International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 87-1408

• Decision Date: 03 June 1987
• Docket Number: No. 87-1408,87-1408
• Citation: 826 F.2d 1141
• Parties: 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2037, 107 Lab.Cas. P 10,129 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, and its District Lodge 100, Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. EASTERN AIR LINES, INC., Defendant, Appellant. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 1141

826 F.2d 1141

126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2037, 107 Lab.Cas. P 10,129

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, and its District Lodge 100, Plaintiffs, Appellees, v.EASTERN AIR LINES, INC., Defendant, Appellant.

No. 87-1408.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard June 3, 1987.

Decided Aug. 18, 1987.

Loyd M. Starrett, P.C., with whom Steven M. Sayers, David M. McCarthy and Fordham & Starrett, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for defendant, appellant.

Harold L. Lichten, with whom Warren H. Pyle, Larry Engelstein and Angoff, Goldman, Manning, Pyle, Wanger & Hiatt, P.C., Boston, Mass., were on brief, for plaintiffs, appellees.

Before CAMPBELL, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, and RE, ^* Judge.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

The question presented by this appeal is whether a district court has jurisdiction to enter a status quo injunction in a minor dispute ¹ under the Railway Labor Act,45 U.S.C. Sec. 151 et seq.(RLA), pending the outcome of a grievance which is being arbitrated.We rule that, absent exigent circumstances not present in this case, "[n]o court of the United States [has] jurisdiction," to entertain such an action.29 U.S.C. Sec. 101 et seq.

Factual background

Appellees in this case, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, and its District Lodge 100 (IAM), represent the mechanics and maintenance employees of appellantEastern Air Lines, Inc.(EAL) throughout the United States and Canada.One shop employing these job classifications is located at Logan International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts.

The IAM and EAL entered into a collective bargaining agreement which among other things provides for a detailed grievance procedure (Article 17-Grievance Procedure;Article 18-Investigation and Hearing Re: Discharge or Suspension ), culminating in mandatory and binding arbitration (Article 19- System Board of Adjustment ).This procedure covers "disputes between any employee covered by this Agreement and the Company growing out of grievances or out of interpretation or application of any of the terms of this Agreement"(Article 19 D.).

On April 17, 1987, EAL notified approximately 68 bargaining unit members performing maintenance and mechanic work at Logan Airport that they were being laid off effective May 5, 1987.The apparent reason for this action was the reduction in EAL's maintenance operation in Boston as part of a company-wide economy drive.

The IAM filed grievances questioning the layoffs because they were allegedly in violation of the collective bargaining agreement.The General Chairman of the IAM also contacted EAL management and challenged the layoffs as contrary to Article 20, Sections C and D(transfers because of geographic relocation of work), ²Article 28, Section A(lateral transfer procedure) and AppendixNo. 1(job security and full utilization of employees)³ of the collective bargaining agreement, and sought also to have the company rescind the layoff notices and to arbitrate the disputes in an expedited manner.The IAM contended that AppendixNo. 1 prevented EAL from laying off employees with more than one year seniority on the date of the contract signing (May 16, 1985), and that Article 20 C and D required EAL to "immediately notify and negotiate with the [IAM] to arrange for the transfer of employees to a location where such relocated work is being performed."Complaint, p 8.EAL responded that AppendixNo. 1 was not violated because the laid off Boston employees had "bumping"(i.e., seniority displacement) rights over employees in similar jobs within EAL's system in other locations, ⁴ and contended that Article 20 C and D did not apply because EAL had not geographically relocated work but rather "merely eliminat[ed] ... positions for which there is no longer any need in Boston."Affidavit of John S. MacDonald, paragraphs 10-11, 17.

Without first exhausting the contractual grievance and arbitration procedures, the IAM filed an action in the United States District Court for Massachusetts seeking injunctive relief "to prevent [EAL] from changing the status quo in this 'major dispute' " pending compliance with the RLA, and in the alternative, to maintain this status quo "pending the submission of this dispute to the System Board of Adjustment in order to prevent irreparable harm to the [IAM's] members."Complaint, p I.

The district court, in an unpublished opinion, concluded that the controversy was in fact a minor dispute because it concerned "[d]isagreements over the 'meaning or coverage' of an existing contractual provision."International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, et al. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., No. 87-1106-5, slip op. at 2(D.Mass.May 4, 1987).Furthermore, the court concluded that it could not be said "that [EAL's] position is so meritless as to constitute a unilateral rewriting of the collective bargaining agreement."Id.However, relying on a series of cases, mainly from the Second Circuit, ⁵the court ruled that notwithstanding that a minor dispute was involved, a preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo could be issued "if the union makes a showing of the traditional requirements for preliminary injunctive relief."SeePlanned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1009(1st Cir.1981).The court then proceeded to consider the various requirements of Planned Parenthood for the issuance of injunctive relief, finding that the IAM's membership would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction did not issue, that such injury would outweigh any harm caused to EAL by the issuance of this relief, and that the public interest would not be adversely affected by such action.Id. at 4-5.As to the fourth requirement under Planned Parenthood, i.e., that plaintiff exhibit a likelihood of success on the merits, the district court"intentionally refrain[ed] from making a prediction as to the likelihood of success because consideration of the merits of the dispute in any respect has clearly been excluded from the jurisdiction of this court."Id. at 5.These conclusions were substantially reaffirmed by the district court in another unpublished memorandum denying EAL's request for reconsideration, in which the court cited as additional authority for issuance of the status quo injunction the Supreme Court's rulings in Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana Railroad Co., 353 U.S. 30, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622(1957)andBrotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 363 U.S. 528, 80 S.Ct. 1326, 4 L.Ed.2d 1379(1960) and this circuit's holdings in Carbone v. Meserve, 645 F.2d 96, 98(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 859, 102 S.Ct. 312, 70 L.Ed.2d 156(1981) and International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 473 F.2d 549, 555 n. 7(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845, 93 S.Ct. 48, 34 L.Ed.2d 85(1972).

The district court issued a preliminary injunction against EAL prohibiting it from laying off the 68 employees in question "pending disposition of the grievances growing out of the Work Force Reduction/Displacement program ... by the Systems Board of Adjustment."It also enjoined EAL "from terminating any such employee's option to relocate until a reasonable time after the decision of the Systems Board of Adjustment."

We must vacate the district court's issuance of the preliminary injunction for two reasons: (1)the district court improperly applied the standards established by Planned Parenthood for the issuance of such relief, and (2)the district court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this suit pursuant to the proscriptions of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 101 et seq.

The misapplication of the Planned Parenthood standards

Although we would normally not comment upon this issue in view of our jurisdictional holding, post, it is important that we do so in this case to prevent incorrect application of the injunctive standards which we have established in this important area of the law.

It is patently anomalous that in issuing the preliminary injunction the district court on the one hand invoked compliance with the standards of Planned Parenthood, yet contemporaneously exempted the moving party to that proceeding from a most important imperative under those standards, that of showing that there was a likelihood of prevailing when the case is heard on the merits.Planned Parenthood, supra, 641 F.2d at 1009.The district court reached this conclusion because it apparently confused the proscription against consideration of the merits of the matters being submitted to arbitration, with determining likelihood of success on the merits of the case before it.The court most decidedly had jurisdiction to entertain whether there was a probability of success on the injunction.Elimination of such a requirement would emasculate the Planned Parenthood standard and revive the ancient conflicts between chancery and the courts of law in which equity was used to circumvent the legal rights of the parties.SeeLeubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunction, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 525(1978).

It must be remembered that the granting of interlocutory injunctive relief is a drastic procedure.It is a temporary remedy allowed at a time when the parties have not had full opportunity to present their case to the court, nor has the court, conversely, had the benefit of a full trial and deliberation.It is thus very important that the standards of Planned Parenthood, which are designed to grant the parties a minimum of due process in a dynamic environment, be fully complied with.Without downgrading the other three requirements of Planned Parenthood, there can be little doubt that granting preliminary injunctive relief to a party whose chances of receiving permanent injunctive relief when the case is heard on the full merits, are minimal, is most inappropriate.

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