INTERN. ASS'N OF MACHINISTS, 969 AFL-CIO v. INDRESCO

• Decision Date: 17 July 1995
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. H-94-1028.
• Citation: 892 F. Supp. 917
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, AIR TOOL LODGE CO. 969, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, v. INDRESCO, INC.—INDUSTRIAL TOOL DIVISION, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

892 F. Supp. 917

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, AIR TOOL LODGE CO. 969, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff, v. INDRESCO, INC.—INDUSTRIAL TOOL DIVISION, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. H-94-1028.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas.

July 17, 1995.

Patrick M. Flynn, Houston, TX, for plaintiff.

Raymond L. Kalmans, Neel Hooper & Kalmans, Houston, TX, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CRONE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending before the court is Plaintiff International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Air Tool Lodge Co. 969, AFL-CIO's ("Union") Motion for Summary Judgment (# 12). The Union seeks to compel arbitration between the Union and Defendant Indresco, Inc. — Industrial Tool Division ("Indresco") over the discharge of a former employee of Indresco.

Having reviewed the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, this court is of the opinion that the Union's motion for summary judgment should be granted.

I. Background.

Indresco is a Texas corporation that manufactures pneumatic hand tools, primarily for use in the automobile and aircraft industries. Indresco has a manufacturing facility in Houston, Texas, where it employs hourly workers who are covered by a collective bargaining agreement between Indresco and the Union. Indresco is an employer within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") engaged in interstate commerce or in an industry affecting commerce. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the LMRA, existing for the purposes of representing employees in connection with wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment in negotiations with their employers.

In February 1991, Indresco terminated Eric Scott ("Scott"), an employee covered by the collective bargaining agreement with the Union. Scott was terminated for an alleged violation of shop rules and regulations involving purported misrepresentations of fact about the machine on which he was working in order to secure a more favorable temporary time in which to perform his duties. The Union filed a grievance protesting the discharge, and the grievance went to arbitration. On August 21, 1992, the arbitrator, John F. Caraway, sustained Scott's grievance and ordered Indresco to reinstate Scott with the payment of back wages and the restoration of seniority benefits. Specifically, the award states that Indresco "shall pay Mr. Scott back wages from the date of his discharge throug (sic) the date of his reinstatement." The award also states that Indresco "shall deduct earnings received by Mr. Scott from other employment, as well as deduct any unemployment compensation benefits received by Mr. Scott."

Scott returned to work at Indresco on September 2, 1992, at which time John D. Kennedy ("Kennedy"), Industrial Relations Manager for Indresco, requested information regarding Scott's interim earnings. This information was needed to calculate Scott's back pay as ordered in the arbitration award. On September 23, 1992, Indresco presented Scott with a back pay calculation, an affidavit for Scott's signature, and a check in the amount of $27,763.28 for back pay. Scott and the Union representative reviewed these documents and subsequently notified Indresco that the documents were correct. Scott accepted the check and signed an affidavit before a notary public on September 24, 1992. The affidavit recited the pay period dates of February 18, 1991 to September 1, 1992, specified the total earnings reported by Scott for that period, and set $27,763.28 as the amount of the full and final settlement of the arbitration award. Later that day, Indresco received information from the Texas Employment Commission ("TEC") documenting Scott's receipt of unemployment compensation. After Kennedy compared the report from the TEC to the benefits claimed by Scott, he determined that Scott had understated his unemployment benefits by a total of $693.00.

On September 25, 1992, Kennedy, Mark Ideus, Manager of Material and Production Operations, and Deborah A. Pantalion, Benefits and Labor Relations Supervisor, met with the Union Shop Committee. The Union Shop Committee was advised of Scott's alleged falsification of his reported income and that Indresco intended to suspend Scott. After this meeting, Scott was suspended from his employment at Indresco for dishonesty in underreporting his unemployment compensation. In accordance with the procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, a hearing was held on October 5, 1992, and following that hearing, Scott's suspension was converted to a discharge. The Union subsequently filed a grievance over the second discharge of Scott on October 8, 1992. A Step 3 meeting was held on the grievance, after which Indresco notified the Union of its decision to deny Scott's grievance. The Union was dissatisfied with Indresco's 3rd Step answer and, on October 23, 1992, notified Indresco of its intention to take Scott's grievance to arbitration.

Indresco has attempted to collect the money allegedly overpaid to Scott, but it has been unsuccessful. On February 19, 1993, the Union wrote Indresco, noting that Scott's arbitration was pending and advising Indresco, for the first time, that one of the issues to be presented to the arbitrator was the dates that Indresco had used in calculating Scott's prior back pay award. Indresco declined to include this issue in the arbitration, claiming that neither Scott nor the Union had filed a grievance disputing the date used by Indresco to calculate the back pay award and observing that any subsequent grievance on this issue would be untimely under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.

After Indresco refused to proceed with arbitration on the issue of whether the correct dates were used to compute Scott's back pay, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Regional Office of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"). On October 20, 1993, after an investigation, the NLRB concluded that "further proceedings on the charge are not warranted," and the NLRB refused to issue a complaint in the matter.

The Union initiated this action on March 29, 1994, seeking to compel arbitration, alleging that Indresco's termination of Scott violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.

II. Analysis.

A. Arbitration Of the Discharge Grievance.

In 1960, the United States Supreme Court established four fundamental principles of arbitration in a series of cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960). The first principle is that "`arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.'" AT & T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) (quoting Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582, 80 S.Ct. at 1353). The second principle is that arbitrability of a grievance is an issue for judicial determination. AT & T Tech., Inc., 475 U.S. at 649, 106 S.Ct. at 1418. Third, in deciding the arbitrability issue, a court is not to rule on the merits of the grievance. Id. at 649-50, 106 S.Ct. at 1419. Fourth, the existence of an arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement raises a presumption of arbitrability. Id. at 650, 106 S.Ct. at 1419. In general, the Steelworkers Trilogy established arbitration as the favored method of resolving labor disputes where collective bargaining agreements are in force. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 594, 80 S.Ct. at 1359; Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 578, 80 S.Ct. at 1350; American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 568, 80 S.Ct. at 1346.

In the instant case, the Union contends that Indresco has refused to arbitrate the discharge grievance on the grounds that Scott has not reimbursed the company the $693.00 and because there was no quorum when the Union membership voted to take the matter to arbitration. The Union points out that there is no language in the collective bargaining agreement which excludes any particular type of discharge grievance from arbitration. The Union further asserts that the grievance arbitration clause is broad enough to cover not only Scott's discharge grievance but also the issue of the alleged excess back pay received by Scott. The Union claims that the purported excess back wages led to Scott's discharge and that this particular grievance falls under Article XVIII, ¶ A of the collective bargaining agreement which states that "grievances not satisfactorily settled in the Grievance Procedure shall, in the absence of mutual agreement to the contrary, be submitted to an arbitrator to be appointed by mutual agreement of the parties hereto." Moreover, the Union contends that Indresco cannot point to any portion of the agreement that puts Scott's grievance outside the arbitration provision. The Union also observes that the mere existence of the parties' collective bargaining agreement warrants a presumption of the arbitrability of the grievances.

According to Indresco's opposition to the Union's motion, Indresco has not refused to arbitrate Scott's discharge grievance as presented on October 8, 1992. Instead, Indresco has declined to arbitrate the issue of the proper dates to be used in the calculation of Scott's initial back pay award because the issue was not timely and properly raised through the grievance procedure. Indresco contends that, although it has agreed contractually to arbitrate grievances, the issue of the dates used to calculate Scott's back pay is outside the arbitration provision because this...