International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local No. 1227 v. McGill Mfg. Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 3--974A153,3--974A153
• Citation: 164 Ind.App. 321,328 N.E.2d 761
• Parties: , 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2852, 77 Lab.Cas. P 53,724 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, LOCAL NO. 1227, et al., Defendants-Appellants, v. McGILL MANUFACTURING CO., INC., Plaintiff-Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 761

328 N.E.2d 761

164 Ind.App. 321, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2852,

77 Lab.Cas. P 53,724

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, LOCAL NO. 1227, et al., Defendants-Appellants, v. McGILL MANUFACTURING CO., INC., Plaintiff-Appellee.

No. 3--974A153.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.

June 2, 1975.

Rehearing Denied July 17, 1975.

Robert F. Wagner, Lewis, Bowman, St. Clair, Bennett & Wagner, Indianapolis, for defendants-appellants.

George W. Douglas, Douglas, Douglas and Douglas, Valparaiso, for plaintiff-appellee.

STATON, Presiding Judge.

On August 1, 1974, a labor dispute commenced at McGill Manufacturing Company, Inc. (McGill) when the company reached an impasse in its efforts to negotiate a new collective agreement with Local 1227, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (the Union). On the seventh day of the dispute, August 7, McGill filed an action for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief against certain picketing activity near the main gate of its Electrical Division in Valparaiso, Indiana. After hearing the testimony of a McGill official, the trial court issued an order granting an ex parte temporary restraining order enjoining the Union and its individual members from committing the following acts:

'a.) By mass picketing, blocking the public entrance to Plaintiff's Electrical Division Plant on Campbell Street, Valparaiso, Indiana.

b.) By force and intimidation and by standing on the entryway, blocking the entrance to Plaintiff's Plant and preventing the ingress and egress thereto of vehicles through the Plant's main gate at Campbell Street, Valparaiso, Indiana.' Record at 18.

On August 16, the trial court held an adversary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order should be dissolved or converted into a preliminary injunction. At the hearing, the Union moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the jurisdictional prerequisites of the Indiana Anti-Injunction Act had not been satisfied. The trial court denied that Union's motion to dismiss and entered a preliminary injunction, which enjoined the same conduct proscribed by the prior temporary restraining order. ¹ The Union has appealed from this interlocutory order, pursuant to Indiana Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 4(B)(3).

As a preliminary matter, McGill contends that the trial court's temporary restraining order is not subject to appellate review because it is not the type of interlocutory order from which a direct appeal may be initiated under Appellate Rule 4(B). It is well established that a temporary restraining order is not an 'appealable order'; such tentative judicial action does not impart that degree of finality sufficient to justify immediate appellate intervention. See, e.g., State ex rel. Board of Medical Registration and Examination v. Hayes (1950), 228 Ind. 286, 91 N.E.2d 913; Town of Wakarusa v. Bechtel (1948), 226 Ind. 101, 78 N.E.2d 161. The policy advanced by this limitation on the appealability of interlocutory orders cannot serve as an independent ground for circumscribing the scope and subject matter of appellate review. McGill's argument confuses the concept of appealability, which functions solely as a limitation on appellate jurisdiction, with the concept of reviewability, which focuses on whether a particular type of judicial action is amenable to appellate examination. The trial court's entry of an appealable order will subject the entire proceeding to appellate scrutiny, in the absence of some distinct procedural or substantive limitation on reviewability. McGill's somewhat novel contention is clearly refuted by a recent decision of this Court. In Smith v. State Board of Health, (1974), Ind.App., 307 N.E.2d 294, this court, in the course of deciding an interlocutory appeal from the granting of a preliminary injunction, fully considered the procedural requirements applicable to the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Since McGill has been unable to demonstrate the existence of any substantive or procedural limitation on this Court's power to review non-appeable temporary restraining orders, we will review this proceeding in its entirety.

Whenever equitable relief is sought in the context of a controversy involving labor relations, the trial court must initially inquire whether the Indiana Anti-Injunction Act has withdrawn the court's jurisdiction to grant the desired remedy. IC 1971, 22--6--1--1 to 12 (Burns Code Ed.). The Anti-Injunction Act provides:

'No court of the state of Indiana, as herein defined, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this act (22--6--1--1--22--6--1--12); nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this act.'

The term 'Labor dispute' includes '. . . any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, . . ..' IC 1971, 22--6--1--12(c) (Burns Code Ed.). The allegedly unlawful collective action proscribed by the trial court was engaged in during the course of a strike, which began when McGill and the Union failed to execute a new bargaining agreement. Since the picketing enjoined by the trial court arose in the context of a 'labor dispute', the validity of the trial court's equitable intervention is governed by the Anti-Injunction Act. See, e.g., Anderson Fed. of Teachers v. School City of Anderson (1970), 252 Ind. 558, 251 N.E.2d 15, 254 N.E.2d 329; Blackburn v. Koehler (1957), 127 Ind.App. 397, 140 N.E.2d 763.

The primary focus of the Anti-Injunction Act is the minimization of judicial control over conduct related to labor disputes. In order to effectuate this policy, the Act transforms a request for injunctive relief by a party to a labor dispute into a special statutory proceeding; the statute establishes a complex set of procedural requirements which strictly circumscribe the equity jurisdiction of trial courts. IC 1971, 22--6--1--1 and 6 (Burns Code Ed.); State ex rel. Taylor v. Circuit Court of Marion County (1959), 240 Ind. 94, 162 N.E.2d 90; Roth v. Local No. 1460 of Retail Clerks Union (1939), 216 Ind. 363, 24 N.E.2d 280; Peters v. Poor Sisters of St. Francis (1971), 148 Ind.App. 453, 267 N.E.2d 558; Teamsters Local No. 297 v. Air Flow Sheet Metal, Inc., (1968), 143 Ind.App. 322, 240 N.E.2d 830. Section 7 of the Act, IC 1971, 22--6--1--6, which specifies these numerous jurisdictional limitations, provides:

'No court of the state of Indiana shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined, except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court (with opportunity for cross-examination) in support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and except after findings of fact by the court, to the effect;

(a) That unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained or have been committed and will be continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat or unlawful act excepting against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or committing the unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof;

(b) That substantial and irreparable injury to complaint's property will follow;

(c) That as to each item of relief granted (more) injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief; and

(d) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law;

(e) That the public officer charged with the duty to protect complainant's property are (is) unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection. Such hearings shall be held after due and personal notice thereof has been given, in such manner as the court shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the chief of those public officers of the county and city within which the unlawful acts have been threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant's property; Provided, however, That if a complainant shall also allege that, unless a temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice, a substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will be unavoidable, such a temporary restraining order may be issued upon testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the court in issuing a temporary injunction upon a hearing after notice. Such a temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than five (5) days and shall become void at the expiration of said five (5) days.' (emphasis added).

Under section 7 of the Act, a plaintiff seeking injunction relief must affirmatively invoke the court's jurisdiction by a verified complaint which alleges all of the factual assertions enumerated by the statute. State ex rel. Taylor v. Circuit Court of Marion County (1959), 240 Ind. 94, 162 N.E.2d 90; Bartenders, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 103 v. Clark Restaurants, Inc. (1951), 122 Ind.App. 165, 102 N.E.2d 220. The particularized pleading requirements of special statutory proceedings constitute a recognized exception to the liberal 'notice pleading' standard of Indiana Rule of Procedure, Trial Rule 8(A). See, e.g., Squarcy v. VanHorne (1975), Ind.App., 321 N.E.2d 858. Moreover, section 7 imposes additional procedural constraints on the trial court's power to grant injunctive relief; the trial judge is mandated to require the party seeking an injunction to adduce testimony in open court, in support of each material allegation of his complaint. The trial court must also enter specific findings of fact...