INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD, ETC. v. Quick Charge

• Decision Date: 06 July 1948
• Docket Number: No. 3520.,3520.
• Citation: 168 F.2d 513
• Parties: INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 886, et al. v. QUICK CHARGE, Inc.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

168 F.2d 513 (1948)

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 886, et al. v. QUICK CHARGE, Inc.

No. 3520.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

April 26, 1948.

Rehearing Denied July 6, 1948.

David Previant, of Milwaukee, Wis. (Rutherford H. Brett, of Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for appellants.

J. B. Dudley, of Oklahoma City, Okl. (Paul Dudley, of Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for appellee.

Before PHILLIPS, BRATTON and HUXMAN, Circuit Judges.

HUXMAN, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment and sentence of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, finding appellants guilty of civil contempt and jointly and separately fining them in the sum of $10,000.00, together with the costs of the proceeding, including an attorney's fee of $3,000.00, for the use and benefit of appellee, the Quick Charge, Inc., hereinafter referred to as Quick Charge. A rather detailed statement of facts is necessary to an understanding of the legal problems presented.

Quick Charge is a corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of battery chargers, parts, equipment, and steam cleaning devices. It was at all times a solvent, going concern and was in no wise financially embarrassed. It operated what is known as an open shop. About February 1, 1946, a group representing Local Number 5 of the C. I. O. attempted to organize the employees as a unit of the C. I. O. These efforts were unsuccessful. Sometime in March, 1946, representatives of Local 886 of the American Federation of Labor¹ undertook a campaign to organize the employees as a unit of its organization. Sometime thereafter representatives of Local 886 represented to Quick Charge that more than fifty-one per cent of its employees had joined their organization and desired that it be designated as the employees bargaining agent. After considerable discussions an election was ordered under the auspices of the National Labor Relations Board to determine the bargaining agent of the employees, if any. At the election held under the supervision of the National Labor Relations Board, a majority of the employees voted against participating in any labor organization. Before the election was held, Local 886 took the position that the unfair labor practices of Quick Charge had intimidated the employees and that no fair election could be held and requested that certain notices be posted, the exact nature of which is not necessary to set out herein. The day before the election, Quick Charge was advised by members of Local 886 that it would not be bound by the results of the election on account of the alleged unfair practices of Quick Charge, and that it was forwarding to the Department of Labor at Washington, D. C., a notice of the existence of a dispute and its intention to strike after a thirty-day period, as required by the Smith-Connally Act.² Still insisting that the company had interfered and that therefore the outcome of the election did not fairly reflect the will of the employees, Local 886 continued its efforts to negotiate a contract with the company. Immediately after the election, the company was again notified by Local 886 of its protest against the company's conduct prior to the election. About a week thereafter, the operations of the company were temporarily suspended because of an alleged shortage of necessary parts. When the company resumed operations, it called some former employees back to work, but did not call back any employees who had previously joined Local 886. Thereafter, other employees were hired but these were not selected from the former employees but were new employees, none of whom belonged to Local 886 or to a labor union. The rehiring of the employees was in the discretion of Quick Charge's superintendent, Mr. Butler. He had previously attended organizational meetings of the Union at which certain employees of the company had signed application cards for admission to the Union and had made payments on their initiation fees. He testified that he had seen certain of the employees wearing A. F. of L. buttons on their caps.

On May 13, after waiting the thirty-day period provided by the Smith-Connally Act the former employees of Quick Charge, who were members of Local 886, picketed the plant and premises of Quick Charge. The picketing was entirely peaceful and there is no claim that the injunction in question was authorized because of violence or threats of destruction of property.

In addition to picketing the Quick Charge plant and premises, appellants also made representations to other concerns in the city and out of the city with whom Quick Charge had business relations and contacts, that under Local 886's agreements with such organizations, they had agreed not to cross picket lines and that if they did they would picket their places of business.

On June 20, 1946, Quick Charge filed its original petition for reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S.C.A. § 501 et seq. On that day, the petition was duly presented and approved by the court. A restraining order was entered containing the usual provisions found in such orders restraining and enjoining all creditors of the said debtor from instituting and prosecuting any suits or actions, at law or otherwise, against it and restraining the creditors and all persons, firms, corporations and associations, organized or unorganized, claiming and/or asserting any interest against the debtor, from interfering with said debtor in the possession, use and operation of its properties. Although the picketing was in full force at the time said order was issued, neither the individual appellants nor Local 886 were named in said order nor was a copy thereof served on them.

Thereafter, on the 24th day of September, 1946, an order was entered by the trial court directing appellants to show cause why they and each of them should not be adjudged guilty of civil contempt and fined therefor as prayed for in the application of Quick Charge for such an order. Appellants filed their response to the show cause order in the form of a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the application failed to state a claim against them upon which a citation for contempt might issue, predicated upon the following grounds:

1. That the order of the court of June 20, 1946, and the...