International Ass'n of Machinists v. Goodrich

Decision Date18 May 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04-10418.,04-10418.
PartiesINTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS LOCAL LODGE 2121 AFL-CIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GOODRICH CORPORATION, formerly known as BF Goodrich Company, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

James Roddy Tanner (argued), Rod Tanner & Associates, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Lawrence J. McNamara (argued), Robin Dee Gooch, Locke, Liddell & Sapp, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before GARWOOD, JONES and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-appellant Goodrich Corporation (Goodrich) appeals the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to plaintiff-appellee International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Local Lodge 2121 AFL-CIO (Union) on count two of the latter's three-count complaint in which count the Union sought an order compelling arbitration of the parties' dispute over retiree benefits in their collective bargaining agreement (CBA). We hold that we lack jurisdiction to review the district court's order compelling Goodrich to arbitrate. We also conclude that we do not have appellate jurisdiction on the theory that the district court's order was void for want of jurisdiction, because we further conclude that the Union has standing under Section 301(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b), to bring suit on behalf of the fifty-two retirees whose authorizations for the Union to represent them in all the matters at issue in the suit were filed in district court below.

Facts and Proceedings Below

Goodrich merged with Coltec Industries in 1998 and thereby acquired its manufacturing facility in Euless, Texas. The Union represented bargaining-unit aerospace employees at this facility, and Goodrich assumed Coltec's responsibilities under the 1996 CBA. Section 8.37 of the CBA provided that early retirees, meaning those who elected to retire before turning sixty-five, were entitled to choose between healthcare coverage under Coltec's own company plan or under an HMO. If the retiree opted for the Coltec plan, the company would cover the premiums. If the retiree opted for the HMO, the company would contribute an amount equal to the premium for the company plan and the retiree would have to make up the difference. If, on the other hand, the HMO cost less than the company plan, the company would pay the HMO premium and credit the difference between the HMO and the company plan to the cost of coverage for the retiree's spouse.

On April 14, 2000, Goodrich notified the Union that it intended to close the Euless facility. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), the parties then engaged in "effects bargaining," and, on August 1, 2000, signed the Plant Closure Agreement (PCA). Paragraph sixteen of the PCA stated that Goodrich would have the right to modify the healthcare coverage of early retirees as part of "reasonable cost containment measures" but only to the extent that this would not result in any "material change in the level of benefits." The PCA also contained a comprehensive arbitration clause at paragraph seventeen in which the parties agreed that "[a]ny future disputes regarding the interpretation, application or performance of [the PCA] or the CBA shall be resolved by [a designated arbitrator]." Goodrich closed the Euless facility on November 15, 2000.

In November of 2002, Goodrich informed the Union that, effective February 1, 2003, it intended to offer a different HMO option. Under this new HMO option, the cost of HMO coverage would for the first time exceed the cost of coverage under the original Coltec plan. This meant that retirees with HMO coverage would for the first time have to pay out-of-pocket for their healthcare coverage. The Union contended that this change constituted a material alteration in the level of benefits guaranteed by the PCA. Goodrich not only disagreed but also refused to submit the controversy to arbitration.

On December 20, 2002, the Union filed a three-count complaint under Section 301(b) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, seeking in count one, pursuant to Section 301(b), specific performance of the healthcare benefits provision of the PCA; in count two, in the alternative and also under Section 301(b), enforcement of the PCA's arbitration clause; and in count three, in addition to the relief sought under counts one or two, a declaration of the parties' rights and duties under the PCA. Following discovery, the Union filed its "Motion For Partial Summary Judgment," seeking "summary judgment on Count II of its complaint." In support of its motion, the Union filed, inter alia, fifty-two "retiree representation authorization" forms, each one of which was signed by a retiree who, by the terms of the authorization, affirmed that the Union has, and has always had, the authority to represent him in any claim arising under the CBA and PCA. Soon thereafter, Goodrich filed a motion to dismiss counts one and two, arguing that the Union lacks standing under Section 301 to represent the retirees because Section 301(b) only authorizes a labor organization to represent active employees. Goodrich did not move to dismiss count three.

On March 8, 2004, the district court granted the Union's motion for partial summary judgment and directed the parties to arbitrate their dispute. However, rather than enter judgment for the Union and dismiss counts one and/or three, the district court instead directed the clerk to "administratively" close the case and ordered "[i]f the claims in this suit are not resolved in arbitration, either party may move to reopen the cause, but such motion must be filed no later than 30 days after the arbitration process is completed." The district court's ruling is contained in a 15 page document entitled "Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, Compelling Arbitration, And Administratively Closing Case." The district court also determined as part of its summary judgment analysis that the Union has standing to bring a Section 301 suit on behalf of retirees. Having determined that the Union has standing, the district court in a separate order on the same day, "ordered that" Goodrich's motion to dismiss counts one and two on this ground "is rendered MOOT."1

Goodrich timely filed proper notice of appeal.

I.

Though not raised by either party, the unusual procedural posture of this case has led us to question our jurisdiction sua sponte. Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir.1987) ("This Court must examine the basis of its jurisdiction, on its own motion, if necessary."). The issue before us is whether we can exercise appellate jurisdiction over an order granting partial summary judgment in which the district court: (1) directs the parties, pursuant to Section 301(b), to arbitrate their dispute; (2) administratively closes the case without resolving count three of the complaint, brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202; and (3) expressly retains jurisdiction to hear any claims not resolved in arbitration.2 In our view, there are two possible bases for jurisdiction. The partial summary judgment order was either a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or it was an appealable interlocutory injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).3 We will address each in turn.

a. Final Order

In response to our request for additional briefing on appellate jurisdiction, Goodrich relies primarily on Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers of America, 353 U.S. 550, 77 S.Ct. 920, 1 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1957), for the proposition that a district court order compelling arbitration under Section 301 is a final order for the purposes of appeal. Goodrich directs our attention in particular to Goodall-Sanford's holding:

"The right enforced here is one arising under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Arbitration is not merely a step in judicial enforcement of a claim nor auxiliary to a main proceeding, but the full relief sought. A decree under § 301(a) ordering enforcement of an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement is, therefore, a `final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291."

353 U.S. at 551-552, 77 S.Ct. at 921. In Goodrich's view, Goodall-Sanford in effect established a bright-line rule under which an order to arbitrate is always a final order for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as long as the order to arbitrate is issued pursuant to Section 301 of the LMRA. Because the district court's order in the instant case was indeed predicated on Section 301, Goodrich argues that the order is accordingly a final, and therefore appealable, order.

We disagree. Though we have a copy of neither the complaint nor the district court's final judgment in Goodall-Sanford, it is evident on the face of the published opinions in that case that Goodall-Sanford is procedurally distinguishable from the case at bar.

First, in that case the United Textile Workers brought suit exclusively under Section 301. United Textile Workers of America v. Goodall-Sanford, Inc., 129 F.Supp. 859, 860 (S.D. Me. 1955) ("The plaintiffs have initiated this proceeding under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185."); accord United Textile Workers of America v. Goodall-Sanford, Inc., 131 F.Supp. 767, 767 (S.D. Me. 1955); Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers of America, 233 F.2d 104, 105 (1st Cir.1956); 353 U.S. at 551, 77 S.Ct. at 921. In addition, the United Textile Workers sought only one form of relief, either an order to arbitrate or, in the alternative, damages. 129 F.Supp. at 860.

Like the United Textile Workers, the Union in the instant case similarly brought two counts under Section 301, pleading respectively for either specific performance of the CBA or, in the...

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