INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF MACH. & A. WKRS. v. General Elec. Co.
Decision Date | 19 March 1968 |
Citation | 282 F. Supp. 413,67 LRRM 2817 |
Parties | INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS (AFL-CIO) and Auburn Electronics Local 967, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (AFL-CIO), Petitioners, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Bernard T. King, of Blitman & King, Syracuse, N. Y., for petitioners.
Robert W. Kopp (Tracy H. Ferguson and Edwin M. Shultes, III, on the brief), of Bond, Schoeneck & King, Syracuse, N. Y., for respondent.
In this action arising under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964), invoking remedies pursuant to Section 4 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1964), the union's petition filed January 3, 1968 to compel arbitration, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the parties, of a dispute resulting from the company's notifying a substantial number of production and maintenance employees in a bargaining unit engaged in the manufacture of semiconductor rectifiers not to report for work on July 3, 1967, presents essentially the following questions:
After holding a hearing at Syracuse on January 8, 1968 and upon consideration of the oral arguments, the petition, the answer, the affidavits, the exhibits and the extraordinarily helpful briefs submitted by able counsel on both sides, the Court concludes that the dispute between the parties is subject to arbitration under the agreement; that the remedies of the Arbitration Act are available in this action under the Labor Management Relations Act; and, accordingly, that the union is entitled to an order granting its petition to compel arbitration.
The Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its order compelling arbitration.
(1) Petitioners, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (AFL-CIO) and Auburn Electronics Local 967, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (AFL-CIO) (hereinafter, "the union"), are labor organizations within the meaning of Sections 101 and 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 152 and 185 (1964) (hereinafter, "the LMRA").
(2) Respondent, General Electric Company (hereinafter, "the company") is an employer in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 101 and 301 of the LMRA.
(3) On November 10, 1966, the company and the union executed a collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter, "the agreement") effective for the period from October 20, 1966 through October 26, 1969.
(4) Relevant provisions of the agreement are set forth in the margin as follows: ARTICLE IV, WORKING HOURS;1 ARTICLE XII, REDUCING AND INCREASING FORCES;2 and ARTICLE XVI, ARBITRATION.3
(5) On June 26, 1967, the company's plant newspaper (S-P-D Headliner) carried the following announcement:
(6) The union did not receive any formal notice from the company of the change in working hours or working schedule for July 3, nor did the company discuss the change with the union, such notice and discussion being required by Article IV, Section 3, of the agreement. The union was informally notified of the change in working hours and schedule for July 3 at a meeting with the company for an unrelated purpose on June 29.
(7) The multi-step grievance procedure provided for in Article XV of the agreement was invoked by the union on June 29 by filing a written grievance as follows:
(8) On August 6, the company's answer to the grievance was filed as follows:
"Production requirements made it necessary for a one day temporary lack of work in most areas of the Plant, as provided for in Article 12 Section I. July 3rd was chosen since it would provide affected employees with a four day weekend and would avoid a double start up."
(9) Under date of August 25, 1967, the company's Personnel Practices Manager sent to the union's Shop Committee Chairman a memorandum headed "Subject —Temporary Layoff", reading, "Attached is a list of those employees who were on temporary layoff, July 3, 1967".
(10) The grievance having been processed through the grievance procedure without resolution, the union by letter dated October 14 requested arbitration of the dispute in accordance with the agreement.
(11) The company by letter dated October 26 replied that the grievance "does not raise an arbitrable issue".
(12) The union's instant petition to compel arbitration was filed in this Court on January 3, 1968. The company's answer thereto was filed January 8, and on the same date the Court held a hearing at which counsel were fully heard. At the January 8 hearing and within a week thereafter, the Court received affidavits submitted in support of the union's petition and in support of the company's answer thereto, respectively. Briefs by both sides were submitted on Feb. 14.
(1) The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of, and the parties to, this action.
(2) The parties to the collective bargaining agreement expressly agreed (Article XVI, Section 1(a)) that there should be submitted to arbitration any unsettled grievance involving the interpretation or application of those provisions of the agreement, among others, relating to working hours (Article IV) and reducing and increasing forces (Article XII).
(3) The company's notification of a substantial number of employees in the bargaining unit not to report for work on July 3, 1967 fairly may be interpreted, as the union claims, to have constituted a change in working hours or working schedule (Article IV, Section 3) or a temporary layoff (Article XII, Section 1).
(4) The union as the party seeking to compel arbitration has made a claim which on its face is covered by the language of the grievance arbitration clause.
(5) The company's claim that its ordering employees not to report for work on July 3, 1967 constituted a shutdown (Article XVI, Section 1(a)), while raising a dispute about the interpretation or application of the working hours provision of the agreement, cannot be said with positive assurance to render the arbitration clause not susceptible of an interpretation which covers the asserted dispute, resolving doubts in favor of coverage.
(6) The summary remedies of the Arbitration Act are available in this action under the LMRA.
(7) The union is entitled to an order granting its petition to compel arbitration in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement of all issues arising out of the company's action from June 26, 1967 through July 3, 1967 allegedly in violation of the provisions of Articles IV and XII of the agreement.
The union claims that the company's action in ordering 1069 out of 1243 production and maintenance employees at its Auburn plant not to report for work on Monday, July 3, 1967, constituted a change in "hours of work or working schedule" for that day and the ensuing week which was subject to the notification and discussion requirements of Article IV, Section 3, of the agreement, which requirements were not complied with by the company. The union further claims that the company's action with respect to July 3 was a "temporary layoff" within the meaning of Article XII, Section 1; and the union refers to the company's own characterization of its July 3 action as a "temporary layoff" throughout the multistep grievance procedure. Unsettled grievances involving interpretation or application of the provisions of Articles IV and XII, the union urges, are expressly made subject to arbitration pursuant to Article XVI. Finally, the union points to the company's belated characterization of its July 3 action as a "shutdown", asserting that the...
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