International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street

Decision Date08 May 1959
Docket NumberNo. 20428,20428
Citation108 S.E.2d 796,215 Ga. 27
PartiesINTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS et al. v. S. B. STREET et al.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. The plaintiffs in error not having excepted by cross-bill of exceptions to the order allowing the amendment of January 29, 1957, when this case was here before (Looper v. Georgia Southern & Florida Ry. Co., 213 Ga. 279, 99 S.E.2d 101), it is now too late to except to such order.

2. The amendment of September 23, 1958, to the petition was not subject to the objections interposed.

3. If the legal rights of the parties are not prejudiced or denied, this court will not interfere with the discretion of the trial court in matters of practice in the hearing and disposition of causes before it unless this discretion has been exercised in an illegal, unjust, or arbitrary manner.

4. The findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the final decree are fully supported by the pleadings and evidence.

5. The plaintiffs and the class they represent have a common interest in the subject matter of the suit and the ultimate issues to be decided. The objections to the findings by the court that this was properly a class action authorized under Code § 37-1002 are without merit.

6. The finding by the court in its decree that the defendant unions were using the funds derived from the collection of dues, fees, and assessments from their members to propagate and promote political and economic doctrines, concepts, and ideologies opposed by the plaintiffs and the class they represent, was demanded by the evidence.

7. The finding by the court, that the exaction of money, in the form of dues, fees, and assessments, by the defendant unions, was by virtue of the union shop agreements between the defendant railroads and the defendant unions, permitted under section 2 (Eleventh) of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.); and that the use of such union funds for the purposes set out in the preceding headnote, was violative of the plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, was authorized by the law and evidence.

Milton Kramer, Schoene & Kramer, Washington, D. C., David L. Mincey, Macon, C. E. Gregory, Jr., Arnall, Golden & Gregory, Atlanta, for plaintiffs in error.

Gambrell, Harlan, Russell, Moye & Richardson, Terry P. McKenna, Atlanta, Bloch, Hall, Groover & Hawkins; Harris, Russell, Weaver & Watkins, Charles J. Bloch, Macon, for defendants in error.

ALMAND, Justice.

When this case was before this court on a bill of exceptions assigning error on the dismissal of the plaintiffs' petition, we reversed the order of dismissal because, by reason of the allegations of paragraph 59(b) of the amended petition, that 'The initiating fees, periodic dues and assessments which plaintiffs would be required to pay under the terms of the union shop agreement heretofore referred to will be used in substantial part for purposes not germane to collective bargaining but to support ideological and political doctrines and candidates which plaintiffs are not willing to support and cannot lawfully be forced to support, thus violating plaintiffs' constitutionally guaranteed rights of freedom of association, thought, liberty and property,' and of paragraph 51 of the amended petition, that 'Petitioners allege that sec. 2 Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Eleventh), to the extent that it authorizes the union shop agreement heretofore referred to, and said agreement, are violative of the First, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America, and are therefore invalid,' the petition as against a general demurrer was sufficient to state a cause of action for equitable relief. Looper v. Georgia Southern & Florida Ry. Co., 213 Ga. 279, 99 S.E.2d 101, 105. We there said that, though the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States (Railway Emp. Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112) upheld the validity of a union shop agreement executed under sec. 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 152), in view of the statement made in the opinion that 'Judgment is reserved as to the validity or enforceability of a union or closed shop agreement if other conditions of union membership are imposed or if the exaction of dues, initiation fees or assessments is used as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First or Fifth Amendment,' the question of whether the union shop agreement violated the plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fifth Amendments to the Federal Constitution, under the alleged facts in this case, was left open for future determination.

When the case was returned to the trial court the defendant unions filed their answer. At a pre-trial hearing the trial judge entered an order requiring the union defendants to produce certain books, documents, and records and the appearance of officers and agents to testify with respect to them. The motion of the union defendants to suspend this order until their plea of res adjudicata could be inquired into was denied. On September 23, 1958, the plaintiffs filed an amendment to their petition. The objections of the union defendants to this amendment were overruled. At a later pre-trial hearing the plea of res adjudicata was withdrawn. A stipulation of facts, executed by all the parties on August 14, 1958, was approved by the court and filed. This stipulation consists of 85 stipulations covering 45 pages. We set out here only those stipulations that we deem most pertinent to the issues.

'2. Each of the plaintiffs and each of the intervening plaintiffs was an employee of one of the railroad defendants herein (collectively constituting the Southern Railway System) in a craft or trade covered by the union shop agreement at the commencement of this litigation.

'3. Some of the plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs are not now, and never have been, members of any of the defendant labor union organizations (their status being protected by supersedeas bond).

'8. Each of the plaintiffs, and intervening plaintiffs, and the class they represent received notice, both from the railroad defendant employer and the labor union defendant applicable to his or her craft or trade, that unless he or she became a member of the appropriate labor union defendant within 60 days of the date he or she first performed compensated service for the railroad defendant, or within 60 days of the effective date of the union shop agreement, whichever is the later, such employment would be terminated and such employee dismissed pursuant to the union shop agreement.

'12. The union shop agreement referred to in paragraph 1 above was negotiated by the labor union defendants with the railroad defendants without any authorization from the employees of such railroad defendants embraced within the craft or trade applicable to each labor union defendant [italics ours], other than such authority as might be implied from each labor union defendant's being the collective bargaining representative of employees of such railroad within such craft or trade for the purposes of the Railway Labor Act from the dates and as set forth in paragraph 13. The usual processes of the defendant unions in determining collective bargaining policy were followed. Such processes do not, and in the instance of the negotiation and execution of the union shop agreement did not, involve any notice to the employees of the railroad defendants that the negotiation and execution of such an agreement was contemplated, or any opportunity to express their wishes pro or con with respect to such negotiation and execution of the union shop agreement, or any opportunity to ratify or reject such action.

'14. Each of the plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs was employed for many years by one of the railroad defendants prior to the execution of the union shop agreement hereinabove referred to, and that also is true of many others of the class represented by the plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs, and none of such persons had notice prior to entering into an employment relationship with such railroad defendant that union membership would at any time be required as a condition of employment or continued employment [italics ours].

'19. The periodic dues, fees and assessments which plaintiffs, intervening plaintiffs and the class they represent, have been, are and will be required to pay under the terms of the union shop agreement hereinabove referred to, have been, are being, and will be used in substantial part for purposes other than the negotiation, maintenance, and administration of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and working conditions, or wages, hours, terms and other conditions of employment, or the handling of disputes relating to the above, but to support ideological and political doctrines and candidates which plaintiffs, intervening plaintiffs, and the class represented by them, were, are, and will be opposed to and not willing to support voluntarily [italics ours].

'20. The mechanism by which the periodic dues, fees and assessments required to be paid under the terms of the union shop agreement were, are and will be used in substantial part to support ideological and political doctrines and candidates for public office which plaintiffs, intervening plaintiffs, and the class represented by them, are not willing to support, is as set forth in this Stipulation.

'A substantial portion of the periodic dues, fees and assessments required of plaintiffs, intervening plaintiffs, and the class they represent, or which will be so required, has been, is being and will be retained by, or remitted to, the individual local lodge of the labor union defendant to which each such person paid and will be required to pay his dues, and has been, is being, and will be, used to support legislative activity in...

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