INTERN. UNION v. AUTO GLASS EMPLOYEES FED. CREDIT

• Decision Date: 22 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 3-92-0821.,3-92-0821.
• Citation: 858 F. Supp. 711
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL UNION, United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, et al. v. AUTO GLASS EMPLOYEES FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, et al.

858 F. Supp. 711

INTERNATIONAL UNION, United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, et al. v. AUTO GLASS EMPLOYEES FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, et al.

No. 3-92-0821.

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

June 22, 1994.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lynn Allen Agee, Susan Kay Bradley, Agee, Allen, Godwin, Morris & Laurenzi, Murfreesboro, TN, for plaintiffs.

Charles Eric Stevens, Trabue, Studivant & DeWitt, Nashville, TN, for defendants Auto Glass Employees Federal Credit Union, National Credit Union Ass'n Bd., Allen Carver.

William Randall O'Bryan, Jr., Charles Eric Stevens, Jeffrey Zager, Trabue, Studivant & DeWitt, Nashville, TN, for defendant National Credit Union Administration.

Ernest D. Bennett, III, Taylor, Philbin, Pigue, Marchetti & Long, Nashville, TN, for defendant Jerry Sweet.

MEMORANDUM

HIGGINS, Judge.

The Court has before it cross motions for partial summary judgment on behalf of the defendants,¹ Auto Glass Employees Federal Credit Union (AGEFCU) and the National Credit Union Administration Board (the Board) (filed August 17, 1993; Docket Entry No. 46),² and the plaintiffs, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 737 (the Union), Martha Poston, Virginia Ligon, Sue Doss, Brenda Maley, Glynda Johnson, Tamala Lavender, Lucy Pinson, Janice Weatherly, Phyllis Law, Diane Armonat, and Mary Peoples (filed September 9 and 20, 1993; Docket Entry Nos. 56 and 65)³ for partial summary judgment. The Court also has before it the defendants' memorandum (filed August 17, 1993; Docket Entry No. 47) in support; the plaintiffs' memoranda (filed September 9 and 20, 1993; Docket Entry Nos. 57 and 66) and their supplemental memorandum (filed January 5, 1994; Docket Entry No. 77) in support.

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court shall grant the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment in part and deny it in part. In addition, the Court shall grant the plaintiffs' partial summary judgment motion in part and deny it in part.

I.

This cause of action arises out of the repudiation of a collective bargaining agreement, pursuant to the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1786, by the conservator of a federal credit union. The plaintiffs, the Union and numerous individuals who are or were employees of defendant AGEFCU, originally filed their action against AGEFCU and its conservator, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), alleging numerous statutory and constitutional violations.⁴ Complaint (filed September 14, 1992; Docket Entry No. 1). The plaintiffs filed their amended complaint (Docket Entry No. 6) on October 16, 1992, thereby adding Jerry Sweet, individually and in his official capacity as agent of the NCUA, as a defendant as well as posing a jury demand.⁵ The plaintiffs subsequently moved (motion filed February 16, 1993; Docket Entry No. 16) to join H. Allen Carver⁶ and the Board as defendants, which was granted by the Court. See order (Docket Entry No. 19) entered February 23, 1993. The plaintiffs' second amended complaint (Docket Entry No. 22), which added the Board and Mr. Carver individually and in his official capacity as agent of the NCUA as defendants, was filed on March 9, 1993.

On March 30, 1993, defendants NCUA and Mr. Carver in his individual capacity filed a motion (Docket Entry No. 27) to dismiss the plaintiffs' action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Court referred this motion to the Magistrate Judge for consideration, submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendation for disposition, see order (Docket Entry No. 32) entered April 26, 1993, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The Magistrate Judge recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted with respect to defendants NCUA and Carver. Report and Recommendation (entered July 7, 1993; Docket Entry No. 38). The Court approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation in its entirety, see order (Docket Entry No. 43) entered August 12, 1993, thereby dismissing the plaintiffs' action as to defendants NCUA and Mr. Carver in his individual capacity.

The plaintiffs' motion (filed May 24, 1993; Docket Entry No. 34) to file a third amended complaint was granted by the Court (Docket Entry No. 45) on August 12, 1993. The amendments to the complaint, see third amended complaint (filed August 20, 1993; Docket Entry No. 51), added claims on behalf of certain plaintiffs under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).⁷

The facts giving rise to this action began on December 16, 1991, when the Board issued an order of conservatorship, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1786(h), thereby appointing itself conservator for the AGEFCU. On January 3, 1992, the Board assumed all authority for the credit union's operations in its capacity as the AGEFCU's conservator. Mr. Sweet, who was appointed by the Board as president of AGEFCU and administrator of its pension benefit plan, took a number of employment actions⁸ which the Union considered to be violative of the collective bargaining agreement in effect between AGEFCU employees and the Union. A meeting of the Board's agents and union representatives was held on March 13, 1992, during which the Board proposed changes to the collective bargaining agreement which were deemed necessary for rehabilitation. The Union did not accept the proposed changes and the Board provided the Union with written notice of its repudiation of the collective bargaining agreement on March 20, 1992. Implementation of the employees' new wages and benefits occurred on April 1, 1992, and following termination of the AGEFCU Money Purchase Plan and Trust on April 21, 1992, vested benefits were paid to the plan participants.⁹

In their summary judgment motion, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants' conduct in unilaterally changing their employment conditions and in repudiating the collective bargaining agreement violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA). 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1786. They state that the Board had no authority to repudiate their collective bargaining agreement because it is not an executory contract under the FCUA. Memorandum (Docket Entry No. 66) at 4-9. In addition, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants violated their constitutional rights by depriving them of property without due process. Id. at 12-14. The plaintiffs further assert that the Union is a proper party to file this action pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., id. at 15-16, and that the AGEFCU is a proper ERISA defendant in light of its control over the administration of the pension plan. Id. at 16-17.

In contrast, the defendants contend that the FCUA supersedes any alleged violations of the NLRA or the LMRA and that its repudiation of contracts provision encompasses collective bargaining agreements. Memorandum (Docket Entry No. 47) at 5-9. In addition, the defendants assert that the Union lacks standing to assert an ERISA claim, id. at 9-10, and that AGEFCU is not a proper party defendant to the plaintiffs' ERISA claims. Id. at 10. Finally, the defendants claim that the state law claim of wrongful termination is pre-empted by ERISA, id. at 11-12, and that the plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action for intentional interference with a contract under Tenn.Code Ann. § 47-50-109. Id. at 13.

II.

As provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 211 (1986). In order to prevail on a summary judgment motion, the moving party bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning an essential element of the opposing party's action. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 274 (1986); Davidson & Jones Dev. Co. v. Elmore Dev. Co., 921 F.2d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir.1991); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989).

In this action, both parties submit that the questions posed by their respective partial summary judgment motions are not subject to any genuine issue of material fact, thereby rendering them appropriate for the Court's determination as a matter of law. See defendants' memorandum (Docket Entry No. 47) at 3-4; plaintiffs' memorandum (Docket Entry No. 66) at 3-4. Because of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, a jury or judge, as fact finder, is not necessary to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d at 212; First Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592, 20 L.Ed.2d 569, 592 (1968). Rather, resolution of the parties' partial summary judgment motions in such a situation will depend upon the Court's determination of the questions of law presented.

III.

At issue in the plaintiffs' claims concerning the defendants' repudiation of the collective bargaining agreement is the interplay of several federal statutes, namely, the FCUA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1795i, the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., and the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. While the defendants contend that the authority vested in the Board, as conservator, by the FCUA to repudiate executory contracts supersedes any alleged violations of the LMRA or NLRA, the plaintiffs assert that collective bargaining agreements are not ordinary contracts and are therefore not encompassed by the...