Intern. Soc. for Krishna v. City of L.A., CV 97-3616 JGD (VAPx).

• Court: United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Central District of California
• Citation: 966 F.Supp. 956
• Decision Date: 09 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. CV 97-3616 JGD (VAPx).,CV 97-3616 JGD (VAPx).
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS OF CALIFORNIA, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants.

966 F.Supp. 956 INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS OF CALIFORNIA, INC., et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
The CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants. No. CV 97-3616 JGD (VAPx). United States District Court, C.D. California, Western Division. June 9, 1997.

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Fleishman Fisher & Moest, Barry A. Fisher, David Grosz, Los Angeles, CA, David M. Liberman, Los Angeles, CA, Deborah Zexter, Beverly Hills, CA, for Plaintiffs.

City Attorney Office, James K. Hahn, John Werleich, Deputy City Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.

Munger Tolles & Olson, Marc Becker, Los Angeles, CA, for amicus curiae Center for Community Interests.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

DAVIES, District Judge.

On June 6, 1997, the Plaintiffs' Application for Preliminary Injunction came on for hearing. The Court, having considered the written submissions of the parties and amicus curiae, and the oral argument of counsel, hereby GRANTS the Application.

Background

The Complaint in this matter was filed on May 13, 1997. There are four named Plaintiffs: (1) International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. ("ISKCON"), a California nonprofit, religious corporation; (2) Emil Beca, a member of ISKCON; (3) Committee for Human Rights in Iran ("CHR"), a California, public benefit corporation; and (4) Reza Nabati, a member of CHR. The three named Defendants are: (1) the City of Los Angeles, which owns and operates Los Angeles International Airport ("LAX"); (2) Stephen Yee, the manager of LAX; and (3) Gilbert A. Sandoval, the Chief of Airport Police.

The lawsuit arises as a result of the City's recent enactment of an amendment to the Los Angeles Administrative Code. Specifically, pursuant to Ordinance Number 171552:

Subdivision (c) of Section 23.27 of the Los Angeles Administrative Code is hereby amended to read:

(c)(1) No person shall solicit and receive funds inside the airport terminals at the Airport.

(2) No person shall solicit and receive funds in the parking areas at the Airport.

(3) No person shall solicit and receive funds on the sidewalks adjacent to the airport terminals or the sidewalks adjacent to the parking areas at the Airport.

(4) Subdivisions (c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3) apply only if the solicitation and receipt of funds is conducted by a person to or with passers-by in a continuous or repetitive manner. Nothing here in is intended to prohibit the distribution of flyers, brochure, pamphlets, books, or any other printed or written matter as long as such distribution is not made with the intent of immediately receiving funds, as defined in subdivision (c)(5), at the locations referred to in (c)(1), (c)(2), or (c)(3).

(5) "Solicit and receive" funds means any written or oral request for (A) the donation of money, alms, property or anything else of value, or, (B) the pledge of a future donation of money, alms, property, or anything else of value, or, (C) the sale or offering for sale of any property upon the representation, express or implied, that the proceeds of such sale will be used for a charitable or religious purpose.

(6) If any provision of Sec. 23.27(c) is declared invalid, the validity of any other provision contained in Sec. 23.27(c) shall remain in effect.

Los Angeles, Cal., Ordinance 171552 (Apr. 1, 1997). The Ordinance was scheduled to take effect on May 15, 1997.

Members of ISKCON follow the evangelical teachings of Krishna consciousness, a religion that is related to Hinduism. A tenet of

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the religion is to disseminate the written teachings of Krishna consciousness as widely as possible. ISKCON members are required to venture into public places in order to proselytize, sell and distribute religious literature, seek support, including donations, for their religious undertakings, and provide information about Krishna consciousness. This activity is known as sankirtan.

CHR was founded in 1993. Its purpose is to publicize ongoing human rights abuses in Iran and to assist the victims of persecution and torture. Among other things, it also monitors and investigates human rights abuses of children, women, and religious minorities in Iran and provides emergency supplies and relocation to needy refugees. CHR members solicit donations for their cause.

The Plaintiffs seek to conduct their activities in the interior, general circulation areas of the LAX terminals because of the large number and diversity of people that can be found there. Compl. at 5. The LAX complex occupies 3,500 acres within the City. In 1996, LAX serviced a total of 57,974,559 passengers, making it the third busiest airport in the United States and the fifth busiest in the world. The upper level of the airport contains many commercial concessions and amenities, including four duty free shops, five fast food restaurants, five full service restaurants, 18 gift shops/newsstands, 19 cocktail lounges, five cafeterias, eight snack bars, three coffee shops, two food courts, six business centers, two bookstores, three postal facilities, and four specialty stores. The Plaintiffs aver that they limit their activities to the interior, commercialized areas of LAX. Compl. at 6.

The Department of Airports ("DOA") governs LAX. In turn, the DOA is under the management and control of a board of five commissioners known as the Board of Airport Commissioners ("Board"). As a response to what it perceived as a growing problem with solicitors, the Board requested that the City enact the Ordinance described above. According to the Defendants, the complaints relating to solicitors are legion, but "[t]he story is the same.... The solicitors annoy, harass, delay and in some instances con the traveling public." Opp. at 16. This impelled the City to take action.

In the Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that the Ordinance violates their rights under the Liberty of Speech Clause of the California Constitution, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993. On May 14, 1997, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order preventing the Defendants from applying the terms of the Ordinance, which was to go into effect the next day, to the Plaintiffs. The purpose of the Temporary Restraining Order was to preserve the status quo until a full hearing on the merits could be conducted.

Discussion

A. The Standard for Injunctive Relief

The standard for issuing injunctive relief in the Ninth Circuit requires the moving party to "meet its burden by demonstrating either: (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury if relief is not granted; or (2) the existence of serious questions going to the merits and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor." International Jensen v. Metrosound U.S.A., 4 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir.1993). Moreover, "[t]he standards `are not separate tests but the outer reaches of a single continuum.'" Id. (quoting Regents of University of California v. American Broadcasting Cos., 747 F.2d 511, 515 (9th Cir. 1984)).

If the Plaintiffs demonstrate probable success on the merits of their claims, a finding of irreparable injury is virtually mandated since the right at issue relates to freedom of speech. "The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2690, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976).

B. The Constitutionality of the Ordinance Under California Law

1. California Law is Not Co-extensive with Federal Law in Regard to the Issues Raised in this Case

Generally speaking, district courts must address issues of state constitutional

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law prior to addressing issues of federal constitutional law.¹ The Ninth Circuit has provided:

It is well-established that we should avoid adjudication of federal constitutional claims when alternative state grounds are available. Where the state constitutional provisions are co-extensive with related federal constitutional provisions, we may decide the federal constitutional claims because that analysis will also decide the state constitutional claims. However, where the state provisions offer more expansive protection than the federal constitution, we must address the state constitutional claims in order to avoid unnecessary consideration of the federal constitutional claims.

Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1391-92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1000, 115 S.Ct. 510, 130 L.Ed.2d 417 (1994) (citations omitted).

It is widely recognized that the Liberty of Speech provision of the California Constitution provides more expansive protection of speech than does the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1043 n. 7 (9th Cir.1985); Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 652, 658, 119 Cal.Rptr. 468, 472, 532 P.2d 116, 120 (1975) (stating that the Liberty of Speech Clause is "more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment"); Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal.3d 899, 908, 153 Cal.Rptr. 854, 859, 592 P.2d 341, 346 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). The Liberty of Speech Clause of the California Constitution provides that "[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." Cal. Const. art. 1, § 2(a).

The Defendants argue that, while the Liberty of Speech Clause may be more expansive than the First Amendment in some contexts, it is not more expansive in the instant context. Thus, the Defendants maintain that the California Constitution and the United States Constitution are co-extensive and the Court should therefore begin and end its analysis of the constitutionality of the Ordinance under federal law.

In addressing this issue and, indeed, all state law issues in this case, the Court...