKS, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

928 F. Supp. 83

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL AND ORNAMENTAL IRON WORKERS, SHOPMEN'S LOCAL UNION 501, Plaintiff, v. BURTMAN IRON WORKS, INC., Defendant.

CA No. 95-11571-JLT.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

May 30, 1996.

Alan H. Shapiro, Sandulli, Grace, Shapiro, Horwitz & Davidson, Boston, MA, for International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Shopmen's Local Union 501.

Harold N. Mack, Morgan, Brown & Joy, Boston, MA, Paul Prew, DiMento & Sullivan, Boston, MA, Philip A. Tracy, Jr., Boston, MA, for Burtman Iron Works Incorporated.

Michael K. Gillis, Gillis & Bikofsky, P.C., Newton Centre, MA, for Paul Andrews.

MEMORANDUM

TAURO, Chief Judge.

International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Shopmen's Local Union 501 ("Local 501") brings this action to confirm a labor arbitration award entered in its favor against Burtman Iron Works, Inc. ("Burtman"). In its answer to Local 501's complaint, Burtman asserted a counterclaim, seeking to vacate the arbitration award. Presently before the court is Local 501's motion to dismiss the counterclaim.

I. BACKGROUND

For approximately fifteen years, Local 501 has represented a bargaining unit of employees at Burtman's facility in the Hyde Park section of Boston, Massachusetts. On July 15, 1992, the then current collective bargaining agreement between the parties expired. On July 21, 1992, Burtman discharged Paul Andrews, an employee represented by Local 501. Local 501 grieved the discharge and, after Burtman refused to arbitrate the issue, filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB").

In September 1992, the parties settled on terms of a new collective bargaining agreement (the "1992 CBA"), purportedly agreeing that it become retroactively effective on July 16, 1992. Local 501 withdrew its unfair labor practice charge and renewed its request to arbitrate Andrews' dismissal. Burtman again refused and Local 501 filed a complaint to compel arbitration in the Suffolk Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The state court agreed with Local 501's position that the dispute regarding Andrews' discharge was governed by the 1992 CBA and ordered that Burtman submit to arbitration "concerning the discharge of Paul Andrews pursuant to the applicable terms" of that agreement.

On March 19, 1995, the arbitrator ruled for Local 501, finding that Andrews had been discharged without proper cause (the "March Award"). As the remedy, the arbitrator required that:

Andrews shall be reinstated with back pay and lost benefits and seniority. Any interim earnings that were, or could have been, earned shall be deducted from the back pay Burtman owes him. His record may show two written reprimands for theft of time and disrespect to a supervisor on July 21, 1992. In all other respects, his record shall be purged of this incident.

With respect to overseeing this remedial award, the arbitrator further provided that:

The arbitrator will retain jurisdiction over this matter in order to handle any disputes relating to the remedy. In accordance with the parties' agreement, Burtman shall immediately offer reinstatement to Andrews. The parties shall meet and confer in an attempt to agree on the amount of back pay due. They shall contact the arbitrator to advise of the need for a back pay hearing to be held on the agreed upon date of April 5, 1995.

Though the precise date that Burtman received the March Award is unclear from the record, it is clear that Burtman received it no later than March 27, 1995 for, on that date, Burtman reinstated Andrews.

Unable to resolve the amount of back pay owed to Andrews, the parties returned to the arbitrator. On June 21, 1995, the arbitrator awarded Andrews $72,447.74 in back wages and required Burtman to pay the National Shopmen Pension Fund $4,000.70 on Andrews's behalf (the "June Order"). Burtman has not complied with the June Order.

On July 5, 1995, Local 501 filed an action in the Suffolk Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to confirm the arbitration award pursuant to M.G.L. 150C § 10. On July 21, 1995, Burtman removed to this court on the basis of this court's jurisdiction over enforcement of collective bargaining agreements under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 (West 1978).¹ Burtman answered Local 501's complaint on July 28, 1995. The answer contained a counterclaim, seeking that the arbitration award be vacated on the ground that, as Burtman had earlier asserted, Andrews' dismissal was not arbitrable under the 1992 CBA. Local 501 now moves to dismiss the counterclaim, contending that it is barred by the statute of limitations.

II. DISCUSSION

In Derwin v. General Dynamics Corp., 719 F.2d 484, 487 (1st Cir.1983), the First Circuit held that the limitations period for motions to vacate an arbitration award under section 301 of the LMRA is provided by state law. Under Massachusetts law, a motion to vacate an arbitration award in a case involving a labor dispute must be filed within thirty days after the moving party receives the award. M.G.L. c. 150C § 11(b). Derwin, 719 F.2d at 489; International Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers, Local Union No. 6 v. Thermo-Guard Corp. ("Thermo-Guard"), 880 F.Supp. 42, 47 (D.Mass.1995).

Local 501 contends, inter alia, that the period for filing the motion to vacate commenced on the date that Burtman received the March Award and, thus, Burtman's counterclaim was not submitted within the thirty day limitation period.² Burtman does not dispute that the counterclaim was filed more than thirty days after it received the March Award, but counters that the March Award was not final because the arbitrator retained jurisdiction to resolve remedial issues related to the award of back pay. The issue before the court, then, is whether an action under section 301 of the LMRA to vacate an arbitration award accrues even though the arbitrator specifically retains jurisdiction to determine the amount of back pay.

Before reaching the merits, the court must resolve a threshold issue regarding its choice of law, namely, whether federal courts should also look to state law to determine the date on which the limitation period for a section 301 action accrues. Though the court has not found a case directly addressing this issue, federal courts addressing statute of limitation challenges to actions seeking to enforce or vacate arbitration awards under section 301 have simply examined general principles regarding the finality of arbitration decisions, rather than inquiring into how the relevant state jurisdiction would decide the accrual issue. See, e.g., Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc. v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America (UPGWA) and Its Local 537, 47 F.3d 14, 16 (2nd Cir. 1995); Local 36, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Pevely Sheet Metal Co., Inc. ("Pevely"), 951 F.2d 947, 949 (8th Cir. 1992); Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 802 F.2d 247, 250-51 (7th Cir.1986). Following the implicit holding of these cases, the court concludes that the date on which a section 301 action accrues is a matter of the federal common law.³ Cf. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO v. Centor Contractors, Inc., 831 F.2d 1309, 1311 (7th Cir.1987) (declining to borrow aspects of state statute of limitations other than the period provided).

As a general matter, federal courts decline to review an arbitrator's decision under section 301 of the LMRA until the award is final. Orion Pictures Corp. v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., 946 F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir.1991). "`To be considered "final," an arbitration award must be intended by the arbitrator to be a complete determination of every issue submitted....'" Millmen Local 550, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO v. Wells Exterior Trim, 828 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Anderson v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 880, 883 (7th Cir.1985)). "Where an arbitrator retains jurisdiction in order to decide a substantive issue the parties have not yet resolved, this retention of jurisdiction `indicates that the arbitrator did not intend the award to be final.'" Orion Pictures, 946 F.2d at 724 (quoting Millmen, 828 F.2d at 1376-77). As with the finality doctrine governing appeals from district court orders, this "complete arbitration rule" preserves judicial resources by preventing piecemeal litigation. Union Switch & Signal Div. American Standard Inc. v. United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers of America, Local 610, 900 F.2d 608, 610-11 (3rd Cir. 1990); Millmen, 828 F.2d at 1375.

The complete arbitration rule, however, does not mean that the mere possibility that an arbitrator may need to take further action renders an award nonfinal. Indeed, if that were the case, the frequent recourse of arbitrators to equitable remedies would, as a practical matter, leave some arbitration decisions unreviewable. Dreis, 802 F.2d at 250. Similarly, an arbitrator's use of boilerplate language generally retaining jurisdiction does not make an award nonfinal. Id. Nor does a party moving for reconsideration of an arbitration award toll the running of the limitations period. Id. Underlying these conclusions is the recognition that the value of expeditious dispute resolution outweighs the prospect of successive litigation arising from action taken by an arbitrator subsequent to the award. Cf. United Paperworks Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc. ("Misco"), 484 U.S. 29, 38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 370-71, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) (explaining that limited role of federal courts in reviewing merits of an arbitration award is premised on federal labor policy of "speedy resolution of grievances by private mechanisms").

For similar reasons, the Seventh Circuit has stated in di...