International Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 611, AFL-CIO v. Town of Farmington

• Decision Date: 23 August 1965
• Docket Number: P,AFL-CI,No. 7694,7694
• Citation: 75 N.M. 393,1965 NMSC 90,405 P.2d 233
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 611,laintiff-Appellee, v. TOWN OF FARMINGTON, a Municipal Corporation, Oscar Thomas, Mayor, Calvin L. Davis, Utility Manager, John P. Sheafe, Erick Johnson, and Francis Reilly, Members of the Utility Commission, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 233

405 P.2d 233

75 N.M. 393

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 611, AFL-CIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOWN OF FARMINGTON, a Municipal Corporation, Oscar Thomas Mayor, Calvin L. Davis, Utility Manager, John P. Sheafe Erick Johnson, and Francis Reilly, Members of the Utility Commission, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 7694.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Aug. 23, 1965.

LaVor W. Burnham, Farmington, for appellants.

Tansey, Wood, Resebrough & Roberts, Farmington, for appellee.

NOBLE, Justice.

The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers brought an action in declaratory judgment to determine the right of the town of Farmington to enter into a written contract with the plaintiff union respecting its employees engaged in the operation of an electric utility owned by the town, and the town has appealed from a judgment declaring that it had legal authority to enter into a prior legal agreement with such union respecting hours, wages and working conditions of its members.

The facts are not in dispute, and the issues are ones of law. The town of Farmington acquired the electric utility from Basin Light & Power Company in 1959, and has operated the plant since its acquisition. Its electrical employees were formerly employees of the private utility working under a so-called collective bargaining agreement, which was continued by the town until 1962 when a new collective bargaining agreement was entered into between the town and the union. The union gave timely notice of its desire to make cartain changes, and negotiations were in progress when this action was filed by the union to test the town's right to so contract.

The town argues that there can be no collective bargaining between it and the union because (1) the employees are public employees whose employment may not be made the subject of collective bargaining, and (2) such a collective bargaining agreement is contrary to the legislative policy as declared by Ch. 216, Laws 1961 (Secs. 14-19-12 and 13, N.M.S.A.1953).

We recognize that, absent legislative authority, the courts of other jurisdictions have generally viewed as invalid any agreement between government management and public employees consummated through a process of collective bargaining. See the Annotation, 31 A.L.R.2d 1142, Sec. 9, 'Collective Bargaining,' p. 1155, where it is said:

'Up to the present time, public employees are generally not entitled to collective bargaining in the sense that private industrial employees are.'

There follow, pp. 1155, 1159, cases which deny or qualify the right to public employees to collective bargaining with their employers in relation to wages, hours, and working conditions.

The courts principally advance as reasons for denying the right of public employees to engage in union activities and particularly in collective bargaining, the sovereignty of the public employer; the fact that the government is established and operated for all the people and not for the benefit of any person or group; that it is not operated for profit; that public employees owe undivided allegiance to the public employer; and, that continued and uninterrupted operation of public employment is indispensable in the public interest. The great majority of the decided cases deal with employees working in a governmental position. The authorities are divided on the question of whether employees of a municipality in connection with its corporate or proprietary capacity may have collective bargaining.

The Missouri court in City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, flatly said that there could be no difference with regard to employees of the city in connection with its governmental or its proprietary capacity. That court ruled in the Springfield case that public employees may organize for the purpose of discussing grievances, etc., but they may not demand the right to bargain collectively. We note, however, that Missouri had a state law with respect to the personnel system in municipalities with which collective bargaining would directly conflict, and in State ex rel. Moore v. Julian, 359 Mo. 539, 222 S.W.2d 720, it was said that the legislature by its King-Thompson Act changed the Springfield rule by expressly recognizing the right of municipal employees to bargain collectively, applying well-established principles of labor law to public employees in the limited field of public utilities. The Missouri court in Julian said that the activity of a bus system by the municipality corresponded in all essentials to the business formerly carried on under private ownership before the facility was acquired by the city, and that the legislature was cognizant of these matters when it included disputes in municipally owned utilities in its labor law. The rule in Missouri, taken from its two decisions on the question, therefore, is that employees of a publicly owned utility may not demand collective bargaining, absent authority to do so conferred upon the municipality by law.

In Local 266, etc. v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & P. Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393, the project, engaged in the manufacture and development of electric power, was said to be a political subdivision of the state, with all of the rights, provileges and immunities granted to municipal corporations. As such a quasi-municipal corporation, the district asserted that as a consequence, it was powerless to enter into collective bargaining negotiations with its employees. The court said that Arizona had no legislative expression of public policy to control the terms of employment, as was the case in Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of...