International Alliance Theatrical Stage Employees v. Sunshine Promotions, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 June 1990
• Docket Number: No. 49A04-8910-CV-466,49A04-8910-CV-466
• Citation: 555 N.E.2d 1309
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES and M.P.M.O. of the United States and Canada, Local Number 30, et al., Appellants (Defendants Below), v. SUNSHINE PROMOTIONS, INC., Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1309

555 N.E.2d 1309

INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES and M.P.M.O. of the United States and Canada, Local Number 30, et al., Appellants (Defendants Below), v. SUNSHINE PROMOTIONS, INC., Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 49A04-8910-CV-466.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Fourth District.

June 27, 1990.

Barbara J. Baird, Fred O. Towe, Fillenwarth, Dennerline, Groth & Baird, Indianapolis, for appellants.

David M. Mattingly, Todd W. Ponder, Ice, Miller, Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, for appellee.

CONOVER, Judge.

Defendants-Appellants International Alliance Theatrical Stage Employees and M.P.M.O. of the United States and Canada, Local Number 30, and the individual members thereof, (collectively, the Union) appeal the trial court's refusal to dismiss a permanent injunction.

We reverse.

We address only the following restated issue:

Whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the injunction against the Union.

Sunshine Promotions, Inc. (Sunshine), is engaged in the business of arranging, producing, promoting, programming and marketing live entertainment at various locations throughout the Indianapolis metropolitan area. At the time the underlying labor dispute began in 1986, the Union represented stage-hand employees working at Sunshine's summer concert series conducted at the Indianapolis Sports Center near downtown Indianapolis. After expiration of the collective bargaining agreement on April 30, 1986, Sunshine and the Union failed to reach agreement on a new contract and Sunshine began utilizing non-union stage-hands to work the summer concert series. Union stage-hands, however, continued to work at Sunshine promoted shows held at other large capacity concert venues in the Indianapolis area, including Market Square Arena.

The Union began picketing the Indianapolis Sports Center during Sunshine promoted events and continued to be engaged in such activity at the time the disputed injunction was issued. On June 18, 1986, Sunshine filed a petition for preliminary injunction alleging the Union and other named individual defendants interfered with Sunshine's business by blocking the ingress and egress of persons and vehicles at the Indianapolis Sports Center, Sunshine's offices and Market Square Arena, by engaging in physical and verbal abuse and threats to Sunshine employees, contractors and entertainers, and by committing acts of sabotage. Sunshine further alleged the Union had contacted performers and threatened them with "repercussions" if they performed at Sunshine shows at the Indianapolis Sports Center with the assistance of non-union stagehands. Sunshine also filed an "Alternative Motion for Preliminary Injunction or Motion for Temporary Restraining Order."

The record indicates the trial court scheduled a hearing on Sunshine's motion for June 19, 1986. The court made no docket entry stating a hearing was held. It issued a permanent injunction on June 19, in which it indicated the Union was given an opportunity to be heard and present evidence. There is no indication any testimony was ever heard or evidence entered from either the Union or Sunshine. On June 26, 1986, the Union filed an Answer which denied several of the averments set forth in the Verified Complaint.

On June 9, 1989, the Union filed a petition to dissolve the injunction on the basis the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the injunction because it failed to comply with Indiana's Anti-Injunction Act (IND.CODE 22-6-1-1 et seq.). ¹ The court heard oral argument, but refused to dissolve the injunction. This appeal followed.

The Union contends the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the injunction because it failed to make the necessary findings under IC 22-6-1-6. The Union contends because the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the injunction, the injunction was void. A void judgment may be attacked at any time. Smith v. Tisdal (1985), Ind.App., 484 N.E.2d 42, 45.

Whenever equitable relief is sought in the context of a dispute involving labor relations, the trial court must initially inquire whether the Anti-Injunction Act has withdrawn the court's jurisdiction to grant the desired remedy. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local No. 1227 v. McGill Manufacturing Co., Inc. (1975), 164 Ind.App. 321, 328 N.E.2d 761, 764. The Act states:

No court of the state of Indiana, as defined in this chapter, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a [sic] strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this chapter. (Emphasis supplied).

IC 22-6-1-1.

The primary focus of the Act is the minimization of judicial control related to labor disputes. In order to effectuate this policy "the Act transforms a request for injunctive relief by a party to a labor dispute into a special statutory proceeding; the statute establishes a complex set of procedural requirements which strictly circumscribe the equity jurisdiction of trial courts." McGill, supra. The procedural requirements which the trial court must follow are found at IC 22-6-1-6 (1986), which states, in pertinent part:

No court of the state of Indiana shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined, except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court (with opportunity for cross-examination) in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and except after findings of fact by the court, to the effect;

(a) That unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained or have been committed and will be continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat or unlawful act excepting against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or committing the unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;

(b) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow;

(c) That as to each item of relief granted [sic] injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief; and

(d) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law;

(e) That the public officer charged with the duty to protect complainant's property is unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection. Such hearings shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been given, in such manner as the court shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the chief of those public officers of the county and city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant's property; ....

The procedural safeguards of IC 22-6-1-6 are "intended by the Legislature to operate as a 'safety valve' against hasty and ill-considered judicial intervention into labor-management contests." McGill, 328 N.E.2d at 766. The statute requires the court to weigh evidence presented at a hearing and to make specific findings evidencing the court's consideration of all the critical elements listed in the statute.

In the present case the trial court failed to comply with the statute in a number of ways. First, there is no record any testimony in support of the allegations was ever heard under oath. Second, the court failed to make a finding regarding the relative impact of the relief granted. Third, the court made no finding the public officers charged with the duty to protect Sunshine's property were unable or unwilling to protect the property. There is also no indication notice was sent to the chief of said public officers.

In addition to its failure to meet these statutory requirements, the court also failed to comply with the spirit of the Act as stated in McGill. Sunshine filed its petition and request on June 18, 1986 and the court scheduled a hearing on the propriety of issuing a temporary injunction or restraining order on the very next day. Instead of making a temporary determination, the court issued a permanent injunction without hearing evidence to support the allegations. The court's action amounted to a McGill "hasty and ill-considered intervention into a labor-management contest."

Sunshine contends McGill, supra, and the underlying case of State ex rel. Taylor v. Circuit Court of Marion County (1959), 240 Ind. 94, 162 N.E.2d 90, are distinguishable from the present case. Sunshine notes McGill neglected to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction because of its failure to allege all the factual assertions enumerated by statute, while Sunshine made all the necessary allegations. Sunshine further notes the Taylor case concerned the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order rather than the issuance of a permanent injunction after the Union was afforded a chance to present evidence.

The crux of both McGill and Taylor is that the requirements of the Anti-Injunction Act must be strictly complied with. The McGill court held the trial court was divested of jurisdiction because of McGill's failure to make proper allegations. Additionally, the court noted the trial court would be divested of jurisdiction if it did not enter specific findings or require the employer to adduce evidence in support of each material allegation of its complaint. 328 N.E.2d at 765. In Taylor, the court reversed the trial court on the basis "the record fails to disclose that testimony was heard as required by the statutes." 162 N.E.2d at 93. The cases are both clearly applicable to the present case.

Sunshine further contends it was...